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INTRODUCTION
Although small claims courts have existed in various United
States jurisdictions only since the early twentieth century, procedures for adjudicating small claims in other countries have been
developing for centuries and have caused debate among legal theorists since the late 1800's. General agreement exists that the judicial
system should provide a realistic opportunity for the redress of all
grievances, whether large or small. Substantial problems have
arisen, however, in developing a system to achieve fair adjudication
of the small claim without expense, delay, or technicality. The need
for such a system is compelling. There are few Americans, whether
businessmen, employees, or professionals, who have not been confronted with faulty goods, fraudulent sales tactics, long-overdue
debts, or other dishonest, injurious acts that can make survival in
modern America an exercise in frustration. But for those citizens
who decide to file a lawsuit to obtain redress, however, the state
courts present a confusing array of courtrooms, complicated forms,
procedural technicalities, and even greater frustration. The obvious
answer to the problem is "get a lawyer," but when the claim is for
a small amount, the high cost of legal representation forces the
potential litigant to try to bury his frustration and forget about the
entire unhappy experience. This scenario need not occur, however.
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A small claims court in which the citizen may sue in his own behalf
can be a quick, inexpensive, and effective means of redress.
The purpose of this Special Project is to analyze the development of procedures for adjudicating small claims, with particular
emphasis on the State of Tennessee, and to suggest statutory revisions that may be of value in improving the quality of justice at the
lowest level of the judicial system. The Project study commences
with an historical survey of the origins of small claims theory and
the various court attempts to apply the theory that have been made
in the United States during the last half-century. The result of this
analysis will be a characterization of a model small claims court.
The development and operation of Tennessee procedures for adjudicating small claims will then be examined within the limits of this
characterization. Although Tennessee has no small claims court as
such, the general sessions courts have been the primary courts for
adjudicating claims for small amounts. The general sessions courts
will be evaluated to determine whether they presently function adequately as small claims courts. The last section of the Project will
comprise a study of the policies to be considered in drafting a small
claims statute. Although the model statute is designed in light of
the particular constitutional, statutory and political characteristics
of the Tennessee court system, it is hoped that by illuminating the
proper goals of small claims procedure and the various methods of
achieving those goals, this Project will be useful to other states in
reforming their small claims procedures.
PART ONE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL CLAIMS COURT
THEORY
I.

ORIGINS OF THE CONCILIATION CONCEPT

Conciliation efforts prior to trial have been utilized in other
nations as a major tool in settling small civil disputes quickly and
fairly. The Scandinavian judicial system, historically less concerned
with the stare decisis effect of prior recorded decisions than its English counterpart, was perhaps by nature more at ease with the idea
of requiring conciliation attempts as a prerequisite to formal court
procedures.' In 1797, Norway officially adopted a system of community conciliation tribunals 2 to provide an informal atmosphere in
1. Grevstaad, Courts of Conciliation,68 ATLANnc MoNmY 405 (1891).
2. The purpose of the community council in Norway was to increase the access of
citizens to a decisionmaker without requiring resort to formal court procedure. If the attempt
at conciliation was unsuccessful, appeal to the Norwegian district court was available. Orfield, Norwegian Law, 23 TAmP. L.Q. 257, 292-93 (1950).
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which claims could be pursued without the observation by litigants
of complex technical procedures or formal pleading rules.3 The
judges functioned as conciliators, and their duties included active
inquiry into the circumstances of each case and encouraging mutually agreeable settlement between the parties. Characterized as a
"forum of common sense unfettered by technicality," 4 the system
frequently accomplished inexpensive and speedy resolution of small
disputes. Similarly, Denmark established a nation-wide system of
conciliation courts in a 1795 statute.5 The Danish tribunals were
comprised of three appointed members, who mediated small civil
cases in private sessions.' The statute required the conciliation court
to consider any claim submitted within fourteen days, unless both
parties agreed to a continuance, and the conciliation procedure was
a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil suit in the district courts.7
Neither Norwegian nor Danish courts admitted evidence of unsuccessful conciliation attempts at a later trial. Both systems achieved
notable success and have remained substantially unchanged since
their inception. A 1920 study indicated that approximately eighty
percent of all small civil cases brought before the Norwegian and
Danish conciliation tribunals resulted in an agreed settlement.8
Although it has never expressly provided for conciliation courts
comparable to those existing in Scandinavia, German law developed a small claims procedure that afforded opportunity for conciliation through a simplified and informal trial. In Germany the judge
traditionally has been the preeminent figure at trial-actively inquiring into the facts and questioning the parties and witnesses
prior to decisionmaking1 For civil cases with an amount in controversy less than a set jurisdictional limit, the German District Court
developed a very informal procedure: no formal pleadings were required; no binding rules of evidence existed; the judge was free to
suggest solutions or remedies directly to the parties; and the judge
conducted the examination of witnesses.'" Because of the judge's
dual function as examiner and conciliator, he could guide the parties through the small claims suit and fashion relief appropriate to
3. Id. at 293.
4. Grevstaad, supra note 1, at 403-04.
5. See Ostenfeld, Danish Courts of Conciliation, 9 A.B.A.J. 747 (1923).
6. Id. at 748.
7. Smith, The Danish ConciliationSystem, 11 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 85, 89 (1927).
8. Harley, ConciliationIs Succeeding, 4 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 70, 72 (1920).
9. Pound, The Administrationof Justice in the Modem City, 26 HARV.L. REv. 302, 31819 (1913).
10. The German procedure is described in von Lewinski, Courts and Procedure in
Germany, 5 ILL. L. Rav. 193 (1910).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

each case." The simplicity of this procedure resulted, by 1900, in
almost half of the small claims cases brought in German district
courts being tried without counsel on either side, keeping the costs
of the actions at a minimum.'2
Thus, statutes in Denmark and Norway, and active German
courts using simplified procedures established forums in which conciliation of minor civil disputes was possible. The beneficial characteristics of these forums included fair and prompt consideration of
a litigant's claim although the potential monetary award was small,
an opportunity for settlement or adjudication without formal court
procedure, and minimal expense in maintaining the action.
IH.

THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM AS A PREDECESSOR
TO SMALL CLAIMS COURTS

England established the first statutory justice of the peace system in 1360,' 3 during its transition from a feudal society to a unified
monarchy. The functions of the justice of the peace included both
administrative and judicial duties, but jurisdiction over all civil
suits was vested in county courts." As the system matured, several
statutes increased the administrative duties of the justices, and
during the Tudor period justices assumed criminal jurisdiction over
certain actions for conversion of personal property and intentional
damage to real property.1 5 The justices were primarily the representatives of the crown for each community. While his authority came
from statutory grants, a justice's discretion in the performance of his
duties was subject to little direct control within his own territory.'6
Seldom educated in the law or the administration of justice, the
English justice was usually a local nobleman, and his office was
highly respected. 7 Justices were compensated by fees assessed
11.
12.
13.
14.

See Lauer, Test Conciliationin City Court, 8 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 175, 177 (1925).
Von Lewinski, supra note 10, at 195.
34 Edw. 3, c. 1.
A brief summary of the jurisdiction of the early English justice of the peace is found

in R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 7-8 (1940). The civil jurisdiction at the lower court level

in England was vested in a system of county courts that generally followed formalized procedure. I W. HoLDSwoRTH, IsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 192 (1926).
15. See Maudsley & Davies, The Justice of the Peace in England, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv.
517, 518-19 (1964). Although a "small claims court" was established in London as early as
1606-probably to relieve the city courts of the many civil actions brought by merchants-English justices of the peace never assumed similar jurisdiction. See D. GOULD, STAFF
REPORT ON THE SMALL CLAMS COURTS 3 (Nat'l Inst. Consumer Justice, Aug. 15, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as NICJ REPORT]; 34 COLUM. L. REV. 932, 933 n.7 (1934).
16. Unless restricted by a prerogative writ from a higher court, the English justice was
very much a "law unto himself." Maudsley & Davies, supra note 15, at 525.
17. The justices were appointed and were almost always members of the local gentry,
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against litigants, following the practice of the common law courts.18
The lack of legal training and the mode of compensation of justices
has led many legal historians to question both the competency of
the average justice and the efficacy of the system in general.'9 Although the English justice of the peace functioned primarily as a
lower level criminal judge and as an administrative official, his
place in Anglo-American legal history is important because it provided a model on which the American colonies based their justice
of the peace systems.
Familiar with the traditional role of the English justice of the
peace and faced with travel and communication problems that necessitated the establishment of some readily accessible authority
capable of resolving local disputes, many American colonies provided for justices of the peace. 21 In addition to the administrative
authority and minor criminal jurisdiction of his English counterpart, however, the American justice often had civil jurisdiction over
claims not exceeding a low monetary limit.2 ' Early in the colonial
period the Plymouth Colony provided for the annual selection of two
men in each community to settle local controversies involving
claims of three pounds or less, and in 1640 Massachusetts granted
its justices jurisdiction over all civil actions within a forty-shilling
jurisdictional limit.22 Thus, in America the justice of the peace became the adjudicator of minor civil disputes as well as an administrator and peacekeeper.
During the mid-nineteenth century the number of states with
justices of the peace increased, 23 and by 1915 forty-seven of fortyeight states provided for justices in their constitutions.2' While juscommanding community respect. Palmer, The Vestigial Justiceof the Peace, 47 A.B.A.J. 380,
384 (1961).
18. The fee system has long been criticized. Maitland wrote, "A great deal of our legal
history is to be explained by the fact that for centuries the judges were paid by fees; more
business therefore meant more money and they had a keen interest in attracting litigants to
their courts." F. MArrLAND, CONsTrruTIoNAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 135 (1908).
19. Most of the criticism of the English justices centered on either a dislike for the
amount of ministerial and administrative power they wielded, or abuses of discretion encountered in experiences with particular justices. Several examples appear in Palmer, supra note
17, at 380-83.
20. In colonial America the justice could act as a true conciliator; the objective was to
"decentralize the administration of justice so as to bring justice to every man in a sparsely
settled community." Pound, supra note 9, at 307.
21. 1 Plymouth Colony Records, cited in R. POUND, supra note 14, at 32.
22. Later state constitutions sometimes incorporated specific details of justice's duties
within the constitution itself. In this regard see the discussion of the West Virginia Constitution in Silverstein, Small Claims Courts versus Justices of the Peace,58 W. VA. L. Rav. 241,
246-47 (1956).
23. INsTITuTE OF JUDIciAL ADMINISTRATION, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE TODAY 1 (1965).
24. See id. at 16, and tables following thereafter.
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tice of the peace systems varied with respect to civil jurisdictional
limit, tenure of justices, and means of selection, the basic function
of the American justice was uniform: he performed various administrative and ministerial duties; he sat as a criminal judge over traffic
and other misdemeanor cases; and he was charged with the responsibility of deciding small civil cases at the local level. The fee system
remained his primary source of compensation.2 The geographical
limitations of a justice's power and the general impracticality of
appealing the types of cases he decided meant that little control was
exercised over the wide-ranging discretion he enjoyed in the per2
formance of his statutory functions. 1
With the approach of the twentieth century, criticism of existing American justice of the peace systems greatly increased. Although justices appeared to function best in rural areas where their
stature as preeminent local authorities helped override the effects
of occasional legal errors in decisionmaking, 2 the number of justices
in towns and cities increased greatly as urban populations grew. As
a result, many justices found themselves competing for business
with municipal officials. 28 These officials often were authorized to
perform administrative and ministerial duties that had previously
been in the domain of the justices, and municipal criminal courts
were created to handle misdemeanor cases. 29 More importantly, the
denser population in cities resulted in an increased number of small
civil claims concentrated in the same area. The shortcomings of
systems that relied on individual justices thus became much more
visible and highly publicized. Untrained in the substantive law,
many justices simply did not satisfactorily perform their civil adjudicatory function. Therefore, the prospective litigant with legally
valid claims or defenses could not be confident that they would be
understood and applied," and a growing public distrust of the institution of justice of the peace resulted. Furthermore, the fee system
25. The various fee schemes developed in American jurisdictions are reviewed and a
statutory reference table is provided in id. at 16, and tables following thereafter.
26. Vanlandingham, The Decline of the Justice of the Peace, 12 KAN. L. REv. 389, 392
(1964).
27. For example, as West Virginia developed, many authorized justice positions in
urban areas simply became vacant due to the lack of interested candidates. Silverstein, supra
note 22, at 242.
28. The duplication of authority occurred because although municipalities generally
were empowered to establish city courts and administrative offices by statute, the justices of
the peace usually were constitutionally authorized, and thus could be abolished or modified
only by a state constitutional amendment.
29. See SMALL CLAIMs STUDY GROUP, CENTzR FOR AUTO SAFETY, LrrnrL INJusTICEs: SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS AND THE AMERIcAN CONSUMER 29 (Mar. 1972) [hereinafter cited as NADER
STUDY].
30. See Scott, Small Causes and Poor Litigants, 9 A.B.A.J. 457 (1923).
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of compensation exposed justices to charges that they rendered
judgments in favor of claimants simply to insure the continued
receipt of the claimants' "business" in the future.3 1 Indeed, the fee
system bore the brunt of the most intense criticism-many alleged
that "J.P." meant "Judgment for the Plaintiff."" In fact, many
justices compensated on the fee system did compile records3 showing
an unusually high number of judgments for the plaintiff.1
The problems noted above led to greater public distrust of justices, and dissatisfaction with the institution in general. Because of
his authority to decide civil cases without legal training, the duplication of his duties by municipal officials, and charges of favoritism,
the American justice of the peace was attacked and ridiculed. 4 The
demand for judicial reform increased as existing systems failed to
change in any material respect during the early twentieth century.
III.

THE

DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL CLAIMS COURTS

IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

Early Small Claims Courts
5

In a 1913 article Roscoe Pound proposed a revision in state
procedures for processing the tremendous volume of small claims.
He argued that citizens who seldom came into direct contact with
the formal judicial structure needed access to a system that would
equitably resolve small civil actions with a minimum of formality
and expense. As a solution, Pound suggested a forum in which the
judge assumed an expanded inquisitorial role, the clerk aided litigants in filing simple, common-sense complaint forms, and litigants
proceeded pro se in an informal atmosphere encouraging mediation
or conciliation, resulting in quick and inexpensive justice. In 1924
31. Sunderland, A Study of the Justices of the Peace and OtherMinor Courts, 21 CONN.
B.J. 300, 332 (1947).
32. R. H. SMrH, JusTIc AND THE POOR 42 (3d ed. 1924).
33. A study in 6 Michigan counties over a 2-year period during 1929-1931 showed that
of 933 civil judgments rendered by 16 justices of the peace, 926 (99.2%) were for the plaintiff.
Over the same time period in the same counties, plaintiffs were successful in only 65% of
county court civil cases. 4th Ann. Rep. Jud. Council of Mich. 170 (1934), cited in Sunderland,
supra note 31, at 333. The Tennessee justices of the peace exhibited a similar statistical
favoritism for plaintiffs. See note 101 infra and accompanying text.
34. See R.H. SMrrH, supra note 32, at 42-43; Virginia abolished its justice of the peace
system in 1942. VA. CODE §§ 4987 a-p (1942).
35. Pound suggested that there were several major deficiencies in the then-existing
American judicial system. One of the needs he saw was to "make adequate provision for petty
litigation in communities where there is a huge volume of such litigation which must be dealt
with adequately on pain of grievous denial of justice." Pound, supra note 9, at 310. He found
no justification for formalized court procedure with retained counsel and all the attendant
expense in small claims cases, where the potential recovery could hardly pay for the process.
Id. at 319.
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another proponent of reform, Reginald Heber Smith, examined the
legal problems of the urban poor, including apartment dwellers who
encountered difficulties with landlords and creditors, and employees who had valid complaints against employers able to hire
and fire at will.3 6 To deal with these problems, he asserted the need
for an alternative forum in which the "poor" litigant could afford
to seek relief. Other proponents of reform of small claims procedure
favored the incorporation of conciliatory principles within the existing court structure rather than3 the establishment of a separate court
to handle small claims alone. 1
Soon after the publication of Pound's article in 1913, the Cleveland municipal court established by rule of court a conciliation
8
branch that was, in effect, a specialized court for small claims. In
the Cleveland system no compulsory process existed; the judge held
sessions in private, and he had the duty to mediate whenever possible. The primary objectives of this court were to provide a forum for
claims of less than thirty-five dollars, to reach a mutually agreeable
settlement of the claim, to unclog the municipal court system
through removal of small claims from other dockets, and to encourage judicial settlement of small claims through provision of an attractive forum.3 9 Heavily used by residents soon after its inception,
the Cleveland conciliation branch was adjudged a success by observers and provided the impetus for the enactment of similar systems in other jurisdictions. °
Instead of establishing a small claims forum by rule of court,
Kansas provided by statute in 1913 for "small debtor's courts" in
its three most heavily populated cities.41 Although designated as
debtor's courts, the Kansas forums were designed to process small
civil claims through conciliation procedures similar to those utilized
in Cleveland. Although the statutory creation of small claims courts
lacked the flexibility of establishment by rule of court, it had the
benefit of a direct legislative stamp of approval.4 2 Using this statu36. R. H. SMiTh, supra note 32, at 15-16.
37. E.g., Randall, Conciliationas a Function of Judge, 18 Ky. L. REv. 300 (1930).
38. The Chicago municipal court had established a simplified procedure for civil actions as early as 1906, but did not develop a specialized small claims division until 1916. R.
POUND, supra note 14, at 266; Informal Procedurein Chicago, 2 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 23 (1918).
39. The first Chief Justice of the Cleveland municipal court described the court's procedure in Dempsey, Conciliationin the City of Cleveland, 9 A.B.A.J. 749, 750 (1923).
40. See Levine, ConciliationCourt of Cleveland 2 AM. JuD. Soc'Y 10 (1918); Smith,
Small Claims Court for Massachusetts, 4 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 51 (1920).
41. Northrop, Small Claims Courts and ConciliationTribunals:A Bibliography,33 L.
Lm. J. 39, 40 (1940); see also Oglesby & Carr, The Small Claims Courts in Texas, 3 KAN. L.
REv. 238 & n.1 (1955) (concerning primarily the Kansas courts).
42. Statutorily enacted courts may be easily expanded, for the state legislatures have
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tory method, Oregon became in 1920 the first jurisdiction to. extend
43
its small claims procedure to every county.
The early small claims courts in America appear to have been
based primarily on the policy objectives favored by Pound. These
court systems incorporated aspects of conciliatory procedures from
the Scandinavian systems and were intended to increase public
confidence in the overall judicial system by providing a forum in
which litigation would proceed quickly to a just conclusion although
the amount in controversy was small.
Smith's arguments on behalf of the "poor" litigant, which are
reflected in many early small claims court proposals,44 remain important because they focus on one of the most troublesome issues
in the area: whether a system should be designed primarily to protect a "poor" class of prospective claimants -or to resolve efficiently
a particular type of claim. The problem of defining the term "poor
litigant" in a modem context clouds the issue. Arguably, today's
lower middle-class citizens are more comparable to the "poor" of
the past than are the indigent, who have access to improved legal
services in many communities. The wage earner who maintains a
moderate standard of living may not be able to afford an attorney
for a small claim,4 5 yet he cannot qualify as an indigent in order to
receive subsidized legal advice or representation.46 While advocates
of judicial reform for the indigent are generally concerned with a
broad spectrum of alleged inequalities, 4 the problem of small claims
procedure is necessarily more narrow in scope. However, the class
of citizens who may be benefited by an efficient and affordable
small claims procedure is large. Plaintiffs far above the poverty level
can hardly afford to expend more money in the prosecution of a
claim than the potential recovery involved. Therefore notwithstandconstitutional authority to create inferior courts as necessary. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. 6,
§ 1.
43. ORE. CODE ANN.§§ 28-1401 to -1414.
44. See, e.g., Maguir'e, Poverty and Civil Litigation,36 HARD. L. RED.361 (1923); Nims,
Poor Man's Court, 96 FORUM 21 (July 1936).
45. See Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claims Courts in California,21 STAN. L. RE. 1657 & n.3 (1969).
46. Smith was very concerned with expanding free legal services for the indigent when
such services were not generally available. See R.H. SmTH, supra note 32, at xv-xvi. Legal
aid's improvement over the years also changes the context of the term "poor" litigant. In an
interview conducted in preparation for this Project, the President of the Nashville Bar Association expressed the view that in the modern legal context the most disadvantaged citizen
is the worker who cannot qualify for free legal aid but also cannot afford present legal rates,
Interview with John J. Hollins, President of the Nashville Bar Association, in Nashville,
Tennessee, Nov. 21, 1974.
47. Clearly legal problems of the indigent are broader than the small claims procedure
issue alone. See D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967).
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ing the valid concern expressed by Smith for the legal problems of
the poor, concentration on development of small claims courts to
dispose efficiently of minor civil actions regardless of the economic
stratum of the claimant will best effectuate the primary objective
of making the judicial system responsive to the needs of citizens. 8
B.

The Years of Development-1920 to 1955

The initial success and praise of early small claims courts led
to the enactment of similar legislation in other states, and by 1955,
twenty-eight jurisdictions had adopted some type of specialized
small claims procedure.49 At first, states tended to initiate small
claims procedures solely in major cities through the establishment
of conciliation branches by rule of court,5" but later a trend toward
state-wide enactment of small claims procedures emerged." Although these procedures were essentially similar, systems differed
from state to state primarily in the areas of jurisdictional limit,
method of judge selection, and venue requirements. 52 A few jurisdictions expressly barred attorneys from small claims courts, but in
most states attorneys were neither barred nor required. 3
The objectives of the various small claims statutes and rules
were articulated differently from state to state. Some appeared simply to follow the procedural details of statutes passed in other jurisdictions without clearly specifying the underlying policies involved. 4 This statutory ambiguity coupled with basic disagreement
on the proper purpose of small claims courts among proponents of
judicial reform made it difficult for those working within the new
systems to effectuate any particular policy goals. By contrast, other
jurisdictions had well-articulated objectives. For example, in the act
48. For a more complete characterization of a model small claims court system see Part
One, § IV infra.
49. INSTITUTE OF JunmcuL ADMINISTRATION, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS INTHE UNITED STATES
3 (1955) [hereinafter cited as IJA STUDY].
50. Of the earliest small claims court systems, those of Cleveland, Chicago, New York
City, and Philadelphia were all created by rule of court. Northrop, supra note 41, at 40.
51. Between 1925 and 1935, 8 jurisdictions adopted specialized small claims procedure
by statute. Id. at 40-41.
52. A comparison of current state small claims courts appears in Forbes, What the
Legal Community Needs to Know about the Small Claims Court, 6 CREIGHTON L. REv. 317,
336 (1973).
53. California and Nebraska are among jurisdictions that bar attorneys from small
claims court, unless the attorney is suing in his own behalf. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §l17y (West
1954); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-523(2) (Cum. Supp. 1972). See notes 301-31 infra and accompany.
ing text.
54. The Texas statute contains a brief statement of objectives, TEx. Rxv. Cirv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2460a, § 7 (1971), while the New Mexico statute contains no such statement. N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16-5-1 et se'q. (1970).
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creating a small claims court for the District of Columbia, Congress
clearly stated the policies and goals behind the act. A primary goal
was the promotion of public confidence in the American judicial
system through initiation of a workable small claims procedure.
Since the average citizen would be more likely to have contact with
the judicial process in such a forum, Congress believed that a positive contact in a small claims court would increase the litigant's
confidence in the administration of justice in general. 5
Although the movement to create new small claims court systems began to taper off in the early 1950's, empirical studies continued to yield highly favorable reports.5 7 The systems generally handled larger numbers of small claims more quickly than state courts
of general jurisdiction, and litigation costs were lower because of
reduced filing fees and service of process by registered mail. The
studies characterized the systems as an efficient alternative to the
processing of small claims by justices of the peace or more formal
courts.58
C.

Growing Problems within Small Claims Court Systems

Recent criticism of small claims court procedures has indicated
that these systems have frequently failed to meet the growing needs
of American society. Since 1950 the rapid increase in the sales of
consumer goods has led to a heavy docket of small collection claims
and, similarly, claims against sellers and manufacturers for defective products or fraudulent sales practices. 59 Since small claims
courts could bear the brunt of this judicial workload, the failure of
small claims systems to provide a forum in which debts may be
fairly adjudicated and in which consumers can obtain redress has
indicated a need for revision."0 Indeed, one of the most frequently
55. 52 Stat. 103, ch. 43 (1938).
56. The unanimous committee stated in its final report:
The purpose of the bill is to improve the administration of justice in small civil cases
and make the service of the municipal court more easily available to all of the people
whether of large or small means; to simplify practice and procedure in the commencement, handling and trial of such cases; to eliminate delay and reduce costs; to provide
for the installment payment of judgments; and generally to promote the confidence of
the public in the courts through the provisions of a friendly forum for disputes, small in
amount but important to the public.
Hearings on S. 1835 Before the Districtof Columbia Comm. of the Senate, 75th Cong., 1st
Seas. (1937).
57. See the discussion of the data compiled on the Hartford, Connecticut courts in IJA
STUDY

at 49.

58.
1 (Supp.
59.
60.

INSTITUTE OF JuDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES

1959) [hereinafter cited as IJA SUPPLEMENT].
Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 746 (1967).
NICJ REPoRT, supra note 15, at 10.
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stated criticisms is that through misuse, disuse, and lack of interest

they have become "forgotten" courts. 1 In many jurisdictions few
individuals use the court; thus, the systems often cater to one class
of litigant, the general creditor, who is represented by a retained
collection agency or collections lawyer.2 Recent studies of some
American small claims courts have shown that the proportion of
cases initiated by organizations against individuals is much larger
than those brought by individuals against organizations or against
other individuals. 3 Commentators in California have characterized
their small claims courts as servants of institutional plaintiffs: government agencies, corporations, and proprietorships. 4 Interviews in
California indicated that those individuals who did elect to use the
small claims court were "almost entirely middle-class and well educated." 5 Moreover, a national study of the institutional plaintiff
situation indicates that in jurisdictions with no statutory curbs on
recurring plaintiffs, business claimants tend generally to take over
the systems. The recurrent plaintiff has some advantage simply
because his frequent presence in small claims court gives him a
familiarity with the stratagems and tactics most successful with the
individual judge." When collections cases dominate the court, individual claimants often appear to be squeezed out, and the court
functions primarily as a tool of the business community.8 Further,
courts in which the individual defendant constantly defaults and
the consumer plaintiff seldom brings suit fail to perform adequately
their potential consumer-protection role, and if the small claims
court is to be the primary vehicle for redress of grievances involving
61. See Murphy, D. C. Small Claims Courts-The Forgotten Court, 34 D.C.B.J. 14
(Feb. 1967). The 1972 Florida court reform provides an excellent example of a possible result
of this problem. Prior to this general overhaul of the Florida judicial system, small claims in
each county were heard by specialized judges who decided only small civil cases. Under the
1972 statute, this system was abolished; the county courts of general jurisdiction, with their
attendant formal structure and tradition of representation by attorneys, now have jurisdiction
to decide all small civil disputes. See Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 42 (1962), repealed, [1972] Fla.
Laws, ch. 72-404, § 30, (effective Jan. 1, 1973).
62. NICJ RioaRT, supra note 15, at 182; NADER STUDY, supra note 29, at 32; Klein,
Buyer vs. Seller in Small Claims Court, 36 CONsUMER REP. 624 (Oct. 1971).
63. NICJ REPoRT, supra note 15, at App. A-E.
64. 4 STAN. L. Rxv. 237, 238 (1952).
65. Persecutionand Intimidation,supra note 45, at 1662.
66. Some jurisdictions have experimented with restrictions on recurring plaintiffs, for
example, allowing a named individual or company to sue in the small claims court only a
certain number of times per month or year. IJA STUDY, supra note 49, at 2, 7 & 10. The Texas
statute bars from the small claims courts altogether all collection agencies and organizations
that lend money as a secondary business. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 2460a, § 2 (1971).
See text accompanying notes 296-99 infra.
67. See note 285 infra and accompanying text.
68. Forbes, supra note 52, at 332-33.
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small monetary sums, it must be used to process consumer claims. "
A related criticism of modem small claims courts is that the
ostensible beneficiary of the system, the community, seldom receives adequate information about the procedures for suing or defending suits in these courts. 7 A small claims court cannot be justified unless it is used, and when individuals lack information about
the court, and therefore do not use it, the proper objectives of the
system are frustrated. When the courts are inadequately publicized
in the community, those well versed in the established procedures
for debt collections-business claimants and collection agen71
cies-will naturally tend to predominate.
One further criticism of modern small claims procedure in
many states is that the costs of suing even in the small claims court
have become so high that initiation of an action is often impracticable. In addition to the fee for service of process, 72 the filing fee and
other related costs may discourage the individual who believes he
has a valid claim but is not absolutely sure of the substantive law.
Especially onerous to the individual claimant is the cost of retaining
counsel to prosecute the small claim, 73 and in those jurisdictions
that allow lawyers in the small claims courts it is often a custom, if
not a requirement, that the plaintiff or defendant be represented by
an attorney. 7 Although the small amounts typically in controversy
in small claims court would apparently discourage the use of counsel, some businesses may have a sufficient volume of claims to justify the expense. Thus, an individual, who cannot afford an attorney
for his small claim, may be placed in the disadvantageous position
of either having to face a collection attorney or defaulting. As a
result, the number of defaults by individual defendants in small
69. See Note, Due Process Denied: Consumer Default Judgments in New York City,
10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 370 (1974).
70. See Appendix B infra. For an extended discussion of the need for better small claims
court publicity and an example of an attempt to provide information in a book containing
general instructions on pro se tactics in small claims courts, see D. MATrHxws, Su THr
B*sT*RDs, THE VIciM's HANDBOOK (1973).
71. Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for
Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH.L. Rzv. 357, 360 (1972).
72. While many jurisdictions do presently provide for service by registered mail in small

claims court actions, some states continue to require personal service as part of their small
claims procedure. E.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 46.445 (1974).
73.

For example, the Nebraska Bar Association in a recent advisory statement on mini-

mum fee schedules suggested that an attorney charge at least $100 for filing a petition and
$25 to $35 per hour for services. Forbes, supra note 52, at 317. In an interview a Nashville
attorney who does some collections work stated that he often simply turned down prospective
litigants of small claims because even if the action would end in a favorable judgment, the
legal fees and court costs would consume all of the money due under the judgment. Interview
with Jude Lenahan, in Nashville, Tennessee, Nov. 11, 1974.
74. See NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 206.
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claims court has been high, and the number of individual plaintiffs
has remained low. 75 While many jurisdictions have done little to
remedy the growing problems in small claims courts, in part due to
an apparent lack of interest by the organized bar in judicial reform
at the lower level, 7 a few systems have been significantly altered in
an effort to revitalize the procedures and utility of these courts.
D.

The Movement to Reform Small Claims Courts

In an attempt to meet the demand for more effective consumer
protection and to eliminate the defects that have turned some small
claims courts into collection agencies, a few jurisdictions have revised their small claims procedures. The New York City small
claims courts are an excellent example of positive reform that has
enabled the consumer with a small claim to obtain relief quickly
and with minimal technicality and expense. The city established
five small claims districts, which utilize simplified procedures and
encourage but do not require litigants to proceed pro se.77 Claims of
a specialized nature, such as eviction proceedings by landlords, are
heard separately; the small claims courts concentrate on small civil
disputes between local residents for monetary relief. 7 The judges
are required to take an active role in these trial-hearings, and to
question the parties closely to draw out any facts that might otherwise remain undiscovered. 7 The court clerks aid prospective litigants in writing complaints or answers and assist in filing other
necessary forms, thereby reducing the number of defaults. If a defendant does not appear, the judge may nevertheless refuse to enter
a default judgment unless the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case." The New York City scheme seeks to provide true "coin75. See Klein, supra note 60; 52 CALIF. L. REv. 876, 884 (1964) (in Almeda County,
California, almost 70% of actions were filed by business or government interests); 4 STAN. L.
RPv. 237 (1952).

76. Although the criticism is not new, it does appear that much of the interest in reform
of small claims procedure evidenced by the organized bar in the early twentieth century has
dwindled. Compare 8 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 186 (1925) with NADER STUDY,supra note 29, at 38.
77. The New York City small claims procedure is outlined in detail in Driscoll, De
Minimis Curat Lex: Small Claims Courts in New York City, 2 FoRDHAm URBAN L.J. 479

(1974).
78.

The New York small claims districts give money judgments only, and therefore

eviction suits cannot be brought in these courts. This aspect of the courts has been criticized.
Id. at 490.
79. NICJ REPORT, App. H., supra note 15, at 680.

80. It should be noted that when the judge requires the plaintiff to present at least some
evidence of a potentially valid claim, even when the defendant does not appear, the small
claims courts will not be used to recover claims without preparation of a case or upon illusory
charges. See NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 141; 1 PEPPERmNE L. REv. 71, 79 (1973). See also
Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 299.22(3) (Supp. 1974).
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munity courts" in which the residents will feel comfortable in appearing and confident of fair treatment." The system is well publicized and the reaction of the community has been strong; the courts
82
are heavily used.
Other jurisdictions also have reacted to current problems in the
small claims field. Nebraska has enacted a state-wide reform of its
small claims procedure.8 3 Attorneys are now barred from the Nebraska system unless they appear in their own behalf; publicity
about the availability of the small claims courts has increased, and
claims are quickly processed.8 4 In addition, the Philadelphia municipal court has expanded the traditional roles of the judge and clerk
by providing a forum in which pro se proceedings are possible with
aid available from the court's staff.85 The Philadelphia system utilizes evening sessions to draw an increased number of individual
consumer plaintiffs, who otherwise might have to miss a full day's
work on the scheduled court day.8" In light of these positive responses to recent shortcomings in small claims procedure, other jurisdictions having less effective small claims courts or no specialized
small claims courts at all should be able to improve their judicial
administration by utilizing these innovative procedural techniques.
In this way, the presently needed reform of small claims procedures
may be advantageously accomplished.
IV.

CHARACTERIZATION OF A MODEL SMALL CLAIMS COURT SYSTEM

With the increased volume of consumer claims for small
amounts and the rise in costs of litigation, efficient small claims
courts are needed more urgently today than in 1913.87 If the adminis81. De Minimis, supra note 77.
82. New York is one of several jurisdictions that has prepared "how to sue" booklets
for distribution to the general public; coupled with media notice, this information should
operate to reduce the publicity problem that small claims courts encounter. See Appendix B
infra; DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, NEW YORK CITY, How TO SuE IN SMALL CLAIMs
COURT AND How To CouEr A JUDGMENT (1974).

83. See Forbes, supra note 52, at 317-18.
84. Id. at 321.
85. For a detailed study of the Philadelphia municipal court's small claims procedure
and achievements, see Steaumann & Rosenstein, "Small Claims" ConsumerPlaintiffsin the
PhiladelphiaMunicipal Court: An Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1309 (1973).
86. The experience in Philadelphia demonstrates at least some correlation between
night sessions and the number of individual consumer defendants and plaintiffs utilizing the
small claims procedure. Id. at 1321.
87. A British study of American small claims courts has reached a similar conclusion.

While criticism was directed generally at the inefficient procedures existing in many states,
the report was optimistic in terms of the potential of small claims courts to provide needed
access to the judicial system for the small claimant, and to do so with a minimum of expense
and delay. CONSUMER COUNCIL, JUSTICE OUT OF REACH: A CASE FOR SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
(1970).
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tration of justice is truly to provide an opportunity for the redress
of all grievances, the prospective litigant with a valid but small
claim must have access to an inexpensive alternative to formal court
procedures.
A.

Simplified Procedure in an Informal Forum
with a Low JurisdictionalLimit

In a small claims court formality is not necessary to preserve
the solemnity of courtroom proceedings; the value of a small claims
court depends on efficient and fair adjudication of the actions that
are brought. The nature of the small claim requires a simple procedure for efficiently initiating and conducting the suit before a judge
sitting alone. This sort of speedy and informal forum will draw more
prospective litigants into court. Additionally, the jurisdictional
limit of the court should be low, in order to ensure that the court is
a forum for small claims only, and to guard against the procedural
formality that accompanies actions for large amounts.
B.

Application of ConciliationPrinciples

Principles of conciliation should be incorporated into the small
claims court. The judge should actively inquire into the circumstances of the particular case, drawing out the facts that might otherwise
be overlooked. The court should encourage settlements between the
parties when a compromise appears possible. Small claims cases
generally do not involve important legal points, and the key objective is to provide a forum in which the parties may pursue their case
to a fair conclusion. Thus, successful conciliation efforts will result
in both parties being satisfied that they have been treated fairly.
Cases should be resolved as quickly as possible, and experience has
demonstrated that many small civil disputes can be resolved simply
by providing an opportunity for the adverse parties to meet and
agree on a settlement.
C.

Opportunity for Individuals to Appear Pro Se

The staff of the small claims court should stand ready to assist
prospective plaintiffs and defendants with their claims and defenses. The parties must not feel that it is necessary to be represented
by counsel in order to succeed in the small claims court. Informational manuals that explain the procedures of the court and the
steps required in bringing or defending a suit should be available
and distributed in the community. These efforts to facilitate a resident's proceeding in his own behalf will help the court become a true
"community court" in the mind of the public.

SMALL CLAIMS COURTS

1975]

D.

Minimization of Expense; Attorneys Banned

If the small claims court is to function properly, it must provide
use by individuals with small claims; they must be able
practical
for
to initiate an action and proceed without excessive expense. Legal
representation in small claims courts brings about a distinct imbalance: individuals simply cannot afford a lawyer for their small
claim, but institutional plaintiffs and defendants can. Therefore, in
a small claims court that allows attorneys the parties often start on
an unequal footing, and as a consequence individuals may not utilize the court. Thus, attorneys should be barred from small claims
courts unless they are representing themselves or testifying as
witnesses. This rule eliminates the problem of balancing the relative
costs of an attorney against the potential recovery. In any case,
other characteristics of the court should render legal counsel unnecessary. Service of process by registered mail must be the primary
method utilized in small claims actions; personal service escalates
costs and delays docketing. Finally, every effort should be made to
keep the filing fee as low as possible, and in forma pauperispetitions
should be permitted.
E. Adequate Publicity for the Small Claims Court
Once established, the small claims court cannot be justified
unless it is used. Therefore adequate publicity beyond the mere
availability of information must be directed toward the community.
Public service announcements in the media should focus community attention on the system, and prepared information should
then be distributed either generally or upon request.
F.

Statutory Enactment

Statutory enactment of small claims procedures is the preferred
method of creating a small claims court. A direct legislative authorization articulates the policy objectives of the small claims court and
lends visible support to the system at the outset, thus giving the
small claims court an opportunity to demonstrate its advantages to
the community.
A small claims court with these characteristics can become a
highly useful and efficient branch of the judicial system. The specific reforms necessary are not difficult to accomplish but require an
affirmative effort. The culmination of this project, a model small
claims court statute for Tennessee, is a recommended response to
the need for specific reforms.
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PART TWO
DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF THE
TENNESSEE GENERAL SESSIONS COURTS
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Establishmentof the Justice of the Peace System
Many of the legal institutions of Britain, as well as the common
law, have been reproduced faithfully in American jurisdictions since
the earliest colonial settlements. Tennessee shares this English judicial heritage, particularly in its local governmental institutions. The
early settlers of the Carolina colony, of which Tennessee was an
unexplored western appendage, transplanted from England the office of the justice of the peace in an attempt to maintain order in the
wilderness."8 Adopted in 1776, North Carolina's first constitution
provided that each county should have justices of the peace who
were recommended by the general assembly and commissioned for
life by the governor. 9 The specific judicial powers of these officers
were left to legislative determination. Justices were soon appointed
for the Tennessee area, then known as Washington County, North
Carolina. The first justices of the peace for Washington County met
initially in 1778 and included men like John Sevier and James Robertson, who later played major roles in the state's development."0
Because of the isolation of settlements, the justices of the peace in
frontier counties had to assume broad governmental powers to keep
internal discord at a minimum in those remote communities. Thus,
in addition to legislative and military duties, the justices' powers
included settling petty controversies, deciding land disputes, providing for widows and orphans, and hearing criminal cases. The
justices were leaders in public affairs on the frontier and were able
conciliators of local disagreements. 9'
When Tennessee was admitted to the Union in 1796, the state's
first constitution affirmed the position and authority of the justices
of the peace.92 Although originally filled by appointment by the
88. The justice of the peace was regarded as an integral part of the English common
law system. The legislature of North Carolina expressly provided that the common law
remained in full force and effect to the extent possible in the New World. Ch. 31, § 6, [1715]

N.C. Acts.
89. N.C. CONST. § 33 (1776).
90. See Ewing, Justice of the Peace-Bedrockof Democracy, 21 TENN. L. REv. 484, 493
(1950) (containing an historical account of the development of the justice of the peace system
in England, North Carolina, and Tennessee). John Sevier was the first governor of Tennessee,
serving 6 terms, and James Robertson is known as the "Father of Middle Tennessee."
91. See id. at 494-96.
92. TENN. CONST. arts. 5, § 12 & 6, § 1 (1796).
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general assembly, the office was made elective by the constitution
of 1834.13 Since the office is prescribed by the constitution, it has not
been subject to legislative abolition, although the extent of its powers has been determined by the legislature. 4
B.

Expansion of the Justice of the Peace System

Throughout the nineteenth century, the basic structure of Tennessee local government continued with few modifications, and the
justice of the peace remained a central legislative and judicial figure. In their legislative capacity the justices of the peace collectively
constituted the "Quarterly County Court" of each Tennessee
county. 5 The quarterly court functioned as the law-making body of
the county, with the important duties of appropriating funds for
operation of the local government and setting the property tax rate.
Though termed a "court" and presided over by the county judge,
the quarterly court exercised no judicial power.96
In addition to their legislative functions, the justices of the
peace individually functioned as local judges and exercised limited
original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases in the counties. Indeed, the judicial role of the justices was perhaps more important
than their legislative role in the predominately agricultural society
of Tennessee in the 1800's. Representing a district with only a few
hundred inhabitants, the justice of the peace was always wellacquainted with the events in his neighborhood. The typical justice
would often compromise or settle his neighbors' disputes at the
crossroads country store, or on his front porch, or while working in
his cotton or tobacco field. The office was regarded as one of great
public trust, and the justice frequently would charge neither party
with fees. Thus, though the position was not lucrative, the justice
was generally a man of respect in the community, often a country
93.
94.

TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (1834).
The supreme court held in an early case that the jurisdiction of judicial officers,

including justices of the peace, falls within the discretion of the legislature. State v. Turk, 8
Tenn. 287 (1827). Yet the extent to which the judicial power of the justices of the peace could
be withdrawn was not finally settled until 1937. See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
95. Each county is divided into as many as 25 civil districts, each of which elects at

least 2 justices of the peace. The county seat and incorporated towns are allotted additional
justices. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (1870). Many rural areas traditionally have had fewer than
100 voters per justice. This method of representation has been altered somewhat in recent
years by reapportionment along one-man, one-vote lines. The justices may be elected on a
partisan or nonpartisan basis, depending upon the tradition in each county.
96. Neither is the principal function of the county judge judicial. He is regarded as the
head of county government and acts as its administrative and fiscal officer. County judges
do have jurisdiction in probate and juvenile cases unless it has been removed by private act.
Some counties have a county chairman instead of a county judge.
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merchant or leading farmer, and always readily available to dispense his notions of fairness in local disputes. Although the justice
almost never had any formal legal training, he was aware of the
community mores and the temperament of his neighbors, and he
usually could settle disputes with finality.97 By the turn of the century, the legislature had given the justices of the peace jurisdiction
over contract and tort cases up to 500 dollars and over cases involving negotiable instruments up to 1,000 dollars. It also provided for
justice of the peace jurisdiction in detainer suits and other minor
actions.98 Hence, the role of the justice was deeply embedded in the
fabric of county government in Tennessee.
C. The Movement for Reform in Tennessee
Unfortunately, by the early 1900's, the justice of the peace system in Tennessee had developed most of the generally recognized
abuses found on a nation-wide scale.99 As the state became increasingly urbanized and travel to the county seats became easier in rural
areas, many of the justices ceased their home-community function
as conciliator among neighbors. A significant number established
offices in the larger county seats and in the expanding cities. In the
cities some justices of the peace devoted their full time to the office,
which became a lucrative one because compensation was based on
the fee system. Since a large volume of cases insured substantial
fees, some justices subtly solicited business, and the resulting competition for cases was often flagrant. Justices were paid a fee that
was charged to the losing party, and each justice knew he would
receive no more business from those plaintiffs who did not win in
his court.'0 Consequently, defendants were seldom successful in
justice of the peace courts. A random survey in 1933 found that 96.8
percent of the cases in Davidson County (Nashville) and 96.7 percent of the cases in eight rural counties of middle Tennessee ended
in judgments for the plaintiff. Shelby County (Memphis) set the
record, with 99.4 percent of the cases decided for the plaintiff.'," A
large volume of cases made the office extremely lucrative; as one
observer remarked, "[s]ome of the justices of the peace in Tennes97. See Simpson, Constitutionalityof the Fee System of Justices of the Peace, 14 TENN.
L. REv. 565, 566 (1937).
98. Tenn. Code Ann. § 5935 (Shannon 1896).
99. See notes 27-33 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Simpson, supra note 97, at 567, 570, 572-73.
101. The middle Tennessee counties surveyed were Bedford, Cannon, Coffee, Marshall,
Maury, Rutherford, Williamson, and Wilson. The survey examined all civil cases docketed
in these counties and the 4 urban counties in January, April, July, and October of 1933.
Howard, The Justice of the Peace System in Tennessee, 13 TENN. L. Rxv. 19, 22-25 (1934).
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see have been known to earn more than the Chief Justice of our
Supreme Court.

'11 2

As a result, the default rate in justice of the

peace courts was extremely high-estimated at 75-80 percent of all
judgments. 3 Many defendants, realizing the justices' prejudice for
plaintiffs, chose to default and then appear for trial de novo in the
circuit court.' 4 The collection of judgments also constituted a serious problem. In 1933, the proportion of unsatisfied judgments
ranged from 41.6 percent in Davidson County to 63.8 percent in
Knox County (Knoxville)." °5
Thus, by the late 1930's, the justice of the peace system had
departed radically from its original function in Tennessee. It largely
had ceased to provide the free and effective hearing before a sympathetic country squire that had once characterized its operation. Instead of serving as arbitrators and peacemakers, many justices became mercenaries who preyed upon the very people for whose benefit their office had been created. At the foundation of the legal
system, the courts that were designed to have the most intimate
contact with the laborer, the small debtor and the tenant, had been
turned against these elements of the population most in need of
justice.' 6 The function of the justice of the peace was tailored to an
earlier era and was basically inadequate under later conditions.
In addition to its obvious abuses, the justice of the peace system
was subject to a number of substantive criticisms. Most of the justices lacked knowledge of fundamental legal principles, since very
few, if any, had formal legal training. Thus, they lacked the exposure to the law that was increasingly necessary to settle complicated
disputes properly.'" The justices' only real qualifications were political, related to their legislative duties on the county quarterly
court.' 8 This duality of function gave rise to conflicts of interest
when the justices were called upon to levy taxes and appropriate
funds for law enforcement activities that were closely related to
0 9 In addition, the vottheir judicial duties in minor criminal cases."
102. Keebler, Our Justice of the Peace Courts-A Problem in Justice, 9 TENN. L. REv.
1, 14 (1930). The average costs in civil cases in the 1933 survey were $3.55, of which the
justices received $2.02. When considered in light of the large number of civil actions and the
fees derived from criminal cases, the justices' compensation could be substantial. The most
energetic justice in Davidson County earned $8,537, quite a tidy sum in the depression year
of 1933. Howard, supra note 101, at 27, 32-35.

103.
104.

Howard, supra note 101, at 25.
See id.; Keebler, supra note 102, at 12.

105.
106.

Howard, supra note 101, at 25-26.
See Keebler, supra note 102, at 4-5.

107. Id. at 12-13.
108.
109.

Id. at 16.
See Simpson, supra note 97, at 568-69.
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ers usually elected the justices on the basis of their performance on
the county court rather than their qualifications for judicial position. The justices' political nature also explains the great oversupply
of these officers. With nearly 3,000 justices in the state,' many were
able virtually to ignore their judicial duties, while those who pursued that role with great vigor were competitors for business. Since
the jurisdiction of justices was county-wide, each could seek business far from the district that elected him.
The inefficiency of justices of the peace was a further shortcoming. They were subject to no significant supervision, and their records often were poorly kept and inadequate."' Justices' offices were
often dark and dingy cubbyholes, instilling in litigants contempt for
the law. Not surprisingly, the public lost confidence and respect for
the justice of the peace courts. Although many of the justices were
dedicated and conscientious, the growing abuses of the system on a
state-wide basis began to draw heavy criticism, which was encouraged by the nation-wide movement at that time for reform of the
justice of the peace courts. The need for change was most acute in
the urban areas, where fee-grabbing and other abuses were most
acute. Reform-minded civic groups became concerned with these
deficiencies, and major newspapers and bar associations led the
agitation for modification of the system." 2
Although initial attempts in 1935 to reform the justice of the
peace system met defeat at the hands of the supreme court and a
cautious legislature,"3 the demand for reform continued with in110. Over 1,200 civil districts existed in Tennessee during the early 1900's. Howard,
supra note 101, at 20-21. Since each district elected at least 2 justices of the peace and many
elected a larger number, the total number of justices must have approached 3,000. Several
rural counties elected more than 50 justices. See note 95 supra.
111. Howard, supra note 101, at 35-36.
112. See Ewing, General Sessions Courts, 16 TENN. L. REv. 979 (1941).
113. The first reform attempt in 1935 resulted in poorly drafted private acts applicable
to 3 counties. Ch. 213, § 9, [1935] Tenn. Priv. Acts 493 (restricting powers of justices of the
peace in Hamilton County over misdemeanor and criminal cases); ch. 352, § 10 [1935] Tenn.
Priv. Acts 786 (creating a court in Washington County to exercise certain powers of justices
of the peace); ch. 410, § 8, [1935] Tenn. Priv. Acts 978 (vesting in the county judge of Unicoi
County the powers of the justices of the peace, except for jurisdiction over detainer cases).
The supreme court declared each of these statutes to be unconstitutional on different technical grounds. Gouge v. McInturff, 169 Tenn. 678, 90 S.W.2d 753 (1936) (holding the Unicoi
County act invalid because its contents were broader than its title and because it removed
the sheriff's office from the classifications of the general salary law); State ex rel. Ward v.
Murrell, 169 Tenn. 688, 90 S.W.2d 945 (1936) (declaring the Hamilton County act to be
unconstitutionally discriminatory since it deprived citizens in one county of jury trials);
Spurgeon v. Worley, 169 Tenn. 697, 90 S.W.2d 948 (1936) (holding that the Washington
County act unconstitutionally permitted the court to determine its own jurisdiction and that
it violated the right to a jury trial).
A bill to establish courts to replace justices of the peace on a state-wide basis also met
with ignominious defeat in the 1935 session of the general assembly after senate and house
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creasing momentum, particularly in the larger cities. The first
breakthrough came in 1937 when the general assembly passed an act
transferring the judicial powers of the justices of the peace in Davidson County to a newly-created "General Sessions Court.' ' 14 An
objection to reform based on the constitutional requirement that
justices of the peace exist was met in the 1937 Act by retaining
justices as legislative members of the county quarterly courts. In
declaring the law to be constitutional, the Tennessee Supreme
Court recognized the broad power of the legislature to limit the
justices' functions."' Consequently, the Davidson County Act became a model for other private acts creating general sessions courts
across the state. The gradual expansion of general sessions courts
continued for the succeeding two decades."'
Although a measure of uniformity was present in the various
private acts because of their common basis in the Davidson County
Act, substantial differences existed in the organization, jurisdiction,
and procedure of the several general sessions courts. The variations
were most pronounced in the provisions relating to general sessions
judges. Many counties required the judge to be a lawyer, while a
significant number did not, and the salaries and methods of initial
selection of the judges varied significantly."17 Yet in each instance
the origins of the new court's functions could be traced to the justices of the peace. The general sessions judges, however, were able
to exercise their power in a more responsible fashion. Most of the
amendments exempted 90 of the 95 counties from its operation. S. 661, 69th Gen. Ass. (1935).
114. Ch. 12, [1937] Tenn. Priv. Acts 51.
115. Hancock v. Davidson County, 171 Tenn. 420, 104 S..2d 824 (1937). Although the
office is given a few powers by the constitution, the court found that the judicial authority of
the justices of the peace was purely statutory and could be withdrawn by the legislature at
will. The court easily disposed of other constitutional objections to the Act.
116. Although the larger counties more rapidly established general sessions courts, a
number of smaller counties followed suit. Each county's legislative delegation determined
when to present a private act for its county, strongly influenced, of course, by the officials,
lawyers, and voters back home. In 1939 and 1941, the legislature approved general sessions
courts for the other urban counties of Knox (Knoxville), Hamilton (Chattanooga), and Shelby
(Memphis). By 1947, 10 years after passage of the initial private act, general sessions courts
had been established in over one-fourth of the counties. These included most of the larger
counties although several smaller ones, like Bledsoe and Trousdale, were among the first to
set up general sessions courts. For a concise account of the early development of general
sessions courts, see Williams, GeneralSessions Courts in Tennessee, 31 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 101
(1947). See also Bryan & Baer, General Sessions Courts: Origin and Recent Legislation, 24
TaEN. L. REv. 667 (1956) (an article that attempts to trace the development of general
sessions and contains a list of counties and private acts that stripped justices of the peace of
their judicial powers).
117. See generally Overton, The JudicialSystem in Tennessee and Potentialitiesfor
Reorganization,32 TENN.L. REv. 501, 503-05, 517-19, 525-26 (1965) (including some analysis
of the general sessions courts).
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judges were attorneys, particularly in larger counties, where greater
legal expertise was needed. Nevertheless, general sessions courts
were able to retain some of the informality of the justice of the peace
courts. The abolition of the fee system removed conflicts of interest
and contributed to more honesty and fairness in judgments. In addition, the general sessions judges were more efficient and able to
handle the work of many justices of the peace, and record-keeping
improved significantly. As a whole, the new courts began to restore
public confidence in the merit of the entire judicial system.'
By the late 1950's, general sessions courts had been established
by private acts in thirty-nine of the ninety-five counties in Tennessee, including those that contained the great majority of the state's
population."' The superiority of the new courts over the justice of
the peace system enabled the 1959 Tennessee Legislature to do
what its predecessors of the 1930's had found impossible-pass an
act for general sessions courts on a state-wide basis. Consummating
the efforts to remedy the abuses of the justices of the peace, the 1959
General Sessions Court Act' 0 provided for a general sessions court
in each county, thereby reaching many rural counties for the first
time and stripping nearly all of the local justices of the peace of their
judicial authority.'2 ' The 1959 Act did not establish complete uniformity among the general sessions courts, however, since eight
counties were exempt from its provisions, 2 2 and the private acts
continued to apply to the previously established courts. 2 3 Yet the
Act did set forth minimum standards for all the general sessions
courts in the state. Most significantly, it signaled a change in approach-general sessions court was now a recognized institution of
118. See Ewing, supra note 112, at 980-81; Williams, supra note 116, at 103-04.
119. See A. CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUrr § 8 nn.29 & 29d (8th ed. S. Gilreath &
B. Aderholt 1963).
120. Ch. 109, [1959] Tenn. Pub. Acts 350 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1101 to
-1124 (Supp. 1974)).
121. The justices of the peace retained their importance as members of the county
quarterly courts and their authority to perform marriage ceremonies and administer oaths.
Ch. 109, § 2, [1959] Tenn. Pub. Acts 353 (codified at TENN. ConE ANN. § 19-312 (Supp.
1974)).
122. These counties were exempted from the Act by narrowly drawn population categories. See ch. 265, § 1, [1959] Tenn. Pub. Acts 764; ch. 255, § 1, [1959] Tenn. Pub. Acts
746; ch. 109, §§ 1, 22, [1959] Tenn. Pub. Acts 351, 365 (codified, as amended, at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 16-1101 (Supp. 1974)). The counties originally excluded from theAct were Johnson,
Humphreys, Stewait, Hancock, Sevier, Gibson, Perry, and Polk. A. CARTuruxas, supra note
119, at § 8 n.29b.
123. The 1959 Act was not designed to decrease the powers of any courts previously
created by private act. Those courts were to have the powers and jurisdiction granted by the
1959 Act in addition to the powers conferred by the private acts. Ch. 109, § 22, [1959] Tenn.
Pub. Acts 365 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-1124 (Supp. 1974)).
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Tennessee county government. Since 1959, the jurisdictional limit
of the general sessions courts has been increased, as have the judges'
salaries, and the trend toward uniformity on a state-wide basis has
24
gained legislative support.1
I.

GENERAL SESSIONS AS A SMALL CLAIMS COURT

The general sessions court is the only Tennessee court that
might arguably be said to function as a small claims court. As noted
below, the statutory provisions for general sessions bear a certain
similarity to those for small claims courts in other parts of the
country: the court has limited jurisdiction over civil actions, operates without a jury, and is a relatively informal forum in which the
judge may exercise substantial discretion. At this point it is necessary to analyze the general sessions court's structure and operation
in order to determine whether it actually functions as an adequate
small claims court. The standards applied in evaluating the general
sessions court are those developed in the second part of this Special
Project-the characterization of a model small claims court. Thus,
the evaluation must determine whether general sessions court is: (1)
an informal forum with simplified procedures and a low jurisdictional limit; (2) a court whose judge inquires into the circumstances
of the case and encourages conciliation; (3) a court in which an
individual may sue in his own behalf without difficulty; (4) a court
in which the expenses of suit are minimized by low fees for filing
and service, and provisions barring representation by attorneys; (5)
a court with adequate publicity in the community; (6) a court enacted by statute.
A.

Structure of the Court

The present structure of general sessions court is founded on
124. General sessions has spread to most of the originally exempt counties, so that today
justice of the peace courts function only in Johnson and Stewart counties. Several counties
have joined the trend of vesting probate and juvenile jurisdiction in general sessions. See, e.g.,
ch. 2, [1973] Tenn. Priv. Acts 12 (applicable to Rutherford County). A bill introduced in
the 1974 general assembly may be the precursor of major changes in general sessions courts.
S. 1886, 88th Gen. Ass. (1974). The proposal was part of a plan to revamp the Tennessee
judicial system before the August 1974 judicial elections, but it met the usual fate of judicial
reform measures and was not enacted. Nevertheless, much study went into its formulation
and the bill does indicate possible future trends. The bill would have divided the state into
65 general sessions court districts, consisting of one or 2 counties in most instances, in order
to equalize case loads. Jurisdictional limits would have been increased to $5,000 in cases at
law and equity, and juvenile and probate authority would have been placed in the court. The
bill contained a requirement that judges be attorneys, although a "grandfather clause" would
have protected incumbent nonlawyers. The bill also would have suspended the operation of
piivate acts, thereby creating a uniform, state-wide general sessions court system.
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several chapters of the Tennessee Code Annotated and the county
private acts.r2 In substance, the powers of the court are those formerly exercised by the justices of the peace, with increased jurisdictional monetary limits. The Code grants to general sessions courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases involving up to 3,000 dollars and
unlimited authority over cases of forcible entry and detainer.15 In
equity matters, the courts' jurisdiction is limited to 250 dollars, and
while the courts may apply the principles of equity, they are limited
in the equitable remedies they may impose.'2 In actions to recover
personal property, general sessions courts have jurisdiction up to
7,500 dollars. General sessions judges have power to issue restraining orders and to impose penalties for their violation. The court also
exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery
courts "to grant fiats for writs of injunction, attachments and other
extraordinary process."' 28 The minor criminal jurisdiction granted
29
general sessions courts falls outside the scope of this study.
The judges of general sessions courts are elected to eight-year
terms 3 and are in most instances attorneys, although they need not
be unless a private act so specifies. 3 ' Only a few larger counties have
more than one general sessions judge. The judges' salaries are fixed
by statute, generally according to the population of the county in
which they serve, although numerous exceptions may be found for
specific counties.'3 2 The statute further provides that judges in counties having a population of more than 30,000 must devote their full
time to the duties of the office, while those in most smaller counties
may engage in private law practice.' The clerk of the circuit court
125. The private acts are now supplementary in nature, often relating to the judges'
qualifications and salaries and granting additional jurisdiction over certain matters. The
provisions of the often-amended public laws give general sessions courts their primary authority.
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-301 (Supp. 1974). This jurisdiction extends to justices of
the peace in the 2 counties in which they are not supeiseded by general sessions courts.
127. See W. HAL, THE GENERAL SEssIONs COURT 16 (1972).
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-1104 (Supp. 1974).
129. See id. §§ 16-1104, 40-118.
130. Id. § 16-1106.
131. The varied qualifications required of judges often relate to the additional powers
exercised by some courts, and some degree of legal training is frequently required. See Overton, supra note 117, at 517-19. In smaller counties the judge often is not a lawyer, and in a
few counties it might be impractical to impose such a requirement because of the shortage of
attorneys. Recently, however, Sumner County (Gallatin and Hendersonville), which has a
population of 60,000 and is one of the faster-growing and more progressive counties, voted in
a public referendum not to require its general sessions judge to be a lawyer. Nashville Tennesseean, May 24, 1974, at 21, col. 3.
132. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1108 to -1112 (Supp. 1974).
133. See id. § 16-1113.
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normally serves as clerk of general sessions.' 34
To commence a civil suit in general sessions, the plaintiff must
pay fees for filing and service of process that vary by county from
twelve to fifteen dollars unless a pauper's oath is filed.'35 The rules
of pleading and practice are the same as those for justice of the
peace courts.' 31 The filing of a warrant, which serves as a combined
complaint and summons, begins an action; 31 no answer is required
unless the action is a suit on a sworn account. 13 No generally mandated procedure for the trial of a case in general sessions exists, and
these courts are expressly exempt from the operation of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.'3 For this reason, procedural rules
are improvised for the occasion by judge or counsel, and, in addition, the rules of evidence do not strictly apply. The atmosphere is
much less formal than that of the circuit courts, and the judge
exercises considerable discretion in the conduct of cases. In these
respects, the general sessions courts clearly reflect their justice of
the peace origins.'40 Although attorneys are not necessary in general
sessions, they appear, at least on behalf of the plaintiff, in the great
majority of cases."'
General sessions is a court not of record, and a jury trial cannot
be obtained there. Since the Tennessee constitution provides for the
right to a jury trial for nonequitable claims above twenty dollars,
an appeal for a trial de novo is necessary as a matter of state constitutional law to protect that right.12 For this reason, the losing party
134. Id. § 16-1116. But see note 145 infra. A few of the private acts contain different
provisions. In some counties with separate criminal courts, including Davidson, the criminal
court clerk serves as clerk for the criminal division of general sessions, while the circuit court
clerk serves the civil division of general sessions.
135. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2115 (Supp. 1974). The total of court costs may vary
according to the type of case and the county, since some counties impose small additional
fees.
136. Id. §§ 16-1118, 19-301 to -710 (1955), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
137. Id. § 19-402 (1955).
138. See text accompanying note 258 infra.
139. TwN. R. Crv. P. 1.
140. See Institute of Judicial Administration, The Judicial System of Tennessee 62, 64,
Oct. 1971 (study made for the Tennessee Judicial Council); France, Effective Minor Courts:
Key to Court Modernization, 40 TENN. L. Rav. 29, 42-43 (1972). Since geneial sessions is the
successor to the justice of the peace court, basically the same rules of procedure apply.
"[T]he Legislature intended to preserve the informalities of the Justice of the Peace Court
and the General Sessions Court so that cases may be tried upon their merits without regard
to any formality except that which is absolutely essential." Weaver v. Cromer, 54 Tenn. App.
510, 513, 392 S.W.2d 835, 836 (1965).
141. See notes 161-65 infra and accompanying text.
142. TENN. CoNsr. art. 1, § 6 declares that "the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate." The courts have interpreted this provision as a guarantee of jury trial in civil cases
that would have been tried by jury when the first state constitution was written in 1796.
Therefore, the provision protects the right of trial by jury at common law as recognized in
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in general sessions court has an unrestricted right to appeal to the
circuit court for a new trial.13 The ready availability of such an easy
appeal route has seriously undermined the finality of general sessions judgments and led in the past to the use of the courts as an
inexpensive discovery device."
Although the Tennessee Code Annotated provides a broad outline of the structure of the general sessions courts, it is important
to recognize that some variations continue to exist among these
courts because of numerous private acts applicable to individual
counties. For example, though most are not of record, the general
sessions court in Roane County (Kingston, Harriman, and Rockwood) is a court of record.'4 5 The equivalent of general sessions in
Anderson County (Oak Ridge) is the "Trial Justice Court," also a
court of record.'" The new Trial Justice Court of Sevier County
(Sevierville and Gatlinburg) has much more extensive jurisdiction
than most general sessions courts.1 4 7 Although many similar variaNorth Carolina when the Tennessee territory was ceded by North Carolina to the federal
government. Grooms v. State, 221 Tenn. 243, 426 S.W.2d 176 (1968). The law at that time
guaranteed jury trial when more than $20 was at stake. The supreme court held in Morford
v. Barnes, 16 Tenn. 444 (1835) that statutes conferring jurisdiction upon justices of the peace
to try jury cases of a civil nature involving more than $20 are constitutional, provided that a
jury trial may be had upon appeal. This same rationale was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899)(upholding a statute that
permitted justices of the peace in the District of Columbia to try civil cases of moderate
amount without a common law jury when the parties could have a jury upon appeal). The
seventh amendment to the federal constitution, which guarantees the right to jury trial in
civil cases involving more than $20, is one of the few provisions of the Bill of Rights that has
not been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 169 n.4 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-1118 (Supp. 1974), 19-425 (1955). The appeal must be filed

within 10 days after the general sessions judgment is rendered, id. § 27-509 (Supp. 1974), and
an appeal bond must be posted, id. § 27-503 (1955). The circuit court in Tennessee is the
court of original, unlimited juiisdiction. Most circuits include several counties and least one
term of court is held in each county. Tennessee is one of the few states that have not formally
merged their courts of law and equity. Separate chancery courts continue to function in
Tennessee, although their jurisdiction largely overlaps that of the circuit courts. From these
courts of general jurisdiction appeals may be made to the 9-member Court of Appeals, which
sits in regional panels. Criminal appeals from the circuit courts and the separate criminal
courts that exist in certain counties are taken to the 7-member Court of Criminal Appeals.
The highest court in the state is the Supreme Court, which is composed of 5 justices.
144. Use of general sessions as a discovery vehicle has been alleviated by the adoption
of the liberalized pretrial discovery procedures of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. See
TENN. R. Cv. P. 26-37.

145. Ch. 77, § 7, [1959] Tenn. Priv. Acts 268. Another unusual feature of the Roane
County Act is that the clerk and master of the local chancery court serves as general sessions
court clerk. Id. § 19 at 274.
146. Ch. 459, § 6, [1947] Tenn. Priv. Acts 1808. The court in Anderson County has
somewhat more extensive powers than most general sessions courts. See id. § 3, at 1806.
147. The court exercises jurisdiction up to $10,000 in civil cases and $5,000 in equity
matters. Ch. 34, § 2, [1973] Tenn. Priv. Acts 138. Sevier County was one of the last holdouts
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tions exist, the public acts have insured a substantial degree of
uniformity in most courts throughout the state.
B. The OperationalCharacteristicsof General Sessions
This Special Project's analysis of the operation of the general
sessions courts has focused primarily on two counties, one urban
and one rural. Davidson County was selected as the urban county,
in part because its general sessions court was used as a model by
other counties during the transition from the justice of the peace
courts to the present system. In addition, the state capital, Nashville, is located in Davidson County."' For these reasons, Davidson
County might be expected to have one of the better general sessions
courts in the state. Bedford County is the rural county examined in
this Special Project. 4 ' The Bedford County General Sessions Court
was created by private act in 1947,111 but is not significantly different from the great majority of courts established by other private
acts or the 1959 state-wide act."' In addition to analyzing these two
courts, the Special Project evaluated data from other general sessions courts across the state that have been the subjects of study by
other researchers in the past. 5 '
The primary method of gathering data on the operation of the
two courts was a statistical analysis of the courts' dockets. This
of the justice of the peace courts and remains exempt from the public act establishing general
sessions courts on a statewide basis. TENN. CoDF ANN. § 16-1101 (Supp. 1974) (exempting
counties having populations between 23,350 and 23,380 in 1950, which includes Sevier with
23,375).
148. Davidson County is situated in the north-central part of Tennessee and has a
population approaching one-half million persons, making it the state's second most populous
county.
149. Bedford County is located in south-central Tennessee, and has a population of
about 25,000, which is typical in size of many rural counties in the state. The Bedford county
seat is Shelbyville, with a population of about 12,000. The economy of the area is based on
agriculture, particularly the breeding of Tennessee walking horses, and some light industry.
150. Ch. 41, [1947] Tenn. Priv. Acts 115. The Act requires the general sessions judge
in Bedford County to be an experienced attorney. Id. § 12, at 120.
151. Other similar courts established in the same year include those in neighboring
Rutherford County, ch. 384, [1947] Tenn. Priv. Acts 1574, and in east Tennessee's Campbell
County, ch. 769, [1947] Tenn. Priv. Acts 3140.
152. The leading study of the operation of general sessions focuses on Knox County
(Knoxville) in east Tennessee, which is the state's third largest county. See generally H.
Plaas, 0. Stephens, & J. Glass, The Function of the Judge in the General Sessions Court of
Knox County, Tennessee, Feb. 1973 (Preliminary Report to the Tennessee State Law Enforcement Planning Agency) [hereinafter cited as Knox County Report]. This study was conducted by professors and students under the auspices of the Bureau of Public Administration
of the University of Tennessee. The data contained in the study reflect a random sample of
450 civil cases drawn from docket books covering a one year period ending in December 1970,
and in addition, a sample of 1,311 observed civil actions docketed from mid-May to mid-June,
1971. Id. at 6-7.
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analysis was conducted during September 1974, and was supplemented by interviews with judges, clerks, and attorneys who dealt
with cases in those courts. 15 3 The docket analysis has produced certain operational information about the courts: (a) who utilizes the
general sessions courts; (b) what size claims most commonly are
brought; (c) whether the parties normally are represented by attorneys; (d) whether one side wins more frequently than the other.
While the information obtained from the statistical analysis and
interviews necessarily is limited in scope, it does provide a general
picture of the general sessions court as an operating entity, and it
indicates to some extent how well the court functions as a small
claims court.
1.

Who Utilizes the General Sessions Courts?

The docket analysis indicates that the general sessions courts
studied were heavily used by institutional plaintiffs. In the Davidson County General Sessions Court, a total of 84.3 percent of the
surveyed cases were brought by plaintiffs who were not individuals.
The most frequent plaintiffs include governmental agencies (19.5
percent), hospitals (8.9 percent), finance companies (8.6 percent),
and banks (5.0 percent). 51 In contrast to these figures, the dockets
indicate that an overwhelming number of defendants, 95.4 percent
in Davidson County, were individuals. 55' Moreover, the institutional
plaintiff characteristic does not appear to be a strictly urban phenomenon. The docket analysis conducted in Bedford County indicates
that nonindividual litigants utilized the rural and urban courts to
153. The information obtained from the docket and warrants included the names of the
parties, the attorneys of record, the basis of the claim, the amount of the claim, disposition
of the cases and the amounts of judgments awarded, and the time of filing, trial and execution. The analysis of the court in Bedford County included all 66 civil cases docketed for trial
during September 1974. In Davidson County the survey covered the 637 civil cases docketed
for the week from September 24 through September 30, 1974. For a detailed summary of the
information obtained from the docket survey, see Appendix A infra.
In Bedford County, interviews were conducted with the general sessions judge, Marvin
Marshall; the clerk, James Atnip; and 4 attorneys, John Bobo, Tyrus Cobb, Rondal Wilson,
and Charles Kurtz, all on October 31, 1974. In Davidson County, 8 general sessions judges
were interviewed: A. A. Birch, John Boone, Leslie Mondelli, Robert Murphy, Gale Robinson,
Dennis Summers, Donald Washburn, and Randall Wyatt. The ninth judge, Hamilton Gayden, was recently appointed by Governor Dunn to fill the vacancy created by the death of
Judge Andrew Doyle and was not in office during the period of the survey. Interviews in
Davidson County were also conducted with George Rooker, the clerk; Justice William Harbison of the Tennessee Supreme Court; John J. Hollins, President of the Nashville Bar Association; and attorney Jude Lenahan. The Nashville interviews were conducted from October
1974 through February 1975.
154. See Appendix A, Table 1 infra.
155. See Appendix A, Table 2 infra.
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almost the same extent. During the surveyed period, 84.8 percent
of all suits in Bedford County General Sessions Court were brought
by institutions. This similarity in types of plaintiffs is further reflected by the fact that finance companies, banks, and governmental agencies accounted for fifty percent of all suits filed in Bedford
County. 5 ' In addition, every defendant in the Bedford County court
was an individual. 57 Thus, the dockets indicate that the general
sessions courts examined are used primarily by the institutional
plaintiff to recover against the individual defendant.
2.

What Size Claims Are Most Common?

Although the amounts claimed varied greatly in the courts
studied, some general impressions may be gathered from the docket
analysis. 5 First, a substantial portion of suits were for amounts of
250 dollars or less. 54.2 percent of the Davidson County suits and
45.4 percent of Bedford County suits were within the 250 dollar
range. 5 ' Secondly, a significant number of suits were filed for much
larger amounts. The proportion of suits for amounts in excess of 500
dollars was 19.5 percent in Davidson County and 33.3 percent in
Bedford County.' Thus, the docket analysis indicates that although a large percentage of claims filed could be characterized as
small claims, the general sessions court is also heavily utilized for
suits involving much larger amounts.
3.

Are the Parties Normally Represented by Attorneys?

The docket analysis indicates that a large proportion of plaintiffs are represented by attorneys in general sessions. In Davidson
County, 96.4 percent of the examined warrants listed an attorney
of record.'' The docket analysis did not indicate whether or not
defendants were represented, because of the failure of litigants and
court personnel to fill in that information on the warrant.' A recent
study of the Knox County General Sessions Court compiled statis156. See Appendix A, Table 1 infra.
157. See Appendix A, Table 2 infra.
158. A preliminary problem in analyzing the types of claims brought in the general
sessions courts is the high jurisdictional limit of $3,000 in civil cases, in addition to the courts'
unlimited jurisdiction in detainer (eviction) actions. See note 126 supra.
159. See Appendix A, Table 3 infra.
160. Id.
161. See Appendix A, Table 6 infra. A reliable figure was not available for Bedford
County.
162. See id. The low figure indicated is certainly unreliable. Very few attorneys for
defendants were listed at the designated place on the warrants. When the warrant is filed
the plaintiff or his attorney does not know whether the defendant will secure counsel, and
court personnel seldom complete this item of information at a later stage of the case.
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tics through courtroom observation that tend to show that defendants frequently are not represented. 6 3 The Knox County study
found that in seventy-three percent of the cases observed the plaintiff was represented by an attorney, while the defendant was represented in only nine percent of the cases.16 4 Furthermore, the study
found that in almost all cases in which the defendant had retained
an attorney, the plaintiff also was represented. 65
4.

Does One Side Win More Frequently than the Other?

The docket analysis tends to show a very high rate of success
for plaintiffs in the two courts. In the Davidson County court, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in 72.5 percent of the cases,
while the defendant obtained a judgment or dismissal in only 1.9
percent of the trials. The remaining 22.9 percent of cases surveyed
were continued, nonsuited, or settled. The Bedford County statistics show an even greater percentage of judgments for plaintiffs, 98.5
percent of the cases surveyed, while defendants won in only 1.5
percent.16 6 The Knox County study indicated a somewhat lower success rate for plaintiffs, sixty-three percent; 67twelve percent of the
suits were decided in the defendant's favor.
The rate of default judgments is another characteristic of the
courts related to the disposition of cases. While exact information
on the default rate is difficult to obtain because of clerical procedures in the courts, ' the data available from the Davidson County
docket indicates that the default rate is very high. The proportion
of defendants defaulting varied daily during the survey period from
49.1 percent to 80.8 percent of all cases. The total defaults noted on
the warrants was 68.8 percent.169 Default figures were unavailable
from the Bedford County records, but the general sessions judge
170
estimated the default rate at fifty to sixty percent.
Although these statistics show considerable variance among the
courts' dispositions of cases, it is clearly evident that the success
163. Knox County Report, supra note 152, at 41.
164. Id. It is interesting to note, however, that some of the attorneys never appeared in
court. Compare id. at 42 with id. at 41.
165. Id. at 41.
166. See Appendix A, Table 4 infra.
167. Knox County Report, supra note 152, at 30, 33.
168. No place is provided on the warrant to designate a default judgment. This is
usually indicated, however, by a notation made on the comer of the warrant. While the
consistency of this practice in Davidson County makes these statistics quite reliable, the
number cannot be reckoned with absolute certainty.
169. See Appendix A, Table 5 infra.
170. Interview with the Honorable Marvin Marshall, Bedford County General Sessions
Judge, in Shelbyville, Tennessee, Jan. 7, 1975.
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rate for plaintiffs in these general sessions courts has been very high.
In addition, a significant default rate was indicated.
C. Evaluation of General Sessions as a Small Claims Court
In order to determine whether the general sessions court is an
effective forum for small claimants, it is necessary to evaluate the
structural and operational aspects of the court in light of the characterization of the model small claims court developed above. Although general sessions possesses some of the major structural indicia of traditional small claims courts, it is more revealing to gauge
the court in terms of its actual operation.
The first elements that characterize the model small claims
court are informality, procedural simplicity, and a low jurisdictional
limit. Clearly, general sessions has retained to some extent the informal atmosphere and simplified procedures of the justice of the
peace courts. These features, however, are not mandated by statute
and may be present to a greater or lesser degree depending on the
general sessions judge. The judge may in his discretion apply more
rigid courtroom rules, thereby removing the informality which is
necessary in a small claims court. In addition, the customary presence of attorneys in general sessions court naturally leads to more
formalized proceedings. Moreover, the 3,000 dollar jurisdictional
limit of general sessions is substantially higher than that of most
small claims courts. Because of the wide variety of types of cases
and amounts sued for, the general sessions judges have never had
the opportunity to develop specialized techniques for dealing with
small claims. As a result of the presence of attorneys, the high
jurisdictional amount, and the nature of the proceedings, general
sessions has become an instrumentality of institutional plaintiffs
rather than a forum for individuals with small claims. The court
simply has not been oriented toward serving the individual.
The second element of the model small claims court is the
activist judge, who assures that the facts of the case are fully developed and encourages conciliation. The extent to which the general
sessions judge actually fulfills this role appears to vary substantially
among individual judges. General sessions judges who were interviewed disagreed as to the degree to which they should intervene in
trials; several judges questioned the propriety of excessive intervention.' The crucial consideration is that judges are under no statu171. Interviews with A.A. Birch, John Boone, Leslie Mondelli, Donald Washburn, Davidson County General Sessions Judges, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 1975. The Knox County
study found that although the judge was frequently involved in interrogation of parties, in
only 4% of the observed cases did he leave his formal judicial role by giving legal or personal
counsel. Knox County Report, supra note 152, at 43, 45.
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tory duty to assume an activist role in general sessions courts. Unrepresented individual litigants who have no knowledge of the law
may fail to present relevant facts that the judge of the model court
would routinely extract.
The third characteFistic of a small claims court is that an individual may sue there in his own behalf without difficulty. General
sessions falls substantially short of the model court in this respect.
Attorneys now represent the vast majority of plaintiffs in general
sessions suits, which strongly indicates that plaintiffs feel unable to
adequately present their claims in their own behalf. The virtual
necessity of attorneys greatly increases the expense and inconvenience of justice and renders claims for small amounts uneconomical.
Rather than utilizing the court as plaintiffs, individuals seldom
have contact with general sessions unless they are forced into court
as defendants by institutions which are represented by counsel. The
high rate of defaults certainly indicates in some measure the feeling
of individuals that it is useless to come into court without legal
assistance, particularly when one must confront a skilled lawyer."'
The fourth criterion of the small claims court is minimal expense in bringing suit. This is achieved by low fees for filing and
service and elimination of attorneys' fees. These features do not
characterize the general sessions court, with its relatively high filing
fees and the practical necessity of legal counsel in contested matters. The expense of general sessions clearly would deter most plaintiffs from pressing small but valid claims, and high attorneys' fees
reduce the value of any recovery. Although general sessions is less
costly than courts of record, it does not approach the ideal of inexpensive justice.
The fifth characteristic of a model small claims court is its
extensive publicity in the community. In contrast, no concerted
effort has been made to familiarize Tennesseeans with the function
of general sessions courts. Additionally, the paucity of individual
claimants in general sessions strongly indicates that the public is
largely ignorant of the role of the court. 1 3 While the extent of public
172. The litigants who responded to the questionnaires were most vocal on this point.
Several complained that a person cannot receive an adequate hearing unless he has counsel
to speak for him. One said, "If you don't have money these days you can't get anything done."
Another remarked that the judge insisted that he consult an attorney and refused to answer
adequately his questions. Without realizing the probative worth of their comments, these
citizens were expressing the need that the model small claims court fulfills.
173. Many of those connected with the court feel it lacks public notoriety, especially
among the mass of the people. In Nashville, Judges Robinson and Wyatt felt the level of
public awareness was sufficient, but Judges Boone, Mondelli, and Summers and attorneys
Hollins and Lenahan mentioned lack of publicity as a problem of the court. In Shelbyville,
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awareness of general sessions has not been empirically determined,
the absence of any official attempt, through the media or pamphlets, to educate the public as to the availability and procedure of
this forum is a significant weakness of the general sessions courts.
The final characteristic of the model small claims court is that
it is enacted by statute with the articulated purpose of serving the
needs of the individual litigant. While Tennessee has moved toward
more uniformity in the general sessions courts, a rational structure
and expressed purpose for the system are yet lacking. Many of the
features of general sessions which are essential in a small claims
court are subject to the broad discretionary powers of the judge in
the conduct of proceedings. On a state-wide basis, the court has a
jerry-built structure resulting from uncoordinated efforts to remedy
abuses of the justice of the peace courts, without a reasoned philosophy of what purpose the courts should serve.
In summary, the structural and operational characteristics of
the general sessions court reveal that general sessions is not functioning as an adequate small claims court. The similarities of general sessions to the model small claims court have occurred almost
by accident, because of the historical antecedents of general sessions. While general sessions is far superior to the abused justice of
the peace system, it has largely lost those virtues which perpetuated
the justice of the peace courts over the years. The notion that there
should be an inexpensive forum for the rectification of small claims
by a judge acting as a conciliator or arbitrator was historically effectuated in rural Tennessee by the justice of the peace, but this continuing need has been neglected by the present judicial system.
Clearly, general sessions does not adequately serve the interests of
individual litigants with claims which, though relatively small, are
of major importance in the administration of justice. Tennessee
needs a more effective small claims court. In order to obtain this
end, a model small claims court statute for Tennessee will be proposed. At this point it is necessary to consider the provisions of the
model statute.
PART THREE
ANALYSIS OF POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A
MODEL SMALL CLAIMS COURT
I.

STATE-WIDE APPLICABILITY OF THE STATUTE

A preliminary question of great import is whether the small
Judge Marshall and attorneys Bobo and Cobb felt that the public is not familiar with the
functions of the general sessions court. Interviews, supranote 153.
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claims court statute should have state-wide applicability or be limited to the state's larger cities. As noted above, changes in the Tennessee judicial structure traditionally have been made in piecemeal
fashion by private acts.'74 Although this approach runs counter to
the recent legislative policy of increasing uniformity among the general sessions courts, 7 ' it is necessary to determine whether the benefits to be derived from separate small claims courts in rural areas
justify implementing small claims procedures on a state-wide basis.
The smaller volume of cases in rural counties that might be characterized as "small claims" arguably does not warrant the creation of
a specialized small claims procedure.'78
A further problem arises by virtue of the fact that in many rural
Tennessee counties one judge is responsible for the entire general
sessions docket. If, as proposed below, the small claims court is
created within the general sessions court structure,'77 staffed by
present judges, the rural judge would be required to decide cases
under the normal general sessions procedures and also sit as a small
claims judge, without confusing what ideally should be two very
different roles.' 8 This raises the danger of a small claims judge
utilizing the more formal procedures of the general sessions court
that may intimidate a pro se litigant. 7 '
The vast majority of other jurisdictions enacting small claims
court statutes have done so on a state-wide basis,"' and there are
significant arguments in favor of this position. The need for uni174. See notes 114-23 supra and accompanying text.
175, See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
176. Survey of the General Sessions Court of Bedford County, Tennessee, September
1974. See Appendix A, Table 1 infra.
177. See notes 181-91 infra and accompanying text.
178. The small claims judge should assume an active role as inquisitor-conciliator,
charged with the duty of utilizing informal procedures, interrogating witnesses, marshalling
evidence, and seeing that substantial justice is done. See notes 332-34 infra and accompanying text.
179. The further danger exists that when the small claims court judge is also a judge
of the ordinary civil court, he may not only experience a confusion of roles but also feel a
disdain for the role of small claims judge, resulting in a determination "to get the [small
claims] case over as quickly as possible." NADER STuDy, supra note 29, at 117.
180. See, e.g., CAL. CirV. PRO. CODE § 117 (West 1954); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-521 (Cum.
Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-16-1, -16 (1969); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a,
§ 1 (1971). For examples of states with state-wide statutes that also have separate small
claims procedures, for particular cities, see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 218, § 21 et seq. (1974)
(Boston municipal court); N.Y.C. CivIL CT. ACT. § 1801 et seq. (1963) (N.Y.C. small claims
courts).
It was suggested by a Shelbyville, Tennessee attorney that while a uniform statute was
generally desirable, its applicability should be limited to counties with a population in excess
of a given number. Interview with Ron Wilson, in Shelbyville, Tennessee, Oct. 31, 1974. For
an example of a state that has adopted this approach, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-1 (1970)
(small claims courts created in every county having a population of 100,000 or more).
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formity in the Tennessee judicial system is of considerable importance, but a more important consideration is that of fundamental
fairness. If the existing system is deficient in providing a suitable
forum for small claims, reform measures should ensure that citizens
will not be barred from using the new small claims procedures
merely because of their place of residence within the state. That
there are presently fewer small claims in rural areas should not be
viewed as sufficient justification for denying rural residents access
to one portion of the state's court system. This is particularly true
since a significantly larger number of small claims may be brought
in an improved forum in rural areas. A uniform statute, applicable
to all of Tennessee, is therefore recommended.
II.

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SMALL CLAIMS COURTS

A second important question to consider in creating a small
claims court system is whether a separate court system should be
established, or whether a small claims division within the present
general sessions court structure is preferable. The majority of American jurisdictions that have enacted small claims statutes have created special small claims divisions within existing civil courts. '
Other jurisdictions have created separate small claims courts,' 2 and
still others have attempted to simplify procedures in trials involving
amounts under a specified jurisdictional limit in the existing
courts.' 83
An important argument against the majority approach is that
when the small claims court is a division of the regular civil court,
staffed by the same judges and utilizing the same facilities, the
judge tends to run both courts in much the same manner."4 More181. See, e.g., IDAHO COD § 1-2301 (Supp. 1974) (small claims department of magistrate's division); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8401 (Supp. 1974) (small claims division of each
district court).
182. See, e.g., N.D. STAT. ANN. § 27-08.1-01 (1974) (separate court but staffed by judges
and justices of the county courts); Tax. Rxv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, § 1 (1971) (separate
court but staffed by justices of the peace).
183. ALAsKA STAT. § 22.15.040 (1971) (district judge or magistrate hears claims under
$1,000 as small claims unless important or unusual points of law are involved; state supreme
court directed to prescribe rules "to assure simplicity and the expeditious handling of small
claims"); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 218, §§ 21-22 (1974) (alternative procedure to be established,
by rule of court, for trial of small claims in district courts and in Boston municipal court).
184. The common pleas courts in Michigan have been empowered to establish a conciliation division "for the purpose of adjusting, in an informal manner, controversies . . .
involving $300 or less." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3668 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, a judge in the common pleas court of Detroit stated that judges usually are not aware
of whether a case is a small claim or regular case, even though different procedures should
be used in the trial of small claims cases. NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 285 n.125.
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over, if the judge fails to assume an active inquisitorial role, the
unrepresented litigant must bear the entire burden of producing
evidence, interrogating witnesses, and arguing legal questions that
he may not fully understand.
In spite of the inherent problems involved, several policies favor
the creation of a small claims division within the existing general
sessions court. First, since a small claims division could utilize the
facilities, judges, and clerical personnel of the general sessions
court, adopting the divisional structure would involve less expense
than creating and operating a separate court system.'85 Furthermore, by utilizing present personnel, the small claims division
would have the benefit of experienced judges and clerks from the
beginning of its operation. Divisional organization would also be a
politically feasible alternative, because it would not engender radical changes in the state's judicial system." 6 In addition, general
sessions judges should be more receptive to a small claims division,
since no judgeships would be created or abolished.' 7 Finally, adequate supervision and control of the small claims court, which are
necessary to insure the fair dispensing of justice, could be accomplished within the existing court system.' 8
185. The financing of the new court is an important practical problem, especially in
light of the low fee structure proposed; this question was one of the first ones raised by a
Nashville general sessions judge. Interview with the Honorable Gale Robinson, Presiding
Judge of the General Sessions Court of Davidson County, in Nashville, Tennessee, Nov. 21,
1974. The fact that the proposed fee structure may be less than what is actually necessary to
pay for the court makes utilization of existing facilities even more desirable, if not imperative.
See discussion of filing fees, text accompanying notes 265-70 infra.
Though utilization of existing facilities is desirable from an economic standpoint, a
decentralized small claims court, located at convenient locations throughout the community
would have major beneficial effects, including physical convenience for litigants and greater
access from a psychological point of view as well, on the theory that a community court would
seem less distant and alien. Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: the Mechanisms of
Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 281, 318 (1971).
186. The fate of a reform bill proposed in 1974 is an example of the Tennessee legislature's opposition to major judicial change. See note 124 supra. One of the sponsors of that
bill suggested that legislators who might have voted for change were influenced by home-town
judges who, for one reason or another, were reluctant to depart from the present system.
Interview with Daniel Oehmig, Chairman of the Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee, in
Nashville, Tennessee, Nov. 21, 1974. While Senator Oehmig was of the opinion that the
present general sessions system was in great need of reform, he did not favor establishment
of a small claims court in Tennessee.
187. The small claims division could be staffed by designated small claims judges or
by all of the general sessions judges on a rotating basis.
188. See Note, Small Claims in Indiana, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 517, 522 (1970). It also has
been suggested that the prestige and legitimacy of the small claims court may be enhanced
by making the court part of the preexisting civil court. NICJ REPoRT, supra note 15, at 25.
Although this argument may seem to be of questionable validity in Tennessee, where the
operation of the general sessions courts is open to criticism, the danger that a litigant would
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It therefore is recommended that the model small claims court
for Tennessee be created as a division of general sessions court.
Although the simplified small claims procedures proposed for the
model court render unlikely the confusion of the judges' two roles, 89
the functions should be made as distinct as possible. Therefore, it
is recommended that particular judges be exclusively designated
small claims judges in counties having more than one general sessions judge.' 0 Since one judge would be responsible for the small
claims and general sessions dockets in smaller counties, the statute
should require that the small claims judge assume an active inquisitorial role to insure the achievement of substantial justice.'9 '
II.

JURISDICTON

A. Concurrent versus Exclusive Jurisdiction
The major question concerning the new court's jurisdiction is
whether the small claims division should be the sole forum for small
claims, or whether the plaintiff should have the option of suing in
general sessions court.' 2 The majority of jurisdictions grant small
3
claims courts concurrent jurisdiction with the regular civil court.'
Nevertheless, several significant arguments have been advanced in
favor of granting exclusive jurisdiction to the small claims court in
those cases within its purview. The most persuasive argument is
that exclusive jurisdiction prevents forum shopping by forcing all
small claims to be litigated under the same informal procedures. 4
feel he was getting "second-hand justice" from a newly established court with no connection
to the present court system cannot be ignored.
189. See text accompanying notes 343-49 infra.
190. The designation would be by rule of court and the number of small claims judges
would vary from county to county.
191. See text accompanying notes 332-34, and Part Four, § 14(a) infra.
192. General sessions courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts for
claims within the general sessions jurisdiction. Thus, concurrent jurisdiction might include
not only a choice between the small claims courts and general sessions court but also the
option of filing suit in circuit court. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-1104 (Supp. 1974).
193, See, e.g., N.Y. UNIFORM Disr. CT. AcT § 1802 (McKinney 1963); Omo Rav. CODE
ANN. § 1925.02 (Page Supp. 1973); TEX. REV. Cwv. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, § 2 (1971); cf. LA.
CONST. art. 7, § 91 (New Orleans city court given exclusive jurisdiction if amount in dispute
not over $100, but concurrent jurisdiction if amount in dispute up to $1,000); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 46.405 (1974) (small claims court given exclusive jurisdiction in cases up to $20, concurrent
in cases to $500). Contra,D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1321 (1973) (small claims court given exclusive
jurisdiction in cases for the recovery of money to $750).
194. Forum shopping has been mentioned as another problem arising from concurrent
jurisdiction. Ison, Small Claims, 35 MOD. L. REv. 18, 32 (1972). It also has been argued that
exclusive jurisdiction should help clear the dockets of the other civil courts. NICJ REPORT,
supra note 15, at 43. An equally large number of litigants, however, may choose to take
advantage of the lower costs and more informal procedures where the small claims court's
jurisdiction is concurrent.
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Otherwise, as one writer has noted, when jurisdiction is concurrent,
some businessmen will "always bring their small claims in the
higher courts precisely because it makes it more difficult for customers to defend." '95
An inherent problem in granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
small claims court is that litigants would be deprived of an alternative forum in the regular civil court. As a practical matter, it is
unlikely that a truly innovative small claims statute would be politically feasible if the court were to be the sole forum for small claims.
For example, a primary characteristic of the model small claims
court is that representation by an attorney is not permitted. 96 Yet
if attorneys are to be barred from Tennessee's small claims court,
granting the court exclusive jurisdiction would deprive the parties
in a small claims suit of the opportunity to be represented in court.
Additionally, conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the small
claims court would, for constitutional reasons, prevent the legislature from placing controls or limitations on the use of the court. If,
for example, corporate plaintiffs began using the court as a device
to harass debtors, 9 7 the legislature would be powerless to limit the
number of suits that could be brought by corporate plaintiffs in
small claims court198 since those plaintiffs would have no alternative
forum.
For these reasons,' 9 it is recommended that the proposed Tennessee small claims court have concurrent jurisdiction with the general sessions court.
195. Ison, supra note 194, at 32.
196. For a thorough discussion of the preclusion of attorneys from the small claims
court, see text accompanying notes 300-31 infra.
197. The overuse of the small claims courts for debt collection is a frequently voiced
criticism. See, e.g., 47 Tax. L. REv. 448, 452 (1969).
198. Cf. notes 296-99 infra and accompanying text.
199. In addition to those reasons mentioned in text, 2 other arguments have been
advanced in favor of concurrent jurisdiction. First, if a particular small claims court is corrupt
or of low quality, exclusive jurisdiction will relegate the litigant to the undesirable forum.
Secondly, legitimate reasons exist for trying a case in the regular civil court. A particular case
may raise an important point of law, which the parties prefer to have resolved through the
traditional trial and appellate process, complete with attorneys and a record of the proceedings. See NICJ REroRT, supra note 15, at 44. Under the system proposed for Tennessee by
this Special Project, however, in those counties where the general sessions judge will be the
small claims judge as well, concurrent jurisdiction will have no effect. On other hand, in those
counties with more than one general sessions judge, concurrent jurisdiction will give litigants
some measure of relief from corrupt judges by allowing the litigants to bring suit either in
general sessions or in small claims court. Concurrent jurisdiction also gives the plaintiff the
option of having his case tried in circuit court. See note 192 supra.
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B.

Causes of Action

Broad relief should be available in the model small claims court
and for this reason it is important to place few limitations on the
causes of action for which the court may grant relief.2 1 In the majority of American jurisdictions, small claims courts have jurisdiction
over most civil actions, ' although suits for libel and slander frequently are excluded. '
The exclusion of libel and slander is based on the theory that
the judgment of the community is needed to determine the extent
to which a man's reputation has been wrongfully damaged,0 3 thus
requiring trial by jury. Since jury trials should not be available in
the small claims court,'

suits for defamation must be excluded

from the court's jurisdiction. It has been argued further that defamation suits entail a complexity of proof for which small claims
procedures are inadequate.2 5 Additionally, without representation
by attorneys,' 6 litigants would be unable to master the substantive

and evidentiary requirements of a defamation case. It therefore is
recommended that the Tennessee small claims court have jurisdiction over all civil actions with the exception of libel and slander.
C.

Relief Available

Most jurisdictions with small claims courts allow the court to
award money damages only, ' although in at least two states, courts
200. Cf. Part One, § IV supra.
201. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 281 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) (actions in
"tort or contract for money"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-43 (Supp. 1974-75) ("actions in contract and actions for property damages resulting from negligence in a motor vehicle accident"
and landlord-tenant security deposit cases); N.Y. UNIFORM DisT. CT. Act § 1801 (McKinney
1963) ("any cause of action for money only"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-1 (Supp. 1973) ("cases
for the recovery of money only"); WASH. REv. CODE § 12.40.010 (Supp. 1974) ("cases for the
recovery of money only").
202. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-15 (Supp. 1975); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 218,
§ 21 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5531 (Supp. 1974). Some jurisdictions exclude certain
specialized causes of action in addition to libel and slander. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8424
(Supp. 1974) (fraud excluded); OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 1925.02 (Page Supp. 1973) (suits for
alienation of affections, malicious prosecution and abuse of process).
203. Note, Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 47, 62
(Aug. 1969).
204. See text accompanying notes 367-68 infra.
205. Reform Revisited, supra note 203 at 62. Some jurisdictions permit removal to the
regular civil court on the ground of complexity. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 218, § 24
(1974); N.Y.C. Cwm CT. ACT § 1805 (McKinney 1963).
206. See text accompanying notes 314-16, 327-31 infra.
207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-15 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT.
ACT § 1801 (McKinney 1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-1 (Supp. 1973); WAsH. RaV. CODE ANN.
§ 12.40.010 (Supp. 1974).
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may grant certain equitable relief as well. 28 The argument has been
made that equitable relief is too difficult for the small claims court
to fashion. This assertion may reflect the belief that the small
claims judge is unqualified to fashion equitable relief.2",
It should be noted that the Tennessee general sessions courts
have jurisdiction in equity cases in which the subject matter does
not exceed 250 dollars, 20 which is the suggested jurisdictional limit
of the proposed small claims division. ' Therefore, granting the
small claims judge the same equity jurisdiction would not be a
departure from the present system. The argument that the small
claims judge may be unqualified to fashion equitable relief loses its
force in light of the structure of the proposed system, in which the
212
general sessions judges will staff the small claims courts.
Additional arguments compel conferring of equity jurisdiction
on the small claims court. If the small claims division is to be a
forum where substantial justice will be done, 23 the small claims
judge must be able to fashion broad remedies. For example, the
availability of equitable relief provides a consumer threatened with
suit on a contract of sale with a remedy such rescission or reformation of the contract.1 4 Perhaps more important, if equitable relief
were not allowed, small equitable claims might never be brought
because of the high cost of litigating the claim.2 5 It therefore is
recommended that equity jurisdiction be conferred on the small
208. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-522 (Cum. Supp. 1972) ("all civil actions of any type" a
special provision confers jurisdiction when "plaintiff seeks to disaffirm, avoid or rescind a
contract or agreement for the purchase of goods or services"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-01
(1974) (allows cases for "the cancellation of any agreement involving fraud, deception, misrepresentation, or false promise"). Under the Massachusetts small claims procedure, the court
has jurisdiction over all contract and tort actions, with no apparent limitation to monetary
relief. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 218, § 21 (1974). In addition, the Boston municipal court is given
jurisdiction over actions of replevin. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 218, § 54 (1974).
209. This notion may harken back to the justice of the peace system in which justices
had broad jurisdiction but lacked legal training. See Note, supra note 188, at 521.
210. TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-301 (Supp. 1974). It should be noted, however, that limitations have been placed on the exercise of general sessions equity jurisdiction by Tennessee
case law. It has been held that the justice of the peace, who exercises jurisdiction identical
to that of general sessions court, is not clothed with the extraordinary equity jurisdiction of
the chancellor. For example, he cannot enforce a lien on land for unpaid taxes or subject an
equitable estate to satisfaction of a debt. Flanagan v. Oliver Finnie Grocery Co., 98 Tenn.
599, 40 S.W. 1079 (1897); Putnam v. Bentley, 67 Tenn. 84 (1874). The scope of the justice's,
and therefore general sessions', equity jurisdiction is "in a case where equitable principles are
involved, to determine it upon equitable principles." 98 Tenn. at 603, 40 S.W. at 1080.
211. See discussion of monetary limit, text accompanying notes 225-36 infra.
212. As already noted, it is recommended that the same judges staff both courts.
213. See characterization of the small claims court at Part One, § IV supra.
214. See Forbes, supra note 52, at 319.
215. See De Minimis, supra note 77, at 490.
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claims division. 216
The question of whether injunctions and temporary restraining
orders should issue from the small claims division poses a special
problem. Tennessee Code Annotated, section 19-301 empowers the
general sessions court to issue restraining orders. 21 7 Thus, if the jurisdiction of the small claims division is to be truly concurrent with
that of general sessions, so that a plaintiff may choose either forum,
it could be argued that the small claims division must have jurisdiction to issue restraining orders. Yet small claims courts in most
jurisdictions have no power to issue injunctions and temporary restraining orders," ' based on the rationale that these extraordinary
forms of relief should issue only after a more formal procedure. 29
Furthermore, the idea of a "small claim" and the requirement of
"irreparable harm" for issuance of a restraining order seem contradictory.2 1° For these reasons it is recommended that the proposed
small claims division not be empowered to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders.
The award of court costs in an action is one final form of relief
that merits discussion.' Under the small claims court systems of
most jurisdictions,2 22 as well as in the Tennessee general sessions
courts, 22 costs generally are awarded to the winning party. Although
the potential assessment of costs might discourage a litigant with a
valid claim from bringing suit, the relatively low filing fees in the
small claims division should not operate as a deterrent. 24 Indeed,
the award of costs to the winning party obviously lessens the burden
on the litigant with a valid claim, thereby encouraging meritorious
suits. It is therefore recommended that the small claims judge be
216. The court's equity powers will stem both from the grant of equity jurisdiction and
from the statutory mandate that the judge apply equitable principles and do substantial
justice. See text accompanying notes 332-34, 350-54 infra.
217.
218.
219.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-301 (Supp. 1974).
NICJ REPOirr, supra note 15 at 36.
Id.

220. Although it might be argued that plaintiff could be threatened with irreparable
harm in the amount of $250, the loss of a possession of such limited value should not result
in irreparable harm to the plaintiff.
221. A discussion of the related question of whether the small claims court should be
allowed to award attorneys' fees has been omitted, since attorneys are to be barred under the
proposed statute. See discussion of attorneys, text accompanying notes 300-31 infra.
222. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 7455 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:1869 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-15 (1953). Some jurisdictions leave the awarding of costs
within the judge's discretion. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3909 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 5533 (1973).

223. The Tennessee provisions for award of costs are discretionary, not mandatory, and
may be apportioned between the litigants at the judge's discretion. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 201601, -1621 (1956).
224. See discussion of filing fees, text accompanying notes 265-70 infra.
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allowed to award costs to the winning party. In keeping with present
Tennessee procedure, it is recommended that this award be discretionary.
D.

Monetary Limit

The primary question in regard to the proper jurisdictional
amount for a small claims court is whether to opt for a high figure
in order to encompass the maximum number of consumer claims or
whether to choose a smaller figure for the sake of consistency with
the small claims ideals of simplicity and informality.22 Other jurisdictions have differed greatly with respect to jurisdictional monetary limits. The amounts vary from as low as 200 dollars22 to as high
as 2,000 dollars 217 with the average limit in courts surveyed being 489
dollars and the median 400 dollars.
If the small claims court is viewed as a forum for consumer
protection, 228 the jurisdictional limit should be relatively high in
order to encompass major consumer items such as televisions, refrigerators, and automobiles.22 9 Furthermore, a high jurisdictional limit
makes less likely the diminution of the effective jurisdiction of the
small claims courts by rising prices during an inflationary period.2e
The more persuasive arguments, however, urge the adoption of
a fairly low jurisdictional limit. One of the principal virtues of a
small claims court is that because of its informal procedures, a
litigant may sue in his own behalf and thereby forego the expense
of an attorney. This benefit may be lost by setting a high monetary
limit since suits involving larger sums will be important enough to
litigants to justify the trouble and expense of hiring an attorney. 231
225. See characterization of the small claims court at Part One, § IV supra.
226. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7451 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:643 (Supp. 1974) (limit increased to $500 if rent security deposit involved); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-08.1-01 (1974). Although Kansas purports to create a small debtors court with a jurisdictional limit of only $20, the court is defunct. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-1304 (1974). One reason
given for the demise of that court is that the monetary limit was "highly obsolescent," simply
too small for the court to be effective. Oglesby and Carr, supra note 41 at 238. The New
Orleans city courts have exclusivb jurisdiction over cases not exceeding $100, but these courts
have considerably higher concurrent jurisdiction. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 91.
227. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-1 (1970). It should be mentioned that a very small
minority of states place no monetary limit on certain types of cases. See, e.g., HAwAn Rv.
LAws § 633-27 (Supp. 1974) (unlimited jurisdiction allowed in landlord-tenant cases where
the suit is for recovery of a security deposit); cf. TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, §1
(1971) (jurisdictional limit raised from $150 to $200 if suit is for recovery of wages).
228. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
229. Cf. De Minimis, supra note 76, at 489, criticizing the $500 limit in New York as
excluding a large number of cases.
230. Note, supra note 188, at 529.
231. See NADER STUDY, supra note 29, at 36. A logical extension of this argument is that
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Furthermore, it has been observed that higher monetary limits generally lead to more formal court procedures. 2 Thus, the informality
essential to an effective small claims court may be hampered or lost
if substantial sums are involved. It also has been suggested that
higher claims will increase the likelihood of appeal, thereby protracting the litigation 3and bringing into question the finality of
small claims decisions .1
This study recommends that the small claims division for Tennessee have a jurisdictional limit of 250 dollars. Important practical
reasons, in addition to the policy reasons noted above, justify this
relatively low limit. One of the primary purposes of a small claims
court is to provide a forum where individuals may bring claims that
are too small to be economically tried with attorneys. With the 3550 dollar per hour fee range charged by most Tennessee attorneys,
claims under 250 dollars normally cannot be tried economically with
an attorney. 23 In addition, a statute excluding attorneys from small
claims court would be more politically feasible with a 250-dollar
jurisdictional limit since a suit for less than this amount presumably
will be unattractive to most attorneys. 25 Although the 250-dollar
limit would exclude suits involving automobiles and major appliances from the court's jurisdiction, it will encompass most mediumpriced consumer goods, and those actions excluded may always be
brought in general sessions or circuit court. 253
in jurisdictions where attorneys are barred from the small claims court, the litigant is likely
to choose the regular civil court as the forum for his larger case in order to be afforded the
opportunity of counsel and the traditional trial procedure.
232. Fowks, Small Claims Courts: Simplified Pleadingsand Procedures, 37 J. KAN. B.
ASS'N 167, 169 (1968).
233.

NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 41.

234. Interview with J. Hollings, President of the Nashville Bar Association, in Nashville, Tennessee, Nov. 21, 1974.
235. The majority of attorneys and judges questioned by the members of this Special
Project stated that because of the reason stated in text, there should be little bar association
opposition to a small claims court statute with a jurisdictional limit of $250.
Even if attorneys were not barred from the court outright, use of counsel is obviously
discouraged by a jurisdictional limit unappealing to lawyers. The small claims court does,
however, put the attorney in the favorable position of being able to advise the client of the
court's existence and provide a short pretrial conference for a minimal fee; whereas, if the
court did not exist, the attorney is often put in the uncomfortable position of having to tell a
good client that a justifiable cause or claim is not worth litigating. Forbes, supra note 52, at
328-29.
236. See discussion of the proposed concurrent jurisdiction of the small claims division,
text accompanying notes 192-99 supra.
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PRETRIAL PROCEDURES

Service of Process

In an effective small claims court, service of process must be
rapid, effective, and inexpensive. The primary question regarding
service of process is whether the model small claims statute for
Tennessee should utilize service by registered mail or personal service. In most other jurisdictions, service by mail is an alternative but
not an exclusive method of service in small claims courts.2s7 This
method has met with repeated success. 2 8 Personal service, however,
239
has traditionally been utilized in Tennessee courts.
The strongest argument in favor of retaining personal service is
the traditional belief that the defendant is more likely to appear if
he is personally served. 2 " Service of process by registered mail, however, is both cheaper and quicker than personal service by a sheriff,21 and the returned receipt insures that defendant actually received the summons. Moreover, in large urban areas problems have
been encountered with personal service because of corrupt process
servers who often never attempt actual service but instead falsify
the return, a practice known as "sewer service. 242 The server's oath
apparently has proved an ineffective deterent to this practice. Finally, constitutional due process requirements must be considered
in insuring effective service. 24 It is therefore recommended that the
initial method of service be by registered mail; in the event of non237. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 117c (West Supp. 1975) (personal service also
allowed); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503:6 (1968) (if service cannot be effected by registered
mail, the court may direct that service be made "as in all other actions at law"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-6-3 (1953) (personal service also allowed); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 12.40.040
(Supp. 1974) (service by registered mail an alternative method of service; traditional methods
also allowed).
238. Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 52.
239. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 4.03, 4.04.
240.

NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 70. But cf. D. CAPLOVITz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE

199-201 (1974), for a discussion of problems encountered with personal service in Chicago,
Detroit, and New York City.
241. Delivery by registered mail costs only a little over $1,whereas service by the sheriff
costs approximately $5. See 47 TEX. L. Rav. 448, 453-54 (1969), criticizing personal service
as one of the ineffective provisions of the Texas small claims court statute.
242. Reform Revisited, supra note 204, at 53. The claim made is that the process server
will "throw the summons into the sewer," then swear that the summons has been served. For
a complete discussion of this problem, see Abuse of Process:Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 17 (1967). The only evidence uncovered by this Special Project that this problem
exists in Tennessee were statements by some general sessions judges that there may be
occasions when the summons never reaches the defendant but that the problem is not chronic.
E.g., Interview with the Honorable Donald Washburn, Davidson County General Sessions
Court Judge, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 17, 1975.
243. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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delivery, personal service will be required, but with no additional
charge to the small claims litigant.
B.

Venue

The primary objective in drafting a small claims court venue
provision is to designate a forum that is convenient for both litigants, thereby minimizing expense and delay. In the majority of
jurisdictions, venue in small claims court cases is in the county
where the defendant resides or does business. 24 This could create a
hardship for the plaintiff, who may be forced to travel many miles
to the defendant's county. 24 5 Several small claims statutes provide
that venue also may be where the claim arose or where the contract
was to be performed. 2 "1This type of provision may work a hardship
on the defendant, however. For example, companies that employ
salesmen who sell goods throughout the state may utilize contracts
providing for performance at the company's corporate headquarters.
Although the buyer might be able to bring an action for breach of
warranty in his own county if the goods prove shoddy, if he stops
payment the company can maintain an action in the county of its
corporate headquarters, which may be many miles from the buyer's
place of residence.247 The poor or uneducated consumer who is unwilling or unable to travel many miles to defend, even though he has
a valid defense, is likely to default in this situation.248
At present, the Tennessee venue statute provides for trial of
civil actions "in the county where the cause of action arose or in the
county where the defendant resides or is found. ' 249 It is recommended that the model small claims court statute for Tennessee
follow the general Tennessee venue provisions. It is recommended
further that the statute provide for change of venue at the judge's
discretion to prevent undue hardship to the parties."' Additionally,
244. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 218, § 21 (1974) (statute has provision allowing
defendant to waive improper venue); 14 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7453 (Supp. 1975) (only
where defendant resides); N.Y. UNiFoPm DIST. CT. Acr § 1801 (McKinney 1963); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-6-1 (Supp. 1973) (only where defendant resides).
245. Note, The CaliforniaSmall Claims Court, 52 CA w. L. REv. 876, 889 (1964).
246. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8415 (Supp. 1974); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 2460a, § 3 (1971).
247. Note, supra note 245, at 889; 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 493, 499 (1969). If reduced costs
and delays are to be a virtue of the small claims court, requiring the defendant to travel to a
distant judicial district is "absurd." Id.
248. 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 493, 499 (1969).
249. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-401 (Supp. 1974).
250. Such a provision has been widely recommended for small claims courts. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 245, at 889; Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 54; cf. 42 S. CAL. L. Rav.
493, 500 (1969), discussing the similar doctrine of forum non conveniens.
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the defendant should be allowed to move for a change of venue by
25
mail. 1
C.

Pleadings

Most commentators agree that the small claims complaint
should be as simple as possible, containing a concise statement of
the plaintiffs claim and informing the defendant where he should
go to defend and what will happen if he fails to appear. 252 If the small
claims procedure is to be simple and informal, and if attorneys are
barred from the courts,2 5 3 complicated pleading must be avoided to
ensure that the proceedings are comprehensible to the average small
claims litigant.
It is recommended that the Tennessee small claims division use
a combination summons-complaint, similar to the warrant now
used in general sessions court. 254 The warrant should be simplified,
however, to require only the name of the court, the names and
addresses of the plaintiff and defendant, the name of the county in
which the action was commenced, and a statement of the claim in
concise form, including pertinent dates. As noted above, the defendant should be informed of the place of trial and what will happen
if he fails to appear.
The question of whether an answer should be required in small
claims court is more difficult. Requiring an answer should arguably
minimize delays due to surprise, avoid unnecessary appearances by
plaintiffs when the defendant defaults, and clarify issues for the
court. 55

It is doubtful, however, that an answer actually minimizes
delay overall since in most cases an oral answer at the hearing is
simpler, quicker and eliminates paper work by litigants and court
personnel. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the requirement
of an answer increases defaults since the defendant automatically
loses if he fails to answer within the prescribed time.2 6 The majority
of American jurisdictions with small claims courts do not require an
answer,27 and it is recommended that Tennessee not require a writ251. See Note, supra note 245, at 889.
252. See, e.g., Note, The Nature and Operationof the New York Small Claims Courts,
38 ALBANY L. Rav. 196, 200 (1974); Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 50-51, noting that
oversimplification may conceivably work an injustice if the defendant is given insufficient
information to formulate his defense.
253. See discussion of attorneys, text accompanying notes 300-31 infra.
254. See TENN. Con ANN. § 1135 (Supp. 1974) (commencement of actions in generalsessions court).
255. Albany Note, supra note 252, at 200.
256. NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 91.
257. See, e.g., CAL. Cw. PRO. CoDE § 117h (West Supp. 1974) (defendant may file a
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ten answer but allow defendant to file an answer if he wishes.
A special problem is presented by Tennessee Code Annotated
section 24-509, which provides that a sworn account is deemed conclusive proof of the existence of a debt unless a denial under oath is
filed by the defendant. Although this provision facilitates the collection of debts in cases when the defendant has no real defense,25 the
individual litigant who does not understand this technical requirement may be deprived of an adequate hearing. It is therefore recommended that section 24-509 be made inapplicable to cases brought
in the small claims division.
Provisions dealing with counterclaims involve two conflicting
policies. On the one hand, the policy favoring a quick and thorough
dispensation of justice calls for the resolution of all the issues of a
case in a single hearing. On the other hand, the policy favoring
widespread use of small claims courts by individual litigants militates against the allowance of unlimited counterclaims by more
powerful defendants since potential claimants may refrain from
using the court out of fear of a large counterclaim. Furthermore, in
states where a counterclaim in excess of the small claims court's
jurisdictional limit results in automatic removal of the case to the
civil court of record," 9 the defendant can escape the jurisdiction of
the small claims court simply by filing a colorable counterclaim in
20
excess of the monetary limit.

Although most other jurisdictions allow counterclaims in small
claims courts,25 1 some statutes require that the counterclaim arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence as plaintiff's claim.2

2 The

1

time waste resulting from multiple litigation arising from the same
occurrence provides a strong argument against the complete disallowance of counterclaims in small claims court. In view of these
considerations it is recommended that counterclaims be allowed in
verified answer stating any new matter which shall constitute a counterclaim); IDAHO CODE
§ 1-2309 (Supp. 1974) (no pleading necessary other than claim and notice); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110A § 286 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (defendant need not file an answer unless ordered to do
so by the court). Contra, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 10-16-9 (Supp. 1974) ("Upon the hearing,
the defendant shall in writing file in court his answer or defense to the plaintiff's claim").
258. See TaN. CODE ANN. § 24-509, comment 1 (1956, Supp. 1974).
259. See, e.g., N.Y. UNiFoRM DisT. CT. Ac § 1805 (McKinney 1963); PaL. Sup. CT. R.
110(b) (1974); cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 10-16-9 (Supp. 1974) (if defendant counterclaims in
excess of the jurisdictional limit and wins, plaintiff takes a nonsuit; defendant is awarded
costs only in small claims court but may pursue his counterclaim elsewhere). But see HAWAn
REV. STAT. § 633-30 (Supp. 1974) (action stays in small claims court so long as the counterclaim does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the district court).
260. De Minimis, supra note 77, at 496.
261. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 117h (West Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:643 (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 10-16-9 (Supp. 1974).
262. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 299.02 (Supp. 1974).
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the model small claims court. Counterclaims should be restricted,
however, to those within the jurisdiction of the court that arise from
the transaction or occurrence complained of. If the counterclaim
exceeds the court's jurisdictional limit, the case should be automatically removed to the general sessions court. Furthermore, all counterclaims should be deemed permissive rather than mandatory.
Although it may be argued that the recommended provision
allows the defendant to escape the jurisdiction of the court by counterclaiming over 250 dollars, the counterclaim must be valid before
the case can be removed.21 3 The requirement that the counterclaim

arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiffs
claim reduces the likelihood of a valid counterclaim in excess of the
jurisdictional limit. Of course, excessive counterclaims without
basis can be dismissed by the court. Moreover, as a practical matter, this type of provision has not been greatly abused; for example,
during a one-year period in New York City fewer than one percent
of the cases filed in small claims court were removed to the regular
civil court." 4
D. Filing Fees

A low fee structure is important to the effective functioning of
a small claims court, because it encourages middle and lower income litigants to utilize the court.2

5

There are valid reasons, how-

ever, for retention of at least a minimal filing fee. First, these fees
should help to discourage frivolous suits. Secondly, a filing fee
should deter collection agencies, finance companies, and other corporate plaintiffs from using the small claims court to threaten debtors.

6

Admittedly, one of the chief uses of the court will remain debt

collection, but at least this function will not be subsidized by the
state.
In other jurisdictions, a fee of one dollar to $3.50 usually covers
filing and service of process. 27 A slightly higher fee of five dollars is
263. De Minimis, supra note 77, at 496.
264. Id. It should be noted that in the situation where the consumer, for example, pays
$200 on a $900 sales contract, stops payment, then sues for return of his money, the defendant
can counterclaim for $700 and thereby remove to the regular court. Id.
265. See characterization of the small claims court at Part One, § IV supra.
266. One theory is to set the fee at a level which slightly exceeds the usual cost to a
corporation of sending a typical series of letters notifying customers of delinquent accounts.
Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 51-52.
267. See, e.g., CAL. C1V. PRO. CODE § l17p (West Supp. 1974) ($2 plus $1.50 for each
copy of an affidavit sent to a defendant); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 218, § 22 (1974) ($3); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:18-65 (1952) ($2.10 plus 40¢ for each additional defendant); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 12.40.030 (Supp. 1974) ($1). Some small claims courts provide for higher filing fees for
frequent users of the court. See note 295 infra and accompanying text.
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recommended for the Tennessee statute,268 however, in order to partially finance the operation of the court. Although this fee will not
totally defer the expenses of the small claims division, this amount
strikes a balance between the legitimate fiscal needs of the state and
the policy of encouraging broad use of the court.2"9 It also is recommended that the model statute provide for a waiver of the filing fee
if the claimant takes a pauper's oath.270
E. Scheduling of Trials
Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1207 and Rule 40 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure outline the present system for
scheduling cases in Tennessee trial courts. These are essentially
mechanical rules and serve adequately. It therefore is recommended
that no special provision be made for the initial scheduling of trials
in the small claims division.
An acute problem, however, has been created by the frequent
use of continuances in general sessions courts. This Project's analysis of the Davidson County general sessions court docket revealed
that a significant number of cases are continued, causing considerable delay in the trial of all general sessions cases. 27 ' The possibility

of abuse of the continuance procedure is great since continuances
are often granted for little or no reason, merely out of professional
courtesy, in small claims courts in other jurisdictions. In addition,
defendants may exploit continuances to defeat bona fide claims by
2
27
delaying trial until the plaintiff drops his case.

Since the unlimited use of continuances could defeat the small
claims court goal of a speedy trial, it is recommended that a party's
first request for a continuance be granted whenever the judge determines that such request is warranted and in the interest of justice,
268. It is recommended that this fee cover filing and service of process.
269. The model statute should also be more politically feasible if the filing fee provides
at least some measure of economic support for the court.
270. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1974) (pauper's oath may be given in lieu
of cost bond).
271. The Knox County General Sessions Court Study revealed that 35% of the cases
heard during the observation period were continued at least once, while 18% of the cases
continued were continued 2 or more times. The study also took a random sample of cases, of
which 21% were continued at least once. Of this 21%, 49% were continued more than once.
Knox County Report supra note 152, at 35-37. The writers of the report were of the opinion
that, because the first trial date was chosen by the plaintiff's attorney, the court could not
be criticized for granting continuances and thereby contributing to delay. The report did not
deny, however, that continuances contributed to delay and seemed to imply that it was
usually the defendant who took advantage of the procedure.
272. NADER STUDY, supra note 29, at 79-80. See also NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at
145-47.
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but that a more rigid standard 273 be applied to subsequent requests,
unless the parties and the judge agree to the continuance.
F. Evening and Saturday Sessions
One reason cited for the high default rate in the Tennessee
general sessions court is that many defendants do not feel their case
merits missing a day's work. 274 It is even more likely that a plaintiff

will forego bringing suit on a small claim merely because of the
inconvenience of the hours of the court. Though this is a problem
that should be dealt with by rule of court rather than by statute, it
is highly recommended that evening and Saturday small claims
court sessions be established for the convenience of the average
citizen.

25
1

"How TO SUE" MANUALS
Small claims courts in several jurisdictions have been underutilized by average citizens but overly utilized by business plainV.

PUBLICITY AND

tiffs. 271 Business concerns are often far more familiar with the legal

process than the individual.27 It therefore is essential to the success
of the Tennessee small claims division that the public be thoroughly
informed of the existence and operation of the court both by means
of publicity and through instruction manuals for individual litigants. A model instruction manual is set out in Appendix B.
VI.

CLAIMANTS, COUNSEL AND COURT PERSONNEL

A.

PartiesPlaintiff

One of the salient characteristics of the Tennessee general sessions courts and of courts of limited jurisdiction in other states has
been the dominance of business interests over consumer interests.2
This predominant position of business will not cease automatically,
however, with the establishment of a small claims court.2

9

In fact,

273. E.g., "dire circumstances" or "only upon agreement of the other party." See NICJ
supra note 15, at 146.
274. Interview with the Honorable Gale Robinson, Presiding Judge of the General Sessions Court of Davidson County, in Nashville, Tennessee, Nov. 21, 1974.
275. NADER STUDY, supra note 29, at 80.
276. Haemmel, The North CarolinaSmall Claims Court-An EmpiricalStudy, 9 WAKE
FOREST L. Rav. 503 (1973).
277. Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 185, at 297.
278. See text accompanying notes 154-57. A survey of British courts in 1968 found that
90% of the summons were issued on behalf of corporations or utilities. The surveyors added
that a good portion of the suits filed by individuals were probably brought for small businesses
in the proprietors' names. CONSUMER COUNCIL, supranote 87, at 13.
279. In the small claims branch of the municipal court of Chicago, 80% of the cases
REPORT,
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the low court costs and summary nature of the proceedings have
encouraged businesses to use small claims courts where they exist
to collect delinquent accounts.2"' In some small claims courts the use
of this efficient collection process by businessmen and finance companies so pervades the court that legal writers have referred to them
as "super collection agencies.1 21' In proposing restrictions on the use
of small claims courts as devices for collection of debts by merchants
and lenders, several writers have argued that small claims courts are
run frequently at a loss to the taxpayer, and that allowing unlimited
28 2
use by businesses amounts to subsidizing their collection process.
On the other hand, restricting these companies' use of the small
claims mechanism will not deprive them of an adequate judicial
remedy since the regular civil courts, such as general sessions, are
still available to them.283 In addition, allowing merchants to rely on
a streamlined small claims process to collect overdue accounts may
encourage some sellers to extend credit to high-risk customers with
the expectation of quick and easy collection in small claims court
after default.2s4
The repeated use of the small claims court by business plaintiffs creates problems apart from the risk of abuse by unscrupulous
businessmen. An agent of a business using the courts frequently
becomes familiar with the format and simplified procedures of the
small claims court as well as the relevant substantive law governing
represent commercial collections or assigned claims. Robinson, A Small Claims Division for
Chicago'sNew Circuit Court, 44 Cm. B. RECoRD 421, 422 (1963). In a study of the small claims
courts in Oakland-Piedmont-Emeryville, California, 60% of all actions were initiated by
businesses and government agencies, while over 80% of all suits were defended by individuals.
52 CALIF. L. Rxv. 876, 884 (1964). An additional indicator of business domination was revealed
in a study of the Pomona, California small claims division. When a private party was a
defendant, and a business or government agency was plaintiff, the plaintiff had a favorable
judgment in 93% of the cases. When the roles were reversed, an individual plaintiff won in
only 65.5% of cases. 1 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 71, 75(1973). See Appendix A, Tables 1 & 2 infra.
280. 14 U.C.L.A. INm. L. Ray. 879, 885 (1967). For an article encouraging doctors to
employ small claims facilities as a collection device, see Perrin, Small Claims Courts Can
Help Collect Your Fees, 32 MEDICAL EcONOMICS 119 (Feb. 1955).
281. Forbes, supra note 52, at 333. For a discussion of abuses by collection agencies in
the California small claims court system, see Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661,
668-69, 504 P.2d 1249, 1254-55, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785, 790-91 (1973);4 STAN. L. Rav. 237, 237-40
(1952).
282. 4 STAN. L. Rgv. 237, 241 (1952).
283. 34 COLUM.L. REv. 932, 941-42 n.74 (l^34). See Adolph M. Schwartz, Inc. v. Burnett Pharmacy, 112 Cal. App. 781, 785, 295 P. 508, 509 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct. of L.A. County
1931). As was noted supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text, businesses in Tennessee
presently use the general sessions courts to collect delinquent accounts. Though general
sessions is not as inexpensive or as informal for the layman as a small claims court, the court
does provide an efficient forum for debt collection. See generally Knox County Report, supra
note 152, at 23-52.
284. See D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 47, at 21-25.
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a specific type of case. In a court where defendants are rarely represented by counsel these "professional plaintiffs" have significant
advantages over individual defendants.2 85 More significantly, the
use of small claims courts as a debt collection device is directly
contrary to the function of the model small claims court as a forum
286
for consumer relief.
Numerous solutions to the problem of the potential dominance
by business interests in small claims courts have been suggested and
enacted. 2 7 The primary method used by states to prevent business
domination of small claims courts has been to deny access to the
courts to certain types of plaintiffs. 28 The most frequent restriction
has been the prohibition of suits brought by assignees, 29 thus pre285. Persecutionand Intimidation,supranote 45, at 1662. This participation by professional plaintiffs results in a form of limited legal education. One writer has suggested that
not only should lawyers be barred from the small claims courts, but also the "semiprofessionals." 1 PEPPERDINE L. Rav. 71, 81 (1973). Cf. State ex rel. Long v. McLeod, 6 Wash.
App. 848, 496 P.2d 540 (1972).
286. See Part One, § IV supra.See generally CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 87; Eovaldi
& Gestrin, supra note 185; Steadman & Rosenstein, "Small Claims" Consumer Plaintiffs in
the PhiladelphiaMunicipal Court: An EmpiricalStudy, 121 U. PA. L. Rv. 1309 (1973).
287. One proposal that no states have adopted is to create separate sections of the small
claims court, one for business plaintiffs and another for individual plaintiffs. Hearings would
be conducted on separate days or in different court rooms. Robinson, supra note 279, at 42126. This proposal attempts to remedy the problem of clerks and judges giving less attention
to individual litigants than to business litigants who frequently use the small claims court
and are known to them. Segregating the cases could result in an atmosphere where court
personnel are more responsive to the problems of the pro se litigant. Another variation of the
segregated-plaintiff approach would have counsel provided at no cost to all indigent defendants in the business section of the small claims court, though this would be unnecessary in
the individual plaintiff section. Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 66-67. This is a partial
solution, however, because it does not discourage overreaching by unscrupulous businessmen.
Although appointing counsel for indigents may help counter the expertise of professional
plaintiffs, adding professionals to the small claims process merely results in added delay and
procedural technicality. See text accompany notes 314-15 infra. The business plaintiff section, in fact, would probably be indistinguishable from courts similar to the present Tennessee general sessions courts. In addition, the cost of having two divisions of a small claims court
other than in large urban counties may be prohibitive.
288. American courts have generally argued that these plaintiffs (primarily assignees
and corporations, see notes 289 and 291 infra) are not denied due process or equal protection
since the classification seems reasonable, and these plaintiffs have an alternative remedy
such as initiating a suit in general sessions or circuit courts. Cf. People ex rel. Brixton
Operating Corp. v. La Fetra, 194 App. Div. 523, 186 N.Y.S. 58 (1st Dept. 1920), aff'd sub
nom. People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921). In
La Fetrathe New York Legislature enacted a statute denying landlords access to lower courts
for the purpose of instituting summary proceedings for the removal of tenants. The supreme
court relied on Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U.S. 747 (1887), and stated that the
legislature could withdraw or modify any remedy at will, provided it left another adequate
remedy available to this class of plaintiffs. Since the landlords had available an action for
ejectment, the statute was not unconstitutional. Cf. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh,
187 U.S. 437, 439 (1903).
289. CAL. Cirv. PRO. CODE § 117f (West Supp. 1975) (no assignee may file or prosecute a
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venting the use of the courts by collection agencies. 20 A few states
have gone farther in restricting categories of plaintiffs,29' and one
proposal to create small claims courts in Great Britain suggested a
total ban on the use of the small claims292process by assignees, corporations, partnerships and associations.
The total exclusion of commercial plaintiffs may not be the best
solution to the problems enumerated above, however. It would be
fundamentally unfair to exclude an entire class of plaintiffs from a
useful adjudicative process because of the abuses of a few. Furthermore, consumer defendants receive substantial benefits from defending a suit in a small claims court, such as reduced court costs
2 3
and counsel fees, night sessions, and relaxed procedural rules. 1
Finally, a small claims court act that grants some access to business
plaintiffs would be more acceptable to the Tennessee business community, and would have a better chance of passage by the legislature.9
The imposition of restrictions on the use of small claims procedure is less drastic than an absolute prohibition, and is perhaps the
claim with the exception of a trustee in bankruptcy and a holder of a conditional sales
contract who has purchased the contract for investment and not collection purposes); NEE.
REv. STAT. § 24-523(1), (4) & (5) (Cum. Supp. 1972) (no assigned claims may be filed, and

only a party to the transaction with the defendant for which the claim is brought may file
and prosecute a claim); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-6 (1953) (no assignee may file or prosecute a
claim).
290. Oglesby & Carr, supra note 41, at 242. A prohibition against assignees alone,
however, is not sufficient to keep financial institutions out of the small claims courts.
HearingsBefore Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 n.1 (1968). Some courts distinguish between assignees and
third-party beneficiaries. Accordingly, a finance or factoring company can bring suit in a
small claims court to collect on a delinquent account if the company is named as a thirdparty beneficiary in the initial agreement signed by the consumer-defendant. See Merchants
Serv. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 94 Adv. Cal. App. 2d 154, 210 P.2d 543 (1949), rev'd on
other grounds, 35 Cal. 2d 109, 216 P.2d 846 (1950).
291. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8407 (Supp. 1974) (no claim may be filed or prosecuted
by an assignee, or by a third-party beneficiary); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. AcT § 1809 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (no assignee, or corporation, may institute a claim, except for a municipal
or public benefit corporation, or for a school district; nor may an insurer bring an action,
either in its own name or that of its insured). An amendment in 1964 deleted the exclusion
of partnerships and associations from use of the New York small claims court. Tzx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, § 2 (1971) (no assignee or collection agent may bring an action; nor
may any person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation engaged primarily or secondarily in the business of lending money at interest). Senator Pearson introduced a bill in 1971
that would provide financial assistance to encoarage states to establish "consumer claims
courts." The states would be eligible for assistance, though, only if they excluded collection
agencies, assignees and persons engaged in the business of lending money at interest. S. 1602,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(2)(A) (1971).
292. CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 87, at 30.
293. Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 65; 4 STAN. L. Rav. 237, 241 (1952).
294. See Note, supra note 188, at 535.
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best solution to the business dominance problem. The statute could
require that court costs be increased by a specified amount each

time a plaintiff files an additional claim.2 95 After the first suit these

costs would be levied on the plaintiff who would bear the costs of
repeated use of the court. Another alternative, which has been
adopted by Nebraska and Ohio, is the best means of accommodating the conflicting policies of free access to the small claims court
and prevention of its misuse.2

6

This method limits the number of

times any one plaintiff may bring a suit in small claims court within

a specified period of time.2 7 In this way, the dominance of business

plaintiffs may be avoided without depriving merchants and individual defendant-debtors of some access to the small claims procedure.
Weekly and yearly limitations give flexibility to a plaintiff with a
few claims while simultaneously prohibiting mass filings. 9 ' It is
recommended that the model statute for Tennessee allow any person, association, or business to bring suit in the small claims court,
but that each plaintiff be limited to no more than two claims per
week and twenty-five claims per year.299 In order to make the provi295. NADER STUDY, supra note 29, at 211. The Nader Study suggests that the model
small claims court increase by not more than 20 cents the filing fees for the second and
subsequent claims filed by a plaintiff in any one year. The NICJ Report recommended
limiting access to court to 3 cases per 30-day period. NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 101-02.
296. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-523(6) (Cum. Supp. 1972) (no party shall file more than 2
claims within a calendar week, nor more than 10 claims within any calendar year). Onso REv.
CODE ANN. § 1925.08 (Page Supp. 1973) (no party shall file more than 6 claims within any
30-day period). The New Hampshire and Maine small claims statutes originally limited
claimants to 5 claims in any one week, and 20 claims in any one month. Me. Rev. Stat. ch.
109, § 5 (1954) (repealed 1957); N.H. Rev. Laws ch. 378, § 5 (1942) (repealed 1955). See Klein,
Buyer vs. Seller in Small Claims Court, 36 CoNsuMR REP. 628 (Oct. 1971).
297. One proposal, instead of limiting the number of cases that could be filed, would
impose a good-faith credit requirement in all businesses suing on debts, thereby limiting use
of the court to companies with "clean hands." 4 STAN. L. REv. 237, 242-43 (1952). This
suggestion is based on Congressman Celler's proposed bill H.R. 33, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951). Though unscrupulous businessmen who engage in overextension of credit, sales of
shoddy merchandise, overpricing, and misrepresentation may not win on the merits, there is
nothing in this solution to stop them from initiating a claim in the small claims court. It
certainly does not decrease the number of cases brought by collection agencies who do not
engage in these sharp business tactics. Furthermore, the "clean hands" standard is vague and
difficult to prove in a forum with summary process and no counsel.
298. Mass filings characterize the civil dockets of courts of general sessions of both
Davidson and Bedford counties. In Davidson County the Metro Development and Housing
Agency filed 171 warrants on September 13, 1974, of which 119 came to trial on September
26, 1974. Even more indicative of the dominance that can be caused by shear numbers is the
use of the Bedford County General Sessions Court by the Shelbyville and Bedford County
Ambulance Authority. On August 19, 1974, the Ambulance Authority filed 83 warrants; this
figure should be compared with the total number of cases, 66, brought before the court in
the entire month of September 1974. See Appendix A, Table 1 infra.
299. The proposed model statute requires that the plaintiff sign an affidavit to the effect
that he has not exceeded his filing limit. This provision ensures that the plaintiff has knowledge of the limitation. See Part Four, § 11(b) infra.
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sion self-enforcing and to penalize any abuse of the small claims
procedure, all claims filed in excess of the number allowed should
be decided summarily in favor of the defendant at the discretion of
the judge.
B.

Attorneys

The role of the attorney in the small claims court has been the
most controversial policy issue involved in the creation of small
claims courts. Even though the use of attorneys in small claims
courts has been prohibited altogether in some states, a few states
actively encourage their presence. 3 0 Representation by attorneys is
passively encouraged in still other states by omitting any reference
to attorneys in the small claims court statute, 30 ' by setting very high
jurisdictional limits, 3 2 or by allowing jury trials in small claims
courts, which requires evidentiary rules and formal procedure. 303
Those legal scholars who favor allowing representation by attorneys have argued forcefully that in some cases the attorney acts as
an essential spokesman for an individual litigant incapable of presenting his case pro se .3 °4 The "disadvantaged" litigant may be ignorant of essential facts or defenses in his case, or frightened, inarticulate, or illiterate.30 5 It is further argued that the presence of attorneys
300. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-15 (Supp. 1975) (attorneys specifically allowed); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 4-5804b (Bums Supp. 1974) (all nonnatural litigants must be represented by
legal counsel); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1925.17 (Page Supp. 1973) (corporation may be represented by attorney or bona fide officer or employee; but if by the latter, then the corporation
may not engage in cross-examination, argument, or other acts of advocacy).
301. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:6-41 et seq. and 2A:18-65 et seq. (1952).
302. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 22.15.040 (1971) (jurisdictional limit is $1000); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110A, § 281 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) ($1000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 631.1 (Supp. 1974)
($1000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-1 (1970) ($2000).
303. In. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 285 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (plaintiff may demand a jury
trial at the time the action is commenced, and defendant may demand a jury by the date he
is required to appear); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-03 (1974) (either party may demand a jury
trial before the commencement of the trial); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1761 (Supp. 1974)
(either party may demand a jury if a demand is made 48 hours prior to time of defendant's
appearance, accompanied by a deposit of $25); TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, § 11
(1971) (each party has a right to demand a jury); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5535 (1973)
(defendant may request a jury prior to date of his appearance if he files an affidavit that there
are questions of fact in the cause requiring trial, with specifications thereof, that such jury
request is intended in good faith, and deposits a jury fee of $4).
304. This elitist approach is exemplified in the following quotation: "Coupled with this
conclusion [that poor litigants will appear frequently as defendants in suits brought by
collection agencies] is the fact that the economically disadvantaged may be unfit both
psychologically and intellectually to legally defend themselves ...
" Note, supra note 188,
at 535-36. See text accompanying notes 328-29 infra.
305. E.g., Committee on Small Claims and Conciliation Procedure, Report, 10 A.B.A.J.
828, 830 (1924); 34 COLUM. L. Rav. 932, 938 (1934); Persecutionand Intimidation,supra note
45, at 1661.
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in small claims courts will discourage businessmen from taking advantage of consumer defendants by equalizing the bargaining position of both sides."' The lawyer can investigate facts, interrogate
witnesses, argue questions of law and protect the rights of his
client-functions better performed by an attorney than by the
judge."' Finally, it has been argued that there is a need for counsel
to take an active role in small claims litigation to be able to recommend legislation and to select certain cases for appeal in order to
develop a body of law that assists the poor." 8
The basic fallacies underlying the arguments in favor of allowin small claims court are readily apparent, however.
attorneys
ing
While most legal scholars favoring the use of attorneys recognize
that these courts often become havens for skillful collection agency
lawyers rather than for neighborhood litigants suing over small
39
loans, property damage, and consumer complaints, these scholars
fail to see that this phenomenon is not so much related to the absence of lawyers as to the unlimited presence of business interests.
The suggestion that this problem may be remedied by the availability of additional lawyers is unpersuasive. Moreover, the availability
10
and quality of free legal services must be questioned at the outset.
The model small claims court is not designed primarily for "small
claimants," poor litigants who are eligible for free legal assistance.
306. Murphy, supra note 61, at 18.
307. Id. at 16.
308. Id.
309. Even Judge Tim Murphy of the District of Columbia court of general sessions, who
has been most vocal in support of attorneys practicing in small claims courts, has criticized
the present D.C. small claims branch which allows representation by counsel. Id. at 15. Yet
he not only continues to favor presence of attorneys of large credit stores, but would increase
the number of lawyers by requiring the Junior Bar and the Neighborhood Legal Services
Project each to assign a lawyer to attend small claims court and accept assigned cases. Id. at
18-19. Another author, while criticizing the presence of lawyers and "professional plaintiffs,"
suggests that the court counter this by providing "legal technicians" to represent litigants
without counsel, or to appoint a "friend of the defendant." Persecutionand Intimidation,
supra note 45, at 1675-84. Another similar suggestion is for "institutionalized counselling and
advocacy." The author would form plaintiff and defendant divisions where litigants could go
for counselling prior to the hearing. At the hearing each party could be represented by an
officer from the plaintiff or defendant divisions or by himself. These divisions would be staffed
by law school graduates, paralegal assistants, and law students. Adams, The Small Claims
Court and the Adversary Process.More Problems of Functionand Form, 51 CANADIAN B. REv.
583, 612-16 (1973).
310. A study by sociologist David Caplovitz indicates that the working class takes its
problems to professionals far less frequently than other social strata. This is not based either
on economics, since free legal services frequently are available, or on ignorance of their
existence, since 36% of the persons in the study knew of some source of help. See also E. Koos,
THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (1952); E. Koos, THE HEALTH OF REGIONVnLL (1954). Furthermore,
it is unlikely that attorneys will have a significant impact on changing the financial habits
of the poor. See generally D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 47, at 32-48.
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To the contrary, the court is created for "small claims" regardless
of the economic stratum of the claimant. Litigants of the middle
income level, who are not entitled to free legal services, would be
relegated to the same alternatives that presently are available in
general sessions court. They may either retain an attorney, making
the litigation too costly, or go into court with the distinct disadvantage of facing an attorney representing the opponent.
In aid of litigants who are ignorant of essential legal principles,
the judge, in his role as inquisitor, will be able to seek out facts and
possible defenses or claims.3 1 Furthermore, cases brought by litigants who are so totally frightened or inarticulate as to be unable
to bring their case pro se will be too infrequent to justify the added
expense, delay, and technicality that would result from allowing
them to be represented by lawyers. An additional safeguard against
the possibility of substantial injury caused by the lack of legal advice may be obtained by providing for a trial with attorneys on de
3 12
novo appeal.
The argument that the presence of attorneys in small claims
court will discourage overreaching by business plaintiffs is unrealistic. In Tennessee general sessions courts the defendant rarely is
represented by counsel; ordinarily, the only attorneys present represent the business plaintiffs. The suggestion that attorneys must be
present to develop case law to protect the poor is more philosophical
than actual. Very few cases have been decided in the past halfcentury dealing with small claims court procedure, and most of the
31 3
cases brought were initiated by financial institutions.
In addition to the criticisms of the proponents' arguments
above, several reasons may be offered to explain why attorneys
should not be allowed. In particular, small claims courts that allow
attorneys increasingly develop more formalized procedures. 3 4 A Bri311. Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 57-58.
312. Vance, A Proposed Court of Conciliation,1 MINN. L. REv. 107, 115 (1917). See text
accompanying notes 386-95 infra.
313. See, e.g., Merchants Serv. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 94 Adv. Cal. App. 2d 154,
210 P.2d 543 (1949), rev'd on othergrounds, 35 Cal. 2d 109, 216 P.2d 846 (1950). For a criticism
of public interest lawyers developing legislation and case law see Cahn & Cahn, Power To

the People or the Pofession?-The PublicInterest in PublicInterest Law, 79 YAE L.J. 1005,
1040 (1970).
314. An observer of the New York City small claims court noted that cases in which
lawyers were involved proceeded at a much slower pace than those cases without lawyers. De
Minimis, supra note 77, at 492. One legal writer analyzing the small claims branch of Chicago's municipal court noted that whereas the court was once characterized by a simple
procedure, over the 47 years of its existence the presence of attorneys had complicated the
procedure until it became one fitted to the needs of the lawyers instead of the litigants.
Robinson, supra note 279, at 425. See Currie, Small Claims Courts, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 33, 33
(1956).
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tish study of American small claims courts concluded that the presence of attorneys made it difficult for the judge to conduct the case
informally and quickly while asking most of the questions himself.
The study found that since the attorneys were accustomed to procedural technicalities and often objected to the introduction of evidence-even in jurisdictions where evidentiary rules were theoretically abolished-the trials tended to proceed by the traditional
method of examination and cross-examination.315 Additionally, the
cost of legal services is great, and it makes no economic sense to pay
attorneys' fees approximately equal to the amount of the claim. A
small claims court will not be used if litigants must incur substantial expense to bring suit. Moreover, cases that take longer to try
and that are procedurally more complex and expensive defeat the
fundamental characterization of a model small claims court as an
informal, speedy, and inexpensive forum. For these reasons, many
legal writers and lawmakers have suggested that counsel be discouraged, restricted or barred from small claims court in order to achieve
3 16
this model forum.

Several major statutory mechanisms for discouraging the use of
attorneys have been proposed, including the imposition of a very low
mandatory fee schedule, 3 7 or the denial of recovery of attorney's
fees. 318 Statutory provisions that would restrict the use of attorneys
include allowing counsel solely at the defendant's option.319 Another
proposal is to provide one side with free counsel whenever the other
side is represented.32 0 Federal Trade Commissioner Jones suggests
that attorneys be allowed only when both sides have counsel; if only
one side is represented then no attorneys should be allowed. 2' Some
statutes do not allow attorneys to appear on behalf of a litigant
without the prior consent of the small claims court judge.3 22 Hawaii
315. CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 87, at 25-26. The London Consumer Council also
was of the opinion that hearings with lawyers took longer to try than those without lawyers.
They noted that objections to the admissibility of certain evidence was made despite the
statutory suspension of evidentiary rules. Id. Accord, NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 215.
316. The Chicago Bar Association by resolutions in 1915 and 1916, discouraged the
appearance of attorneys in the small claims branch of the municipal court of Chicago; however, this policy has not been followed in later years. R. H. SMrrH, supra note 32, at 52.
317. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 299.25(10)(a) (Supp. 1974) (on a judgment for $50 or less,
there are no attorneys' fees; on a judgment for more than $50, and less than $100, there is a
$5 attorneys' fee; on a judgment between $100 and $200, the fee is $10; and for a judgment
between $200 and $500, the fee is $25). See 34 GEO. L.J. 352, 367 (1946).
318. E.g., NEv. Rav. STAT. § 73.040 (1973).
319. Persecutionand Intimidation, supra note 45, at 1680.
320. Murphy, supra note 61, at 19.
321. Address by FTC Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones before the Center for Consumer Affairs, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, August 27, 1970, at 27.
322. ORE. REv. STAT. § 46.415(4) (1974); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 12.40.080 (1962).
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prohibits the use of attorneys in disputes over a security deposit
between a landlord and a tenant.32 3 Finally, some jurisdictions allow
an attorney to appear in small claims court for the limited purpose
of moving for removal to the regular civil court. 324 The majority of
small claims court statutes that place some limitation on counsel,
however, bar them entirely.3ss This total restriction has been held
not violative of due process, provided that the litigant may exercise
the right to be represented by counsel at some stage of the proceed32
ings, for example, in a de novo trial on appeal. 1
Barring attorneys from the model small claims court will have
several beneficial results in addition to decreased expenses and formality. This type of provision will eliminate substantially the unequal bargaining power that exists when the consumer or debtor faces
the merchant, who is ordinarily represented by counsel, in the
323.

HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-28(b) (Supp. 1974).

324. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 419.02 (1971). For a discussion of some requirements to
being granted a removal see the proposed rules in Robinson, supra note 279, at 432.
325. CAL. Cwv. PRO. CODE § 117g (West 1954); IDAHO CODE § 1-2308 (Supp. 1974); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.8408 (Supp. 1974); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 24-523(2) (Cum. Supp. 1972). Kansas
does not allow attorneys in the small debtors court; however, this court is not really a small
claims court. The jurisdictional limit is $20; and before he can entertain a suit in court, the
plaintiff must prove that he does not have the financial means to employ a lawyer and proceed
in the regular court. KA. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1304, -1305, -1310, -1311 (1974). The Pearson bill
would provide financial assistance to states barring attorneys from consumer claims courts.
S. 1602, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(2)(A)(iii). See note 291 supra. Fowks in his Recommended
Small Claims Court Act favors barring attorneys. Fowks, supra note 232, at 223. Similarly,
the London Consumer Council recommends barring lawyers from small claims courts.
CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 87, at 31.
326. The Supreme Court recognized that there is a fundamental right to the aid of
counsel, and that a denial of that right is a deprivation of due process. Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932). The sixth amendment right to be provided counsel by the state,
however, has not been extended to civil cases. McGaughy v. Gardner, 296 F. Supp. 33, 36
(E.D. La. 1967); cf. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322
(1966) (discusses the need to extend the indigent's right to be provided counsel to civil cases,
provided there is a screening process to weed out frivolous claims, and this right is originally
limited to "special circumstances"). While the Supreme Court has never decided a case
involving a court of limited jurisdiction barring attorneys but allowing them on a trial de novo
to a court of general jurisdiction, three state appellate courts have decided such an issue. The
leading case is Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379,
173 P.2d 38 (1946). The California court started with the proposition that the right to a
hearing in both criminal and civil cases includes the right to appear by counsel. Any arbitrary
denial of this right is unconstitutional since it acts as a deprivation of due process. The court
continued, however, by stating that the legislature could deny this right at one stage in the
proceeding provided that the right to appear by counsel is guaranteed in a real sense somewhere along the proceeding. Accordingly, the California small claims court statute was not
unconstitutional despite its denial of representation by counsel since this right could be
exercised at the appeal to the superior court in a trial de novo. This is true even though the
plaintiff is deemed to have waived any right to appeal by electing to commence the action in
the small claims court. Accord, Foster v. Walus, 81 Idaho 452, 347 P.2d 120 (1959); Flour City
Fuel & Transfer Co. v. Young, 150 Minn. 452, 185 N.W. 934 (1921).
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courts. 327 Moreover, providing a forum in which citizens may sue in
their own behalf creates the opportunity for the general public to
have affirmative contact with the judicial system that can result in
a feeling of political efficacy for the winning litigant"8 and confidence in the small claims courts as effective and fair forums. Since
the average citizen is likely to come in contact with the judicial
system only at its lowest level, a small claims court that engenders
confidence will increase the legitimacy of the entire judicial system
3 29
in the public mind.
The prohibition of an attorney's presence is an effective means
of ensuring that the model small claims court will be an inexpensive, speedy, informal, and understandable forum for the litigation
of small claims. 310 Moreover, it is unlikely that most attorneys in
Tennessee would strongly oppose such a proposal if the jurisdictional limit of the court is low. 3 ' Accordingly, it is recommended
that no attorneys be allowed in the model small claims court, except
those appearing in their own behalf or as witnesses, and that all
partnerships, associations, and corporations be represented by a
bona fide partner, official or employee who is not a lawyer.
C.

Court Personnel

In order to create a court that functions well when the litigants
are nonprofessionals, it is necessary to have competent court personnel who will help each litigant present his claim or defense. Since
the roles of the clerk and judge in the small claims court will be
different from their traditional roles in the circuit and general sessions courts, these differences should be specified in the statute.
The judge plays a pivotal role in the small claims court, and
must have great discretion in formulating a remedy that is substantively fair, although summary in nature.3 2 The judge must uncover
the facts, interrogate witnesses and litigants, and assure that potential claims and defenses are asserted. For this reason the judge must
327. One author feels that the reason default judgments and settlements abound in
small claims courts is because plaintiff's counsel convinces the pro se defendant of the futility
of his defense before trial. Reform Revisited, supra note 203, at 65.
328. See NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 218.
329. See generally Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1055
(1970).
330. For an exhaustive list of 16 reasons for barring attorneys from small claims courts
see NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 206-18.
331. Interview with John J. Hollins, President of the Nashville Bar Association, in
Nashville, Tennessee, Nov. 19, 1974; interview with the Honorable Marvin Marshall, Judge
of Bedford County General Sessions Court, in Shelbyville, Tennessee, Oct. 31, 1974.
332. Note, supra note 188, at 533.
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assume an inquisitorial role beyond that of the judge in the traditional adversary system. 33 The judge must be both the devil's advocate and counsel for the litigants. He further must function as a
conciliator who can resolve disputes and fashion remedies appropriate to each situation. Frequently litigants only need a neutral place
to discuss misunderstandings and arrive at informal solutions. To
this end the judge should provide space in the court where litigants
may meet, and he should encourage this form of settlement when3
ever possible. 1
It is apparent that the success of the small claims court will
depend to a large measure on the competence of the judges and their
willingness to participate actively in the small claims proceedings.
In order to ensure this success, some commentators have proposed
that the judge always be an attorney. 35 This requirement becomes
particularly relevant in courts where representation by counsel is
forbidden, raising the possibility that no attorneys would be involved in the entire small claims adjudicative process. It should be
noted that a majority of the states have an attorney-judge requirement, either as a constitutional provision, 331 or by statute.33 7 Nevertheless, judges with great experience frequently may be excellent
333. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 117g (West 1954); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, § 9
(1971). See Eovaldi & Gestrin, supranote 185, at 321.
334. A discussion of the extrajudicial alternative of arbitration of small claims is beyond
the scope of this project. For an analysis and evaluation of small claims arbitration, and the
Pennsylvania compulsory arbitration system, see the following articles: NICJ REPORT, supra
note 15, at 112-19, 226-33; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
AND COURT CONGESTION-THE PENNSYLVANIA CoMPULSoRY ARBITRATION STATUTE (1956); Eov-

aldi & Gestrin, supra note 185, at 306-19; Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration,61 COLUM.
L. REv. 846 (1961); Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A PreliminaryInquiry,
17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 698 (1952); Rosenburg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory
Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961); Comment,
CompulsoryArbitration in Pennsylvania-ItsScope, Effect, Application, and Limitations in
Montgomery and DelawareCounties-A Survey and Analysis, 2 VILL. L. REV. 529 (1957).
335. E.g., Silverstein, Small Claims Courts Versus Justices of the Peace, 58 W. VA. L.
REV. 241, 257-58 (1956).
336. The constitutions of 26 states require that the general trial court judges be lawyers.
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE

CONSTITUTIONS 231 (2d ed. 1959, 4th Cum. Supp. 1971). Another 5 state constitutions impose
a requirement that the trial judge be "learned in the law," which some courts have interpreted as requiring attorney-judges. Id. at 232; see, e.g., In re Daly, 294 Minn. 351, 200
N.W.2d 913, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972); Jamieson v. Wiggin, 12 S.D. 16, 80 N.W. 137
(1899).
337. This has been held as constitutional in LaFever v. Ware, 211 Tenn. 393, 365
S.W.2d 44 (1963). Recently, the California Supreme Court has determined that it is a violation of due process for a person to be tried for a misdemeanor crime by a judge who was not
an attorney. In upholding the right to an attorney judge, the court did not rely on any express
state constitutional or statutory provision. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d
72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974). Contra, Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky.), appeal
dismissed, 414 U.S. 885 (1973). See 28 VAND. L. REV. 421 (1975).
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conciliators, despite their lack of formal legal training.
In states that currently do not require trial judges to be attorneys, like Tennessee in the general sessions courts, the legislatures
may be unwilling to create this requirement for small claims courts.
Since it has been recommended that the model small claims court
for Tennessee be a division of the general sessions court, which
generally does not require attorney judges, they cannot be required
in small claims court. 338 Accordingly, while it is recommended that
small claims judges be attorneys, the political realities in Tennessee
militate against a mandatory provision in the model statute. It is
recommended, however, that the model act for Tennessee clearly
delineate the inquisitorial-conciliatory role of the small claims
judge.
Since counsel will not be available to draft a complaint, it is
important that the clerk be permitted to perform this service. In
addition, the clerk should be able to file claims, effect service by
registered mail, distribute booklets explaining small claims court
procedure (a copy of the booklet should be given to the plaintiff
upon filing the claim and mailed to the defendant along with service
of process), and answer any questions that the litigants may have
about small claims court procedure. Although some jurisdictions
deny this service to corporations, partnerships, and associations,33
there is no need to limit access to the-clerk's services if businesses
are neither represented by counsel nor using the court repeatedly.
The plaintiff should be permitted to state his claim orally to the
clerk who should write a concise statement of the claim on the
warrant. 3 0 In order to protect the clerk from charges of practicing
law without a license in filling out the warrant and in answering
questions about small claims procedure, it is important to specifically delegate these powers to the clerk by the statute.3 41
338. The Tennessee Legislature had the opportunity of passing a provision requiring all
judges to be attorneys in a bill, which would have reformed the entire general sessions system
in Tennessee, sponsored by Senator Daniel W. Oehmig, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee S. 1886, § 9, 88th Gen. Ass. (1973). The Oehmig bill never got out of committee.
See note 124 supra.
339. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3902(a) (1973) (D.C. allows representation by counsel,
though).
340. Many states require that the plaintiff execute an affidavit or verify the statement
prepared by the clerk. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-02 (1974) (executes and files affidavit); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1754 (Supp. 1974) (sworn affidavit); WAsH. REy. CODE ANN.
§ 12.40.070 (1962) (verified claim).
341. The problem of practicing without a license is present in another area. Several
legal scholars have suggested that paraprofessionals such as third-year law students, community advocates and legal technicians be allowed to assist litigants in the court. See, e.g.,
De Minimis, supranote 77, at 493. Such a suggestion is beyond the purview of the model small
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Additional duties have been granted the small claims clerk in
other jurisdictions. In New York and Rhode Island, if the clerk
believes that the plaintiff is using the court for purposes of oppression or harassment-for example, filing claims that have previously
been decided against him-then the clerk, in his discretion, may
notify the plaintiff to appear before the small claims court judge. If
the judge finds that the claimant acted out of motives of oppression
or harassment, he may deny the claimant further use of the small
2
claims court mechanism.

2

It is recommended that the Tennessee model small claims act
contain provisions specifically granting the clerk the responsibility
of filling out and filing the claim and answering any questions that
the litigants might have. Furthermore, the clerk should have the
discretionary power to compel the plaintiff to appear before the
small claims judge if it appears to the clerk that the plaintiff may
be harassing the defendant.
VII.

TRIAL PROCEDURE

A.

Trial Procedure, Rules of Evidence and Substantive Law
The trial procedure must be sufficiently simple to enable litigants to proceed in their own behalf. This may be accomplished by
either simplifying existing rules of procedure or abolishing them.
The states that have attempted to simplify procedural requirements
for small claims brought in general trial courts have been criticized
severely because the technicalities inherent in the "simplified" procedural requirements are substantial enough to require retention of
counsel. 1 13 Thus, in order to ensure that the model small claims

court remains an informal forum, it is essential that procedural
claims court since the philosophy behind the court is to create a mechanism for self-redress
of small claims without resort to lawyers or paraprofessionals.
342. N.Y. UNIFORM DIsT. CT. ACT § 1810 (McKinney 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 1016-8 (Supp. 1974).
343. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-1601 to -2713 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 299.04 (Supp.
1974); Fowks, supra note 232, at 168. The County Court Practice Book for British county
courts states prosaically that the courts "are adapted to the needs of the great masses of the
population by the maximum of. . . simplicity of procedure suitors being able in fact to
obtain relief and to defend themselves without legal assistance." The London Consumer
Council added that in practice this statement translates into "legal representation is always
desirable if obtainable." CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 87, at 19. In Tennessee's general

sessions courts, numerous judges indicate that they frequently tell unrepresented litigants to
get counsel. Interview with the Honorable John T. Boone, Jr., Judge of the Davidson County
General Sessions Court, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 28, 1975; interview with the Honorable
Robert Murphy, Judge of the Davidson County General Sessions Court, in Nashville, Tennessee, Jan. 17, 1975.
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rules are not merely simplified but are abolished entirely."' By abolishing all technical rules of procedure and barring the presence of
attorneys, the small claims court may utilize simple procedures that
litigants will be able to comprehend. This, in turn, encourages citizens to participate in the judicial system and increases their confidence in the system. For this reason it is recommended that the
model small claims court act abrogate all rules of practice, pleading
and procedure for that court.345
Similar considerations of informality and speedy adjudication
are involved in the question of whether to dispense with the rules
of evidence along with other procedural and practice rules. At least
one state has retained evidentiary rules in the small claims court, 346
while another state has done away completely with the rules of
evidence.3 41 The majority, and more sensible, rule348 is to dispense
with the technical rules of evidence except as they relate to privileged communications.3 41 Tennessee's general sessions courts do not
adhere strictly to the rules of evidence, and accordingly, it would
344. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3906(b) (1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8411 (Supp.
1974); N.Y. UNIFORm DIST. CT. Aar § 1804 (McKinney Supp. 1974); see Note, supranote 188,
at 533.
345. Some courts allow depositions to be used in small claims courts. R.I. GEN. LAWs
ANN. § 10-16-10 (1969) (depositions may be used at the hearing provided they have been taken
according to law). In the New York small claims courts discovery is unavailable except upon
order of the court on showing of proper circumstances. N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1804
(McKinney Supp. 1974). In Oklahoma no depositions, interrogatories or other discovery
devices are allowed except as an aid in execution. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1760 (Supp.
1974). Allowing discovery is time-consuming, and injects another procedural technicality into
the system.
346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-222 (1969) (attorneys are allowed in small claims court,
however).
347. N.H. REv. STAT. AN. § 503:7 (1968).

348. See 1 WIGMORE,

EviDENcE

§ 4d, at 106 (3d ed. 1940):

In small causes generally. . . it would be a defiance of common sense and a nullification
of the main purpose, to enforce the jury-trial rules of Evidence; for the parties are
expected to appear personally without professional counsel, and they cannot be expected
to observe rules which they do not know.
349. E.g., HAwAu Rxv. STAT. § 633-32 (Supp. 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8411
(Supp. 1974). The New York statute exempts personal transactions or communications with
decedents and lunatics, as well as privileged communications. N.Y. UNiFoRm DIsT. CT. AcT
§ 1804 (McKinney Supp. 1974). There has been no discussion concerning the need to differentiate between privileged communications and other rules of evidence. Other rules of evidence
are rules of exclusion, while the former are barriers to introduction. The sanctity of privileged
communications results from centuries of habit, religion, and strong public policy considerations designed to protect an individual's right to privacy. A claim for up to $250 does not
outweigh the equitable considerations for continuing their existence. On the other hand, since
there is no jury to protect from prejudice there is no reason to require evidentiary rules
designed around the jury system. The judge should be allowed to weigh all facts in coming
to his decision; this high degree of informality should enable the judge to get quickly to what
he considers to be the basic issues of the case.
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pose no major change to eliminate the use of these rules in a small
claims division. It is recommended that the small claims court act
for Tennessee follow the majority position and abolish the rules of
evidence except as they relate to privileged communications.
Most jurisdictions require that the small claims court judge
dispense justice according to the rules of substantive law.3 5 Strict
adherence to substantive law is practically impossible, however,
given the informality of the trial and the absence of briefs and
lawyers to develop precise legal issues.3 1 Nevertheless, it is unclear
how much discretion small claims court judges can exercise in departing from substantive law. Many states use the language of the
New York statute requiring that a judge do substantialjustice according to the rules of substantive law. 352 The New York courts
interpreting this language have not allowed major departures from
substantive law. 35 3 "Substantial justice" grants the judge considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy while still remaining within
the broad perimeters of substantive law; 34 de novo appeal provides
a safeguard against abuses of this discretion. It is recommended
that the wording of the New York statute be adopted in Tennessee.
B.

Jury Trial

The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the federal constitution and by the constitutions of the fifty
states. 355 The Supreme Court discussed the right of trial by jury in
civil cases in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof.35 In that case the Court
350. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 218, § 21 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5531 (1973).
But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-8 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-567 (1957).
351. NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 127.
352. N.Y. UNinoPm DIST. CT. AcT § 1804 (McKinney Supp. 1974). See e.g., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3906(b) (1973); HAwAI REv. STAT. § 633-32 (Supp. 1974).
353. Bierman v. Consolidated Edison Co., 66 Misc. 2d 237, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 331 (App.
Term 1970), modifying Bierman v. City of N.Y., 60 Misc. 2d 497, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y.C.
Small Claims Ct. 1969). The case was brought in small claims court by an elderly homeowner
against the city and a utility company for damages caused by a water main break. The
plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proving negligence; the judge, however, relying on a
cost-spreading, injury-prevention, and fairness approach, applied a rule of strict liability
rather than a rule of fault. The appellate court in a per curiam decision stated that stability
and certainty of law required adherence to substantive law. The court reversed the small
claims court as to the defendant utility company. It affirmed, nevertheless, the decision
against the defendant municipality on the grounds that proof of a burst water main permitted
an inference that damage was caused by the city's negligence or res ipsa loquitur. The
ultimate result was that substantial justice was done in Bierman, but only upon the traditional fault basis.
354. Siegel, Practice Commentary on § 1804, N.Y.C. CIVIL CT. Acr. at 90 (McKinney
Supp. 1974).
355. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see INDEX DIGEST, supra note 336, at 578-79.
356. 174 U.S. 1 (1899). The Court relied on Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1808).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

noted that the right to a jury trial may be limited, by express state
or federal constitutional provision, to causes involving less than a
certain dollar amount 357 or to cases in which the right to a jury did
not exist at common law at the time the Constitution was enacted. 5 8
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the denial of a jury trial
in a lower court when a jury trial at the appellate level was available. The Court noted that the Constitution guarantees the right to
a jury trial, not the jury trial itself. As long as the statute in question
provides for the exercise of that right at some future time, the seventh amendment is not violated.3 59 Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that a statute denying the right to a jury trial
does not violate the Tennessee constitution provided that this right
36
may be exercised on appeal. 0
Although the small claims statutes of a few states allow jury
trials, 361 the majority do not. In several states, the plaintiff is
deemed to have waived a jury trial by resorting to the small claims
procedure. 62 The opportunity to exercise the right to a trial by jury
is preserved in other states by allowing removal to the regular civil
trial court 3 3 or appeal de novo to a court in which a jury trial may
be had. 364 Removals or appeals taken for purposes of delay are dis357. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII ($20); ALAS. CONST. art. 1, § 16 ($250); N.H. CONST.
art. 1, § 20 ($500); see INDEX DIGEST, supra note 336, at 578.
358. The Supreme Court discussed the constitutional history behind the seventh
amendment right to jury, including British antecedents to Magna Carta in 1215. See 34
COLUM. L. REv. 932, 939 n.58 (1934).
359. 174 U.S. at 23. The Ohio Supreme Court had come to the same conclusion several
years earlier. The Ohio court upheld the right of the legislature to impose any conditions upon
the right to appeal to a court where trial by jury might be had. This was true even though
the Ohio constitution at that time stated that "the right of trial by jury shall be inviolate."
Reckner v. Warner, 22 Ohio St. 275, 278 (1872); OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 5 (1851). See Flour
City Fuel & Transfer Co. v. Young, 150 Minn. 452, 457, 185 N.W. 934, 936 (1921) (right to
trial may be denied in Minneapolis conciliation and small debtors' court provided the party
is offered a jury trial on appeal).
360. Morford v. Barnes, 16 Tenn. 444 (1835) (justice of peace courts), followed in Pryor
v. Hays, 17 Tenn. 416 (1836); cf. State v. Sexton, 121 Tenn. 35 (1908) (legislature may inflict
punishment for small offenses without a jury so that the proceedings might be summary,
speedy and efficient). See note 142, supra.
361. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 285 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (either party may file a demand
for a jury); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-03 (1974) (either party may demand a jury trial); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1761 (Supp. 1974) (either party may have a jury trial if demand is made
48 hours before the time of defendant's appearance, and a deposit of $25 is made); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 5535 (1973) (defendant may request a trial by jury after filing an affidavit that
there are questions of fact in the cause requiring trial together with a $4 jury fee).
362. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 1-2315 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5535 (1973). But

see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 491.06 (1971).
363. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3905 (1973);
1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-13 (1970).
364.

NEB. Rxv. STAT.

§ 24-525 (Cum. Supp.

E.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 1-2311, -2315 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-10 (1953).
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couraged in several states by requiring the appellant to post a bond
as security for the payment of the judgment and costs,3 65 or to pay
jury fees in advance.3 "
If a jury were allowed in the model small claims court it would
become necessary to apply rules of evidence and procedural safeguards, thereby making attorneys a necessity. This would frustrate
the goal of providing for a swift disposition of the case without the
expense of attorneys. Of the methods discussed for protecting the
exercise of the jury right, the appeal de novo is preferable in Tennessee. The removal method is not consistent with the policy of minimizing removals from small claims court to the circuit court, and
that method is subject to abuse by defendants who could defeat the
plaintiff's opportunity to use the small claims procedure by demanding a jury trial.367 In addition, the appeal de novo is presently
utilized in Tennessee as a means of ensuring that parties in general
sessions court, which operates without juries, eventually have access
to a jury in the circuit courts. 8 It is recommended, therefore, that
the model statute creating a small claims court follow the present
general sessions procedure by not providing for a jury trial at the
small claims level.
C. Removal and Transfer3 "l
Two primary reasons for allowing removal from the small
claims court to the regular civil court have been suggested. First, as
noted above, some jurisdictions protect the right to a jury trial by
providing for a removal option.3 0 Secondly, allowing removal withdraws complicated cases involving intricate questions of law from
the summary procedure of the small claims court. A provision for
removal, however, is subject to abuse. It may be used by the defendant when the plaintiff's claim is too small to be economically tried
in the more expensive civil court, and it may be used as a device
for delay. Removal also is unnecessary in the model small claims
court for Tennessee. 3' In the model act the jury right is protected
365.

E.g., MAss. ANN.

366. E.g., ILL. ANN.

ch. 218, § 23 (1974).
ch. 110A, § 285 (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. UNIFORM

LAWS

STAT.

DIST. CT.

ACT § 1806 (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 299.21(3) (Supp. 1974).
367. See text accompanying notes 370-71 infra.
368. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-509 (Supp. 1974).
369. For the purpose of clarity, the term "removal" shall be used to refer only to a
removal from small claims court to the regular civil docket. "Transfer" shall be used to
indicate a transfer to the small claims court.
370. This is especially true when the statute does not provide for an appeal. See MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.8408 & .8412 (Supp. 1974); S.D. CoMpErD LAWS ANN. § 15-39-16 & -17
(1967).
371. In those jurisdictions where removal is necessary to protect the jury right, removal
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by providing for a trial de novo with a jury on appeal to the circuit
court. In addition, it is unnecessary to provide for removal of complicated cases because a low jurisdictional limit will ensure that the
bulk of cases in small claims court will not be of a complex nature.
Moreover, those claims within the jurisdictional limit that do involve complicated legal and factual issues would be costly to litigate
with counsel representing both sides; if an inexpensive and informal
forum is not provided for these claims, they frequently will not be
brought at all. Therefore, it is recommended that the model small
claims court for Tennessee not provide for removal to either general
sessions or circuit court.
The question of whether transfers should be allowed from the
normal civil court into small claims court involves the strong policy
in favor of extending the availability of small claims procedure to
as many litigants as possible. A number of jurisdictions have utilized various methods of allowing or encouraging transfers into the
small claims court. In the District of Columbia, the judge of the
superior court may transfer a case to the small claims and conciliation branch with the consent of all parties, for the limited purpose
of obtaining a partial stipulation of facts, or for the broader purpose
of conciliation.3 7 2 The Minnesota small claims statute, which bars
attorneys, allows transfers from the district court to the conciliation
division of the municipal court of Minneapolis with no provision for
attorney representation after transfer.31 3 It is recommended that the
model small claims court statute for Tennessee provide for transfer
to the small claims court from general sessions court or circuit court
at the option of the defendant, provided the case is one that could
have been brought originally in the small claims court. Neither
party should be allowed representation by counsel in the small
claims court. Since the plaintiff will have no control over the transfer, the case should not be counted against the plaintiffs total for
may be limited to a case when one of the litigants or the court specifically moves for it. See,
e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8408 (Supp. 1974) (removal right may be exercised on motion
of either defendant or plaintiff); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1925.10 (Page 1968) (motion of either
defendant or the court); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1757 (Supp. 1974) (motion of defendant);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-39-24 (1967) (on motion of the court only; the judge may
impose terms upon the removal. The defendant would be foreclosed from a trial by jury if he
fails to request removal). E.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.10 (Page 1968). The plaintiff
would be deemed to have waived any right to a jury by choosing the small claims forum. E.g.,
N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACr § 1802 (McKinney 1963).
372. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1323(a) (1973).
373. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.015 (1971). Washington state allows a transfer on motion
of the defendant. The ban on attorneys, by comparison, does not apply to such transfers and
plaintiff may be represented by counsel if he was so represented at the time the action was
commenced. WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 12.40.025 (Supp. 1973).
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purposes of the maximum limitation on4 the number of suits that
3
may be brought in small claims court. 1

VIII.
A.

POST TRIAL PROCEDURE
Defaults and Executions

One of the major problems in many small claims courts is the
overwhelming percentage of default judgments rendered. 3 5 This

high number of defaults is attributable in part to the ease with
which a default judgment may be obtained and to the defendants'
ignorance of the effect of failing to appear in court. 31 Several small

claims court statutes permit the courts to award default judgments
without requiring the plaintiff to produce even a minimal amount
of proof of his claim. 37 Other states, however, have attempted to

limit recovery of default judgments. New York requires a minihearing to determine the validity of plaintiffs claim before a default
judgment is rendered.3

8

In the District of Columbia the plaintiff is

entitled to a default judgment only if he has a claim for a liquidated
amount; if the amount of the claim is unliquidated, the plaintiff
must present proof of his claim.3 79 Provisions' allowing the recovery

of default judgments without establishing a valid claim facilitate
debt-collection, but since one of the primary purposes of the model
small claims court is to create a forum in which both creditor and
debtor receive equal treatment and a fair hearing, a minimal showing of a legitimate claim should be required. This requirement
would have the benefit of preventing groundless suits or claims for
excessive amounts. 8 ° It is recommended, therefore, that the small
claims statute for Tennessee require that prior to granting a default
374. The proposal of the London Consumer Council favors allowing transfers but prohibiting remands. CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 87, at 30.
375. The number of defaults in Davidson County General Sessions Court varied from
49.1% to 80.8% of the cases docketed for the week studied. The average number of default
judgments for that week was 68.8%. See Appendix A, Table 5 infra.

376.

CONSUMERS IN TROUBLz,

supra note 240, at 201-25. Caplovitz noted that the incid-

ence of defaults due to the inability to understand the summons was high in New York where
the summons is couched in a great deal of legal verbiage. Id. at 207.
377. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 631.10 (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7455
(Supp. 1974).
378. NICJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 140-41.
379. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3902(f) (1973). In the Tennessee general sessions courts a
sworn denial must be made in suits on account. Failure to do so results in a default judgment.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-924, 24-506 (1955).
380. The FTC has recommended that a court-appointed referee conduct a neighborhood
negotiation as a compulsory prelude to receiving a default judgment. HearingBefore Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 42 (1968).
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judgment the judge conduct a mini-hearing to determine whether
the plaintiff has a valid claim and whether the amount claimed is
38
justified. '
In addition to protecting defaulters from groundless suits, the
model statute should be designed to prevent defaults from occurring. One method of decreasing the incidence of defaults is to state
clearly on the complaint (or warrant), and in the distributed booklet
explaining the small claims court procedure,"' that the effect of
failing to appear in court may be a default judgment. The results
of a default judgment also should be explained. It further should be
made clear that special relief may be granted. For example, if defendant acknowledges liability to plaintiff, but cannot pay according
to the terms of the original contract, the small claims court judge3
has the statutory power to set up an installment basis of payment1
Finally, the complaint should explain that a different time for trial
may be scheduled if the assigned date is inconvenient for the defendant. By providing a forum in which the defendant can proceed in
his own behalf and has an equal opportunity to be heard, the model
small claims court statute will reduce the fear of a court appearance
and reduce the motive to default.
Provisions for the execution of judgments add complexity to the
small claims procedure and may cause hardship to low-income
debtors. 84 Nevertheless, a small claims judgment that cannot be
collected is a Pyrrhic victory and may result in disuse of and lack
of confidence in the small claims courts. For this reason, it is recommended that the established general sessions procedures for execution 5 be utilized by the small claims courts to enforce their judgments.
B.

Appeals

Although a majority of jurisdictions provide for appeal from
381. This mini-trial should include questioning whether the plaintiff attempted to contact the defendant to settle the claim before entering the court. See 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 493,
503 (1969).
382. See Appendix B infra.
383. The judges in general sessions court presently have this power. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 26-503 (1955). See W. HALL, supra note 127, § 141.
384. See generally IDAHo CODE § 1-2313 (Supp. 1974) (if no appeal has been filed the
small claims judge may certify the judgment by entering the transcript in the judgment
docket and execution may issue thereafter); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 491.04 (Supp. 1974) (no
execution shall issue from the conciliation courts); NEv. REV. STAT. § 73.020 (1973) (no
attachment or garnishment shall issue from small claims court but execution may issue after
judgment); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-8 (Supp. 1973) (attachment, garnishment and execution
may issue after the judgment in manner prescribed by law).
385. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 26 (1955).
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small claims courts and trial de novo in a court of record,38 the right
to an appeal has not been held essential to due process." 7 Indeed,
several states have made the judgments of their small claims courts
final," thereby eliminating additional expense and delay in the
adjudicatory process. Several states have denied an appeal right to
the plaintiff on the ground that by choosing the small claims forum,
the plaintiff waives this right;389 other jurisdictions discourage apa bond as security for the
peals by requiring that the appellant 3post
°
payment of the judgment and costs.
386. E.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 117j (West Supp. 1974) (defendant may request appeal
de novo); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-228 (1969) (either party may request appeal de novo); cf.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 491.03(3), 491.06(1) (1971) (conciliation courts). A few states allow
appeals solely on questions of law. N.H. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 503:9 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
16-5-12 (1970). New York provides for an appeal on the sole ground that substantial justice
has not been done between the parties according to substantive law. N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT.
ACT § 1807 (McKinney 1963).
387. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930) (legislature is free to limit appeals to state supreme court in accordance with state policy); Reetz v.
Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903) (no provision in federal constitution forbidding state from
granting to a tribunal, whether a court or a board of registration, the final determination of
a legal question); Real Estate Comm'n v. McLemore, 202 Tenn. 540, 306 S.W.2d 683 (1957)
(citing and following Reetz v. Michigan); cf. Skaff v. Small Claims Court, 68 Cal. 2d 76, 435
P.2d 825, 65 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1968) (a party possesses no right to appeal except as provided by
statute).
388. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8413 (Supp. 1974) (all judgments shall be conclusive upon
the plaintiff and the defendant); ORE. REv. STAT. § 46.485(4) (1974) (judgment is conclusive
upon the parties); cf. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a, § 12 (1971) (appeal allowed to
county court only if amount in controversy is in excess of $20; judgment of county court is
final); WASH. Rxv. CODa ANN. § 12.40.120 (Supp. 1974) (no appeal allowed if claim was less
than $100; nor permitted to party who requested the exercise of small claims jurisdiction).
389. The constitutionality of this provision was upheld against an attack on equal
protection grounds. The court found that the legislature was warranted in determining that
there was a natural, intrinsic and constitutional difference between a plaintiff who came into
small claims court voluntarily and a defendant who was forced in by the strong arm of the
law, so as to justify the classification. Superior Wheeler Cake Corp. v. Superior Court, 203
Cal. 1384, 264 P. 488 (1928).
390. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 218, § 23 (1974) ($5 entry fee plus bond in amount of judgment in small claims division of district court); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 491.06 (1971) (bond to
cover judgment and costs in conciliation court); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-12 (1970) (bond to
cover all costs of appeal). The constitutionality of requiring appellate bonds, though struck
down by 2 state courts, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1, 23 (1899). But see Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249,
105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973); Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co. v. Young, 150 Minn. 452, 458, 185
N.W. 934, 936-37 (1921). The California Supreme Court struck down in Brooks a provision
of the California small claims statute requiring an undertaking in connection with an appeal
from a small claims court judgment. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1171 (West 1954). The court said
that this undertaking was a deprivation of property prior to a due process hearing with right
to counsel, and relied on Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S 337 (1969), and Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 356, 488 P.2d 13, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971). First of all, the court's reliance on, and extension of, these cases is
questioned since Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974), which restricts unfettered
application of the Fuentes doctrine. More importantly, these precedents deal with due pro-
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It is necessary, however, that the model small claims statute for
Tennessee provide for an appeal by either party to a trial de novo
in circuit court39 ' in order to protect the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Tennessee constitution. It is recommended that the
appeal be required to be filed within ten days of judgment pursuant
to section 27-509 of the Tennessee Code Annotated relating to appeals from general sessions court to circuit court.3 92 As a condition
to appealing, the appellant should be required to post a bond pur39 3
suant to sections 27-313 to -316 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.
The judgment of the small claims court should become final unless
an appeal is timely made.
C. Res Judicata
Inasmuch as small claims courts are forums where justice is
cess requirements of prejudgment executions and garnishments. In the small claims court
context there is no prehearing taking. Quite to the contrary, there is a full hearing on the
merits before a judge. One of the distinguishing factors present in Mitchell, and absent in
Fuentes, was that in the former case the writ of sequestration was issued by a judge after a
mini-hearing and not by a clerk as in the latter case. 94 S. Ct. at 1899. See also North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). The California court also based its
decision on "compelling policy reasons." 8 Cal. 3d at 668, 504 P.2d at 1254, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
790. Realizing that the California small claims courts had become nothing more than judicial
collection agencies, the court attempted to remedy this problem, and thus return to the
original characterization of small claims courts, in the only manner it thought it could without legislating: encouraging appeals. In fact, the court has been very successful in accomplishing this end as the number of small claims appeals has doubled, and even tripled in some
superior courts, since the Brooks decision. Burley v. Stein, 40 Cal. App. 3d 752, 756 n.4, 115
Cal. Rptr. 279, 281 n.4 (1974). Commentators on Brooks have suggested that the court was
not so interested in due process requirements as in the abuse of the California small claims
courts. California Supreme Court, 62 CAiF. L. REv. 408, 423 (1974); 1 PEPPERDIn L. REv. 71
(1973). The court, however, did not fully consider the consequences of its decision. First, by
encouraging appeals, the court effectively has annulled one characteristic of the small claims
courts: speedy and final adjudication of small claims in a summary manner. Secondly, this
liberalized appeals policy helps business defendants more than indigent, consumer defendants by encouraging defendants to default and then appeal for a de novo trial in an appellate
court which has technical rules of procedure and where attorneys are allowed. This, alone,
frequently will force a plaintiff with a small claim to drop his cause for economic reasons.
And now, a defendant who defaulted may appeal even if he has not attempted to vacate his
default judgment. Burley v. Stein, 40 Cal. App. 3d 752, 115 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1974). The
practical effect is that the consumer plaintiff is denied use of the small claims procedure.
Appeals bonds are necessary to discourage appeals from small claims courts, both to decrease
docket congestion in the circuit courts, and to protect the litigants' right to a simple and final
adjudication of small disputes within the summary procedure. If California wishes to remedy
the abuse in its small claims courts, it must do so by attacking the source of that abuse. By
limiting the number of claims that any one plaintiff may bring, as has been recommended
in the model small claims act for Tennessee, one succeeds in ending possible abuse, while at
the same time strengthening the characterization of the small claims system.
391. See text accompanying notes 370-71 supra.

392.
393.

TENN. CODE ANN.
TENN. CODE AN4.

§ 27-509 (Supp. 1974).
§ 27-313 to -316 (1955).

19751

SMALL CLAIMS COURTS

dispensed primarily on the basis of common sense and notions of
fairness, it is unreasonable to assume that each legal or factual issue
will receive the same thorough attention as when attorneys are present and rules of pleading and procedure are employed. 94 Accordingly, it is recommended that any judgment of a small claims court
be res judicata only as to the amount involved in the particular
action. The doctrine of collateral estoppel would be inapplicable to
a small claims court adjudication of any fact or issue. This policy
has been adopted by New York, 395 and California, " and results in
finality of the present litigation, without affecting future litigation
involving separate or related causes of action.

PART FOUR
A MODEL SMALL CLAIMS COURT STATUTE FOR
TENNESSEE
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE:
Section 1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the Small Claims Court
Act of 1975.
Section 2. Declaration of purpose.
The purpose of this act is to improve the administration of justice
in small noncriminal cases, and make the judicial system more
available to and comprehensible by the public; to simplify practice
and procedure in the commencement, handling, and trial of such
cases in order that plaintiffs may bring actions in their own behalf,
and defendants may participate actively in the proceedings rather
than default; to provide an efficient and inexpensive forum with the
objective of dispensing justice in a speedy manner; and generally to
394. See Leuschen v. Small Claims Court, 191 Cal. 133, 137, 215 P. 391, 393 (1923).
395. N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. AcT § 1808 (McKinney 1963). See 34 COLUM. L. REv. 932,
942 (1934).
396. Sanderson v. Neimann, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941). The California small
claims court statute is silent as to the effect of a small claims judgment on other litigation
arising out of the same or similar causes of action. The supreme court, after analyzing the
characterization of the small claims court and noting the absence of lawyers and jury trial
rules of evidence, decided that the determinations of negligence, contributory negligence and
last clear chance made by a small claims court in a case brought by a husband for damage
to his car and for medical expenses for his wife sustained in an automobile accident with
defendant, were not determinative or binding upon a subsequent case filed by the wife in the
superior court for damages for personal injuries.
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promote the confidence of the public in the overall judicial system
by providing a forum for small claims.
Section 3. Definitions.
As used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Clerk of the Small Claims Division" includes the clerk and
the deputy clerks of the General Sessions Courts;
(b) "General Sessions Courts" includes General Sessions Courts,
Justice of the Peace Courts and Trial Justice Courts;
(c) "Nonnatural parties" means any party who is not an individual;
(d) "Parties" in the Small Claims Division means individuals,
partnerships, corporations, associations, governmental subdivisions, or any other kind of organization or entity;
(e) "Where the cause of action arose" means the county in which
the transaction or occurrence that is the basis of the action in the
Small Claims Division took place;
(f) "Where the defendant is found" includes counties where the
defendant operates a place of business or dispatches sales representatives for the purpose of selling a product or service;
(g) "Where the defendant resides" means the county wherein the
defendant has his principal place of residence or, in the case of a
corporate defendant, the county of the corporation's headquarters.
Section 4. Small Claims Divisions created.
(a) Small Claims Divisions of the General Sessions Courts shall be
established in each county of the State of Tennessee.
(b) The judges and clerks of the General Sessions Courts shall
serve as the judges and clerks of the Small Claims Divisions.
Section 5. Jurisdiction.
(a) The Small Claims Division shall be a court not of record and
shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the General Sessions
Courts, in all noncriminal actions, other than actions for libel and
slander, where the amount in controversy does not exceed two
hundred fifty dollars ($250), exclusive of interest and costs.
(b) The Small Claims Division shall have authority to grant any
appropriate relief, including money damages and equitable relief;
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except that injunctions and restraining orders shall not issue from
the Small Claims Division.
Section 6. Commencement of action; form of complaint; venue;
change of venue; service of process.
(a) The plaintiff shall commence an action in the Small Claims
Division by filing with the clerk of the General Sessions Court a
combination summons-complaint, hereinafter called the "warrant,"
which shall include the name of the court, the names and addresses
of the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s), the name of the county in which
the action is commenced, and a statement of the claim in concise
form, without technicality, including pertinent dates. In addition,
the warrant shall include a clear statement that if the defendant
fails to appear, he may be ordered to pay the amount claimed by
the plaintiff, that the judge may schedule a different time for trial
if the assigned date is inconvenient, and that the defendant may
obtain assistance from the clerk of the General Sessions Court.
(b) The plaintiff may bring his action in the county where the
cause of action arose or in the county where -the defendant resides
or is found.
(c) A Small Claims Division judge may grant a motion for change
of venue in order to prevent hardship to the parties. The motion for
change of venue may be made orally, or by mailing a short statement to the judge of the Small Claims Division before whom the
case is to be heard, setting out the reasons for the desired change.
(d) The defendant shall be notified of the claim and his right to
appear by being served with the warrant. The mode of service shall
be by registered mail with return receipt requested; should the receipt not be returned, the defendant shall be personally served with
process.
(e) The plaintiff shall sign an affidavit stating that he made a
bona fide effort to contact the defendant and settle the claim with
the defendant before filing suit in the Small Claims Division.
Section 7. No answer required; suit on sworn account raises no
presumption in Small Claims Division.
(a) A written answer shall not be required of the defendant in an
action in the Small Claims Division; the defendant may, however,
file a written answer if he so wishes.
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(b) Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-509 shall be inapplicable to actions commenced in the Small Claims Division.
Section 8. Counterclaims.
The defendant may plead as a counterclaim any claim that at the
time of serving the warrant the defendant may have against the
plaintiff, if the counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the Small
Claims Division, and if the counterclaim arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs
claim, and if the counterclaim does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. Removal of actions in which the defendant's counterclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Division shall be
required pursuant to section 16(a) of this act.
Section 9. Fees.
(a) The plaintiff, upon filing a claim, shall pay a fee of five dollars
($5.00); no other fee shall be required of the plaintiff, so long as the
action remains in the Small Claims Division.
(b) The filing fee shall not be required of a plaintiff who signs an
affidavit that he is financially unable to pay the fee.
Section 10. Scheduling of trials; continuances.
(a) The procedures for the initial scheduling of trials shall be those
presently utilized by the General Sessions Courts.
(b) A party's first request for a continuance may be granted whenever the judge determines that such request is warranted and in the
interest of justice. A party's second request for a continuance, and
all requests thereafter, may be granted only upon a showing of
extraordinary circumstances justifying the continuance, unless all
the parties and the judge agree thereto.
Section 11. Limitations on number of claims that may be
brought; requirement of an affidavit; consequences of exceeding
limitations.
(a) No party shall file in the Small Claims Division of the General
Sessions Court in any county more than two (2) claims in any one
calendar week, or more than twenty-five (25) claims in any one
calendar year.
(b)

Any party who files a claim in the Small Claims Division shall
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sign an affidavit with the clerk at the time of filing the warrant
stating that he has not brought more than the maximum number
of claims allowed under section 11(a) of this act.
(c) If any party files a claim in excess of the maximum number of
claims allowed then this claim shall be adjudicated summarily in
favor of the defendant at the discretion of the judge.
Section 12. Trial procedure; substantive law; rules of evidence;
depositions.
(a) The Small Claims Division shall conduct hearings upon small
claims in such manner as to do substantial justice between the
parties according to the rules of substantive law, and shall not be
bound by the statutory provisions or rules governing practice, procedure, pleading or evidence, except statutory provisions relating to
privileged communications.
(b) No depositions shall be taken and no interrogatories or other
discovery proceedings shall be used under the small claims procedure.
Section 13. Attorneys barred.
(a) No attorney at law, except on his own behalf or as a witness,
shall take any part in the filing, prosecution or defense of litigation
in the Small Claims Division.
(b) An individual shall represent himself in the Small Claims Division. A nonnatural party shall be represented by any authorized,
bona fide officer, partner, salaried employee or member, who is not
an attorney at law.
Section 14. Judge's role; judgment; stay; installment payments;
enforcement.
(a) The role of the judge is to be an active inquisitor and conciliator. He shall have the duty to conduct an informal hearing, and
develop all of the facts in the particular case. The judge may take
testimony, raise defenses or claims of which the parties may be
unaware, disregard rules of pleading and evidence, summon any
party to appear as a witness in the suit upon his own motion, and
do other acts which in his discretion appear necessary to effect a
correct judgment and speedy disposition of the case. As conciliator,
he shall attempt to conciliate disputes and encourage fair settlements among the parties. These powers are in addition to any pow-
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ers given to judges of the General Sessions Courts that are not
inconsistent with the sections of this act.
(b) When judgment is to be rendered in an action pursuant to this
act, and the party against whom it is to be entered requests an
inquiry, or on the judge's own motion, the judge shall inquire fully
into the party's financial status and may stay execution and order
partial payments in such amounts, over such periods, and upon
such terms, which may include payment to the clerk of the court,
as seem just under the circumstances. Upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the party has failed to meet an installment payment without just excuse, the stay of execution shall be
vacated. When a stay of execution has not been ordered or when a
stay of execution has been vacated as provided in this subsection,
the party in whose favor the judgment has been entered may avail
himself of all remedies available in the General Sessions Court for
the enforcement of the judgment; except that no execution shall
issue upon any judgment in the Small Claims Division until the
time for appeals has expired.
Section 15. Clerk's role; use of the court for oppression or
harassment.
(a) The clerk of the Small Claims Division, at the request of any
party, shall prepare the warrant and other papers required to be
filed in an action in the Small Claims Division. The clerk shall send
notice to defendant by registered mail, return receipt requested. In
addition, the clerk is authorized to cooperate fully with the parties,
which includes answering any questions that the parties may have
concerning the small claims procedure.
(b) If the clerk finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
procedure provided by this act is sought to be utilized by a party
for purposes of oppression or harassment, as when the party has
previously resorted to such procedure on the same claim and has
been unsuccessful after a hearing thereon, the clerk shall notify the
party to make application to the Small Claims Division judge for
leave to prosecute the claim under this section. The judge upon such
application shall inquire into the circumstances and, if he shall find
that the claim is sought to be brought for purposes of oppression or
harassment, the judge may make an order denying the party any
further use of the procedure in the Small Claims Division provided
in this act.

19751

SMALL CLAIMS COURTS

Section 16. Removal and Transfer.
(a) No party shall move for the removal of a case originally filed
in the Small Claims Division to the General Sessions or Circuit
Courts, except as provided in section 16(b) of this act for counterclaims in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the Small Claims Division.
(b) A case shall be removed from the Small Claims Division to the
General Sessions Court whenever the defendant's counterclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Division, as stated in
section 5 of this act.
(c) A case originally filed in the regular civil docket of the General
Sessions or Circuit Courts shall be transferred to the Small Claims
Division on motion of the defendant if the claim is within the jurisdictional limit of and otherwise could have been brought originally
in the Small Claims Division. Neither party shall be allowed representation by an attorney at law. No case transferred to the Small
Claims Division shall be counted in the maximum number of cases
that the plaintiff may bring under section 11(a) of this act.
Section 17. Defaults.
in order for a plaintiff to be entitled to a default judgment he shall
put forth sufficient evidence of his claim against the defendant in
order to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to a judgment. The plaintiff shall put forth additional evidence, if needed,
to prove the amount owed plaintiff.
Section 18. Costs.
The prevailing party in any action in the Small Claims Division
may be awarded the costs of the action.
Section 19. Jury.
Trial of a small claims action shall be without a jury.
Section 20. Appeal to Circuit Court; appeals bond.
(a) Any party aggrieved by the judgment of the Small Claims
Division may appeal within ten (10) days of judgment to the Circuit
Court for a trial de novo. The manner of appeal shall be the one
established in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-509 for appeals
from General Sessions Courts.
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(b) The appellant shall file an affidavit with the clerk of the Circuit Court that the appeal is made in good faith and not for the
purpose of delay. Appellant must also file an appeal bond pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-503.
(c) On appeal to the Circuit Court either party may request a jury
trial and be represented by counsel. Failure to demand a jury on
appeal is a waiver of the right to a jury trial.
Section 21. Res judicata.
(a) If a motion for appeal is not filed within ten (10) days, then
the judgment of the Small Claims Division shall be final.
(b) A judgment obtained under this act may be pleaded as res
judicata only as to the amount involved in the particular action and
shall not otherwise be deemed an adjudication of any fact at issue
or found therein in any other action or court.
Section 22. Applicability of other laws and rules of court.
All provisions of law relating to the General Sessions Courts and the
rules of the courts apply to the Small Claims Division of the court
as far as they may be applicable, and are not in conflict with this
act. In case of conflict, the provisions of this act control.
Section 23. Severability clause.
The provisions of this act are hereby declared to be severable. If any
of its sections, provisions, clauses or parts, or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance be held unconstitutional or void, then
the remainder of this act shall continue in full force and effect, it
being the legislative intent now hereby declared, that this act would
have been adopted even if such unconstitutional or void matter had
not been included therein.
Section 24. Construction.
This act, being necessary for the welfare of the state and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes as
set forth in section 2.
Paul C. Deemer III, Special Projects Editor
Robert H. Brownlee
Charles Larry Lewis
Gregory J. Moonie
William H. Pickering
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APPENDIX A
GENERAL SESSIONS COURT DOCKET SURVEY,
BEDFORD AND DAVIDSON COUNTIES397
TABLE 1

Type of Plaintiff
Bedford County
Type
Individuals
Finance Companies
Banks
Government Agencies
Hospitals
Other Businesses
Total

No. of Suits
10
20
3
10
9
14
66

Davidson County

%

No. of Suits

15.2
30.3
4.5
15.2
13.6
21.2
100.0

100
55
32
124
57
259
637

15.7
8.6
5.0
19.5
9.0
40.7
100.0

TABLE 2

Type of Defendant
Type

Individuals
Businesses
Total

Bedford Couiaty
No. of Suits
%
66
0
66

100.0
0.0
100.0

Davidson County
%
No. of Suits
95.4
4.6
100.0

397. In Bedford County, the survey includes all cases that were set for trial during the
month of September 1974, totalling 66 suits. In Davidson County, the survey includes all
cases set for trial from Tuesday, September 24, 1974, through Monday, September 30, 1974,
for a total of 637 suits. The survey covers only civil cases and does not include the criminal
cases brought in general sessions.
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TABLE 3

Amount of Claim
Amount

Bedford County

No. of Suits
$100 or less
$100-$250
$250-$500
Over $500
Indeterminable" 8

Davidson County

%

No. of Suits

34.8
10.6
18.2
33.3
3.0

136
209
90
124
78

21.4
32.8
14.1
19.5
12.2

TABLE 4

Disposition of Cases
Disposition

Bedford County

%

No. of Cases

98.5
1.5
-

462
12
23
65

No. of Cases
Judgment for Plaintiff
Judgment for Defendant
Agreed Judgment
Nonsuit
Continued or No
Disposition Given
Appealed39"

Davidson County

-

3.0

58
17

398. The "indeterminable" category includes detainer cases which sought only possession of property. The figure for Davidson County also includes cases in which the warrants
did not state the amount sought and cases for which the warrants were unavailable.
399. For Bedford County, the initial disposition of appealed cases is included in this
table. In Davidson County, the disposition in general sessions for cases that were appealed
was unavailable.
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TABLE 5

Default Judgments (Davidson County)"'
Date

No. of Cases No. of Default
% of
Set for Trial Judgments
Defaults

Tuesday, September 24, 1974
Wednesday, September 25, 1974
Thursday, September 26, 1974
Friday, September 27, 1974
Monday, September 30, 1974

136
79
250
57
115

94
50
202
28
64

69.1
63.3
80.8
49.1
55.7

Total Week

637

438

68.8

TABLE 6
40
Litigants with Attorneys of Record '
(Davidson County)

No. of Suits Docketed
Litigant
Plaintiff
Defendant

Listing Attorney
614
16

96.4
2.5

400. The number of defaults was not available from the docket in Bedford County. But
see note 170 supra.
401. Figures were not available from Bedford County. These statistics, particularly
concerning defendants, are unreliable for Davidson County. See note 162 supra.
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APPENDIX B
SMALL CLAIMS COURT INFORMATIONAL
PAMPHLET
The following is a suggested text for an informational
pamphlet on the Tennessee small claims court. Copies of information pamphlets should be readily available in courthouses, police departments, and post offices throughout the
state. Combined with publicity in the news media, this pamphlet can serve to-educate the citizens of the State of Tennessee about the existence and operation of the small claims
courts. Hopefully, this publicity will encourage citizens to utilize the small claims court as plaintiffs, and may be a significant means of reducing the high rate of default that has existed in general sessions courts in the past by encouraging
defendants to appear in court.
The information should be printed in booklet form. Examples of other small claims pamphlets that may be of use
include the California and New York booklets, both available
upon request from the Department of Consumer Affairs of
those states.

HOW TO SUE AND HOW TO DEFEND IN SMALL
CLAIMS COURT AND HOW TO COLLECT A
JUDGMENT
If you have been cheated, or if a person or business owes
you money, you can sue in small claims court. You cannot use
a lawyer; the procedure is very simple so that you can represent yourself. This informational pamphlet tells you how to do
it.
Remember that the Tennessee small claims court is a tool
designed for your use. It can help you, but only if you take an
active interest in your case and are willing to take the time to
find out extra information when needed.
Important Note!! The rules of the small claims court
allow any person to sue only 3 times at most in any one
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week, or 25 times in one year. This is to prevent misuse
of the court. If you sue more times than the limit allows, you will automatically lose those suits over the
limit. Please observe this rule-it is very important.

You can sue in small claims court if:
-Someone owes money to you and won't pay;
-You worked for someone but have not received the full
amount of pay agreed;
-You have paid someone to perform some work or repair
something and he has not done it;
-You have purchased something from a business but it
breaks down and the business refuses to replace it;
-Someone has carelessly damaged something you own
and refuses to fix or pay for the loss or damage;
-You leave property of some kind to be repaired or
cleaned at a business and the business loses your belongings
or returns them damaged but refuses to pay for its mistake;
-You have paid a security deposit on an apartment and
have not damaged the apartment in any way but the landlord
refuses to return your deposit.
IF YOU WANT TO SUE IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT, GO
TO THE NEXT PAGE. IF YOU ARE BEING SUED IN
SMALL CLAIMS COURT, GO TO PAGE 802

Remember that small claims court is a people's
court-the rules are simple. If you sue someone, no lawyer will
come in to argue against you; lawyers are not allowed to represent people in small claims court. This rule makes it inexpensive to sue and defend, and helps you use the courts to stand
up for your rights.
WHAT IS A SMALL CLAIMS COURT?
It is a court in each county or city in Tennessee that is
designed to handle claims of two hundred fifty dollars ($250)
or less, quickly and easily without the use of a lawyer.
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The small claims court can also order people to do certain
things, such as repairing something as they promised. These
are called "equitable claims."
Anyone over eighteen (18) years of age, who has a claim
for money of $250 or less, or who has an equitable claim of a
value of $250 or less may use the small claims courts.
You may find the local small claims court by checking in
the White Pages of the Telephone Directory under "County
Court-General Sessions, Small Claims Division." (if you live
in a major city, you may have to look under municipal courts
of the city, or metropolitan courts if in Davidson County), or
look at the last page of this pamphlet, where the addresses of
the small claims courts for each county are listed.

HOW TO START A SUIT IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT
If you believe you have a claim against someone for $250
or less, simply go to the office of the general sessions clerk
(who is also the small claims court clerk) and tell the clerk
that you wish to file a small claim. The clerk will explain how
to fill out the necessary forms and papers that simply give the
court enough information to notify the defendant (the person
you are suing), so that your suit can proceed.
At this time you will be charged a filing fee of $5.00, which
includes the cost of sending a copy of your claim to the defendant by registered mail (this is called service of process).
Because registered mail is not forwarded by the post office, if
the defendant has moved it will be necessary to deliver a copy
of your claim to the defendant in person. This will be done by
the sheriff's office.
Be sure to have the correct name and address of the
defendant when you go to file your claim-if the defendant is a business or a corporation, go to the county
clerk's office in the courthouse and ask the employees
to help you find the company's correct legal name so
that your suit will not be delayed.
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WHAT HAPPENS AFTER YOU FILE A CLAIM
The clerk will give you a notice with the time and date of
the hearing and the DOCKET NUMBER-remember these
and always refer to the docket number if you call the clerk
about your case. The clerk will probably tell you what you
need to bring to court the day of your case. You should bring
all the bills, receipts, or other papers that support your claim.
Write down the details of the facts or events to help you present your side at the hearing. Tell the whole story, but give only
the necessary facts; making your story long for no reason will
not help. The day before the trial, call the clerk to be sure that
the defendant received his copy of your claim.
Be sure to appear in court at the proper time to present
your case-if you do not, the defendant may present
his side and convince the court that you should not
win.
WITNESSES IN THE SMALL CLAIMS HEARING
You are allowed to bring witnesses to your small claims
hearing. A witness is anyone who has firsthand knowledge
about your claim. For example, someone you told about your
claim is not a witness, but someone who went with you when
you bought a defective product or who saw the product break
is a witness.
If an important witness in your favor does not want to go
to your hearing for some reason, you can have the small claims
court order him to come by having the clerk issue a subpoena,
which is a legal form requiring a person to appear as a witness
in a trial. To do this, contact the small claims clerk and he
will explain the details of the procedure to you and take the
necessary information.
THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT TRIAL
At the trial both sides will tell their side of the story. The
judge will listen and ask questions. After hearing all the evidence, the judge will tell you who he thinks is right and who
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wins. In most cases the judge will explain his decision. If you
win, try to get the other person to pay immediately.

HOW TO COLLECT A SMALL CLAIMS JUDGMENT
If you win a small claims case, you have a legal right to
have the court make the person pay you. This process, called
execution on a judgment, is complicated and often slow, so
when possible try to arrange payment through personal contact with the person who owes you.
If your judgment is against a business that refuses to pay,
contact the Better Business Bureau and Local Chamber of
Commerce and file a complaint. In addition, in many communities there are consumer protection bureaus that may help
you.
If your judgment is against an individual who owns property, or against a corporation, you may be able to file an attachment-this is a legal order that directs the sheriff to take
some of the debtor's (the party who owes you money) assets
and sell them to satisfy your clait. If your judgment is against
an individual who is employed, you may be able to get a writ
of garnishment-this is a legal order directing the debtor's
employer to hold back some of the debtor's wages on payday
until the claim is satisfied. There are many legal rules about
these forms of execution, and the clerk can explain them to
you if it is necessary for you to file one of these forms. There
will be an additional fee for court-ordered execution also. The
clerk will help you fill out any necessary papers and explain
and answer any questions you have.

WHAT TO DO IF YOU ARE SUED IN SMALL CLAIMS
COURT
If you receive a notice by registered mail that says that
there is a claim against you, and it is sent from the small
claims court, you are being sued. This notice will tell you the
plaintiff's name (the person who is suing), the type of claim
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filed against you and for how much, and the time and date of
the hearing.
First, make sure you remember the time and date of the
hearing and the location of the court. If for a good reason you
cannot be at the hearing, call the small claims court immediately and a new date will be set. If you do not appear, the
judge might decide against you and order you to pay.
Do not worry about having to pay an attorney to help
advise or defend you; attorneys are not allowed in small claims
court-the procedures are simple enough that you can defend
yourself.
If you agree that you owe the money for which you are
being sued, you may agree to pay before the court hearing to
end the problem. If you don't have enough money to pay the
full amount but agree that you do owe it, you should write
down how much you can afford to pay each week and give this
to the judge at the hearing. He can set up a monthly payment
schedule instead of ordering you to pay the full amount at
once.
If you don't owe anything or for some reason you don't
believe that the claim is valid, you should go to court on the
day of the trial and bring with you any proof you have that
the claim does not exist. This proof may include papers, bills,
receipts, account books, and witnesses. Take the time to go to
court and defend yourself-as stated above, if you can't make
the trial date, contact the court to have a different time set
for your trial. The small claims court procedures have been
developed to help you defend yourself and to reduce the number of default judgments (a judgment entered against a defendant who does not appear).

Set forth the addressesand phone numbers of each county
small claims court and the names of the clerks on a separate page of the pamphlet.
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Remember-the small claims court is developed to
help you, so if you have a claim, use the court. If you
are sued, defend yourself. The Judge will be fair and
the procedure is informal. Tell your friends about the
court, and encourage them to pick up one of these pamphlets from the local courthouse, police department, or
post office.

